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ABSTRACT 
Most power market structures have been developed and implemented without 
being tested, causing major problems such as shortages and blackouts. The 
main cause for these problems is the inability of some markets to provide 
adequate stimulus for new generation investments. The installed generation 
capacity goes through boom and bust cycles, exposing consumers to potential 
shortages during long bust periods.  
With the realisation that the power market has a strong interaction with 
generation investment, a System Dynamics (SD) model is developed to study 
how the market interacts with generation expansion. The SD model also 
allows for market structures and policies to be evaluated before being 
implemented. It can be an important tool in ensuring that generation expansion 
is done optimally without the expense of energy security. 
New Zealand’s generation capacity is no exception to the boom and bust trend. 
Since the commencement of the New Zealand Energy Market (NZEM) in 
October 1996, energy shortages occurred in the winters of 2001, 2003 and 
2008. As a case study, an SD model is developed to study the NZEM. The 
results show that under some forecasted scenarios, New Zealand is susceptible 
to future energy shortages due to boom and bust cycles in the generation 
capacity.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis commences with the background information and objectives for 
this research. The second section of this chapter describes the thesis layout. 
1.1 General background  
The electricity supply industry (ESI) in each country is unique due to its 
history, geography, natural resources, economics and politics. Power system 
technologies, international commodities, have been significantly improved 
over time. Prior to the ESI restructuring, most developed countries reached a 
reliability of having nearly zero supply interruption. Engineering tools and 
programs were developed and proved useful in ensuring the technical 
reliability of the system. 
Many developed countries have restructured their ESI to become market 
driven rather than centrally planned and regulated. Restructuring of a country’s 
ESI is a very complex exercise based on national energy strategies and 
policies, macroeconomic developments and available natural resources, and 
hence its application has varied from country to country. There is no single 
solution applicable to all countries and there is a broad range of diverse trends 
(Lai 2001).  
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However, the restructuring changed the system’s behaviour and called for 
some changes in the way the system was planned and operated. Blackouts and 
shortages were observed in some countries, highlighting the need for better 
understanding of the evolved system. Even though generally the utilities’ 
physical structure (power stations, transmission and distribution network, etc.) 
remained unchanged with market deregulation, the ESI began to be operated 
and managed differently in order to maximise profit. As a result, in order to 
maintain the system’s reliability, the concerns were no longer on technical 
considerations alone, but on market components as well.   
Under the market mechanism, the wholesale market price plays an important 
role in infrastructure development. The market becomes an indicator in 
determining whether a new generation investment is required. A consistently 
high wholesale market price indicates a small difference in electricity supply 
and demand, signalling the need for new generation capacity to meet the 
demand. The high prices encourage investors to build new power plants to 
provide the required energy to consumers. When new generation capacity is 
commissioned, the wholesale market price becomes lower to reflect the supply 
adequacy or surplus in meeting the load demand.  
One of the difficulties faced by the restructured ESI is to deliver the correct 
level of generation capacity. Generally, when an ESI is restructured into a 
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competitive market model, a decline in generation capacity is observed 
because investors wait for the suitable time they perceive would give them 
most profits. The suitable time is generally when the margin between supply 
and demand is small enough to require an increase in supply. This is signalled 
by a high electricity price which offers investors a high return on their 
investment. Depending on load growth and power plants decommissioning, 
the interval to reach a suitable time for investment is uncertain. Given a long 
lead time for power plant development, there is also no certainty that investors 
will react to the market signal for new investments in time to meet the 
demand. The decline in the generation capacity is known as a bust period. 
Electricity shortages have been observed in several countries during their ESI 
bust periods. 
A bust period is usually followed by a boom period because when the margin 
between supply and demand is small and the electricity price becomes high, 
several investors will decide that it is a suitable time for them to invest, and as 
a result, several power plants are built. The absence of coordination among 
investors can result in surpluses of supply during boom periods. Investments 
usually cease after the boom period until the margin between supply and 
demand narrows again and another suitable time for investment arrives. The 
wait for another suitable investment time can lead to another bust period. This 
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alternating pattern of boom and bust periods are known as the boom and bust 
cycles. It has been observed in many commodity markets and with the 
restructuring of the ESI into a competitive market, the trend can be observed in 
the ESI as well.  
The observation of boom and bust periods in the ESI indicates that the 
relationship and interaction between the market price and generation 
investment is important and should not be ignored in studying generation 
expansion. Hence, it is useful to have a model that can analyse these 
interacting components of the ESI. System Dynamics (SD) modelling has been 
proven to be a useful tool of studying the interactions of multidisciplinary 
factors (Forrester 1961). SD is a type of behavioural simulation model. It is a 
descriptive modelling method based on explicit recognition of feedback and 
time lags (Forrester 1961; Sterman 2000). Rather than model the electricity 
supply and demand using the concept of cause and effect, SD captures a more 
realistic dynamic relationship between them by incorporating feedbacks.   
1.2 Research objectives 
New Zealand’s ESI was restructured in the late 1980s. Since then, electricity 
supply shortages have occurred in the winters of 2001, 2003 and 2008. It was 
suspected that these shortages were due to boom and bust cycles of generation 
capacities. To analyse these issues further, this research developed an SD 
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model to study the electricity market and generation expansion in New 
Zealand. It was anticipated that the research would be able to use the model to 
answer the following questions: 
i. Will capacity cycles continue to occur in New Zealand’s ESI under the 
current NZEM structure? 
ii. Will the capacity cycles cause any energy shortages? 
iii. Will the capacity cycles cause any supply security constraints1? 
iv. What are the important factors that influence the capacity cycles and 
how do they impact energy and supply security? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, the SD model was used to simulate 
five different possible future market development scenarios that have been 
developed by the Ministry of Economic Development of New Zealand. The 
forecasted generation capacity results from the SD model were then compared 
with the results from the Generation Expansion Model (GEM). GEM is a 
model that has been developed by the Electricity Commission (EC) of New 
Zealand. Their results were published in the Statement of Opportunities 2008 
(SOO2008).   
The SD model was then extended further to investigate if any electricity 
shortages will occur in the future. A new parameter known as “Energy 
Capacity Margin (ECM) has been introduced and is used as a measure for 
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energy adequacy. Electricity supply security constraints are also evaluated by 
calculating Capacity Margins (CM) from the forecasted generation capacities.  
Sensitivity analyses were done using the SD model to study the impacts of 
several factors on generation expansion and energy security.  
1.3 Thesis Objective and Layout  
The main objective of the thesis is to present and discuss the results of this 
study. Initially, it provides some background on ESI structures prior to and 
after restructuring. It then highlights the issues that are addressed by the 
research. It also provides the theoretical background that is required in forming 
the SD model. The model development and verification is then described in 
detail. The model simulation results are presented and explained. The research 
conclusions are then discussed.   
The layout of the thesis is done as follows: 
 Chapter 2 - Restructuring of the Electricity Supply Industry 
This chapter starts off with providing some background on ESI restructuring. 
It discusses the motivations and advantages behind the structures. The 
wholesale competition model structures are then elaborated in detail. Some 
restructuring trends from different countries are briefly examined. Problems 
resulted from the ESI restructuring are then discussed.  


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
 Chapter 3 – Power Generation Expansion Planning Methods 
This chapter provides a discussion on generation expansion planning before 
and after the ESI restructuring. It then elaborates on the market interaction 
with generation investment. It also highlights the problems faced in some 
countries in maintaining the correct level of generation capacity to meet the 
demand.  
 Chapter 4 – Research Method: System Dynamics 
This chapter elaborates on the chosen research method, System Dynamics 
(SD). It briefly discusses other methods that have been used to study electricity 
market interaction with generation investment. It also includes past work 
which utilised SD to study various aspects of the ESI. 
 Chapter 5 – Electricity Supply Industry in New Zealand 
This chapter provides a brief history of the ESI in NZ with emphasis on the 
restructuring period. The market structure is then described in detail. The past 
trends of generation capacity and electricity consumptions are illustrated and 
discussed. The final section discusses electricity planning and energy planning 
in New Zealand. 


"

 Chapter 6 - SD Model Development for Generation Expansion in New 
Zealand 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the SD model that has been 
developed to study the generation expansion in New Zealand. It then explains 
how the model was validated using historical data. 
 Chapter 7 – Simulation Inputs and Assumptions 
This chapter describes the inputs and assumptions that were used to run the SD 
model to analyse the five different future market development scenarios.  
 Chapter 8 -  Results Comparisons and Discussions 
This chapter compares the generation capacity results from both the SD model 
and the GEM model for five different future market development scenarios. 
The SD model also evaluates whether the resultant capacities will cause 
electricity shortages and security constraints. The evaluation results are 
discussed in this chapter.  
 Chapter 9 –Sensitivity Analyses on the SD Model 
The chapter discusses the results of the sensitivity analyses done on the SD 
model.  


#

 Chapter 10 –Conclusions and Further Work  
This chapter relates the results from this study back to its research objectives 
and discusses the findings. Conclusions and recommendations are provided. It 
also suggests some potential future work that can be done by others who wish 
to follow up on this study. 
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2 RESTRUCTURING OF THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
The electricity supply industry (ESI) has for a greater part of the 20th 
century, been considered to be a natural monopoly, with vertically 
integrated state-owned enterprises or private monopolies subject to public 
regulation operating all the segments of the industry. The seed for the 
liberalization of the industry was sown in the 1980s with the introduction 
of competitive markets in the generation of electricity by the entry of 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The industry restructuring has since 
then progressed to include electricity transmission and distribution and the 
creation of an electricity market (Sabai 2001). The restructuring causes 
massive changes in the way the ESI operates. From being heavily 
regulated, the industry became competitive and market driven and even 
left to self regulate in some countries. This chapter provides descriptions of 
traditional and restructured ESI and highlights the differences between 
them. The chapter describes the restructuring processes and provides 
trends from several countries. It concludes with some discussions on 
problems faced in the restructured markets.  
2.1 Regulated ESI  
2.1.1 Description and motivations 
In most countries, electricity started off with private installations for 
industrial purposes. For example, the first recorded use of electricity in 
 
 
11 
 
New Zealand was in 1861 for a private telegraph line between Dunedin 
and Port Chalmers (Martin 1998). Later in the mid 20
th
 century, as 
electricity usage became more widespread, electricity quickly turned into a 
necessity and became an important fuel for economic growth. As a result, 
in most countries, governments took over the ownership and operation of 
the ESI. At that time, large centralized power plants were the most efficient 
and least expensive method of producing electricity and delivering it to 
consumers. These plants took years to build and operated for 30 years or 
more. The need for long term planning was a major reason for government 
intervention and coordination in many countries. It was believed then that 
governments were best able to mobilize the large amounts of capital 
necessary to develop the sector and bear the long time horizons for the 
recovery of costs. Hence, most countries relied upon the government to 
finance, construct, own and operate the industry until the 1980s 
(Hämäläinen, Mäntysaari et al. 2000; Beder 2003).  
The ESI was also vertically integrated where all the components of the 
industry from electricity generation to electricity distribution are owned 
and operated by the same entity, the government or private monopolies 
(e.g. in the U.S.). Hunt and Shuttleworth 1996 described the traditional 
monopoly model shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Monopoly model structure (Sabai 2001) 
 
The monopoly model is characterized by the fact that all segments of the 
industry operates as a monopoly and therefore are not subject to 
competition. While monopoly does not necessarily mean vertical 
integration, the traditional monopoly model is typically categorized by a 
vertically integrated system where the utility owns and controls all the 
segments of generation, transmission, distribution and retail in an area of 
franchise. In some countries, the distribution segment is operated by 
separate entities (distribution companies (DistCos) that are given franchise 
rights for distribution while purchasing their entire electricity, shown on 
the right of  Figure 2.1 (Sabai 2001). England, Wales and New Zealand 
had this structure prior to restructuring in the 1990s. All transactions are 
done internally within the monopoly company. Vertical integration of the 
ESI was prompted by the factors shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Factors encouraging vertical integration of the ESI 
Factors Details 
Economies of scale
1
 
(Frank and Bernanke 
2004; Sioshansi 2006) 
Electricity is cheaper when supplied by large power 
plants rather than by small ones 
Economies of scope
2
 
(Teece 1980; Sabai 
2001; Frank and 
Bernanke 2004) 
Similarities within the industry segments result in 
economies of scope, e.g. system requirements such as 
electrical protection and instrumentation are  applicable 
to all transmission, distribution and generation 
segments 
High transaction costs 
(Sabai 2001) 
Coordinating the operation of separate segments can be 
expensive if they involve different players, due to the 
costs of negotiating, executing and litigating the 
required contracts 
Technical coordination Electricity cannot be stored and supply has to match the 
demand plus losses at all times. Electricity dispatch is 
easier if the flow from the generator to the consumers is 
done by one party 
Investment incentive 
(Sabai 2001) 
With high capital investments in the ESI, the monopoly 
right to operate the entire vertical segments of the 
industry became the motivation for investors to invest 
and recoup their investment by every possible means. 
This was the case in the U.S. where the investors were 
not the government but private companies. 
 
However, as technology progresses, some of these factors are over ridden 
by other motivations that bring about ESI restructuring. 
2.1.2 Perceived Deficiencies of the Regulated ESI 
The most common argument for restructuring is the inefficiency of 
regulation. Ideally, consumers would like a reliable and dependable 
electricity supply at a minimum price. In a truly competitive market, 
suppliers can offer lower prices by:  
                                                 
1 In microeconomics, the term ‘economies of scale’ refers to the reductions in cost when the size of the 
facility and its outputs are bigger  
2 In microeconomics, the term ‘economies of scope’ refers to the reductions in cost when the common 
and recurrent use of proprietary knowhow is used to produce two or more products  
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(i) holding the price down to the marginal cost or/and   
(ii) minimize cost  
On the other hand, a regulator can do the former or the latter but not both. 
It has to make a trade-off since the suppliers always know the market better 
than regulators. Tariffs are in most cases set by ensuring a fair return on 
investments (by rate-of-return price setting or cost-plus) made by the utility 
companies, which provide no incentives for making good investments 
(Stoft 2002). This is a great concern to consumers as bad investments are 
also compensated for (Sabai 2001). 
Regulators also tend to err in the direction of driving prices down toward 
cost. However, generation costs vary constantly, whereas it is difficult to 
readjust the consumer rates too often. This results in regulatory lags that do 
not provide accurate incentives for suppliers to reduce their prices (Stoft 
2002). While regulatory institutions are responsible for ensuring prudent 
investments, and operation and services are up to reasonable standards, it is 
often difficult for the regulators to keep a close eye on all aspects of the 
utility without employing a large number of engineers and economists. 
This factor is aggravated by the fact that regulatory institutions are often 
managed by civil servants who are not totally conversant with the 
technicalities of the very industry they are regulating (Sabai 2001).  
In addition, these companies are inherently large in size and are 
consequently slow in adopting innovation and changes in technology. 
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Bureaucracy within large organizations like the utilities makes the situation 
worse. Also, lack of competition may result in a lack of quality in customer 
service. Argentina’s experience where electricity prices have been reduced 
by 40% merely by introducing competition into the sector is evidence that 
the regulated monopoly status of the industry can hide within it a 
considerable degree of inefficiency (Sabai 2001). 
However, restructuring is not equivalent to perfect competition (Stoft 
2002) and has its own inefficiencies and disadvantages as well. The next 
section discusses the factors that pushed for the restructuring of the ESI. 
2.2 Factors for ESI restructuring 
In the past, the factors summarised in Table 2.2 have been used to push for 
restructuring in many countries.  
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Table 2.2: Factors encouraging restructuring of the ESI 
Factors Details 
Cash 
generation for 
governments 
Governments can generate a significant amount of cash by 
disposing of their stake in the ESI. As the capitals involved are 
large, the motivation to sell these assets is high, particularly for 
countries that are facing financial difficulties due to a stagnant or 
slow economy (Sabai 2001). 
Depoliticizing 
the industry 
The industry can function more efficiently when political interests 
are separated from economic interests. Private companies can make 
investment decisions solely based on economic grounds rather than 
to appease the political masters (Sabai 2001). 
Putting an end 
to using the 
utilities to 
finance social 
objectives 
The removal of the practice of taxation by regulation, cross-
subsidization of tariffs, and subsidizing specific technologies could 
ensure that utilities operate more efficiently (Sabai 2001). 
New 
technology 
New technologies lower costs, providing affordability to private 
firms. Gas-turbine technology has lowered the cost of power plant 
construction significantly and reduced the construction period to 
between 12 to 18 months from the 4 to 7 years needed for 
conventional type plant (Sabai 2001). Other enabling technology 
are the information technology and internet applications that allow 
for power system monitoring and trading (Lai 2001). The case for 
competition is further strengthened by the fact that innovation in 
technology is best motivated by an environment of intense 
competition (Sabai 2001). 
Availability of 
Private Capital 
The emergence of capital and bond markets as an alternative source 
of funds, combined with the removal of barriers for capital flows 
between countries, have made it possible for private enterprises to 
undertake large scale projects in the infrastructure industries (Sabai 
2001). 
Free Market 
Economies 
As nations move from centrally planned economies to free market 
economies, the role of governments is increasingly viewed as a 
facilitator of business rather than being involved in any form of 
business. Globalization and the move to encourage and impose free 
trade between nations through World Trade Order (WTO) 
agreements and trade agreements between nations has induced 
pressure on governments including developing countries to 
privatize and liberalize the network utilities industry (Sabai 2001; 
Beder 2003). 
Public 
perception 
The sentiment that pushes for restructuring is that public service 
obligations are no longer necessary (Lai 2001).  
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2.3 Descriptions of ESI restructuring  
Restructuring of the ESI is one of the most important global energy developments of the last 
century (Hämäläinen, Mäntysaari et al. 2000). Before elaborating on the details, the following 
commonly used terminologies are defined (Sioshansi 2006): 
Table 2.3:Terms used to describe ESI restructuring 
Terms Definition 
Restructuring Attempts to reorganize the roles of the market players, the 
regulators and/or redefine the regulations in the ESI, but not 
necessarily to “deregulate” the market 
Liberalisation Attempts to introduce competition in some or all segments of the 
market and remove barriers to trade and exchange 
Privatisation Selling of government owned assets to the private sector 
Corporatisation Attempts to make state owned enterprises (SOEs) look, act and 
behave as if they were for profit, private entities. In this case, an 
SOE can be made into a corporatisation with the government 
treasury as the single shareholder 
 
The European Union refers to its restructuring efforts using the term “liberalisation”. Market 
liberalisation can be done without privatisation, such as is done in Norway and New South 
Wales, Australia. In New Zealand, the generation was initially corporatized to form ECNZ. 
Part of the asset was then privatised to form Contact Energy. The remainder of the Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) was then “liberalised” further to form three separate state 
owned enterprises (SOEs). They vigorously compete with one another while all belong to the 
same single shareholder, namely the government of New Zealand. The restructuring of New 
Zealand’s ESI is further elaborated on in Chapter 5.   
The term “deregulation” is essentially a misnomer. No electricity market has been fully 
deregulated. Experience suggests that even well functioning competitive markets need a 
regulator, or at a minimum a market monitoring and anti-cartel authority. Germany and New 
Zealand
3
 attempted to do without a regulator until recently. Restructuring’ in the United States 
                                                 
3 The introduction of a regulator in the New Zealand’s ESI is discussed in Chapter 5.   
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is sometimes referred to as “re-regulation” because the resulting competitive markets have 
more federal regulations than the regulated markets they replaced (Borenstein and Bushnell 
2000).  
ESI restructuring often involves ‘unbundling’ – disaggregating an electric utility service into its 
basic components and offering each component separately for sale with separate rates for each 
component. It also involves the separation of ownership and operation (Lai 2001). For the ESI, 
the industry is unbundled into the three main sectors of generation, transmission and 
distribution as shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2: The unbundling of the ESI (Lai 2001) 
   
Generally, when a country decides to privatise their ESI, the first sector that is sold off is the 
generation. The generation companies sell their energy to either a single purchaser or a 
wholesale market to be further dispatched through the transmission and distribution network. 
The transmission and distribution of electricity are done by companies owning the various lines 
whereby their services are paid by their respective customers. Line services in the transmission 
and distribution networks are still widely considered as natural monopolies
4
. Hence, usually 
there is only one line provider within a specified geographic region. 
                                                 
4 Natural monopoly is a situation where one firm can produce a given level of output at a lower total cost than can any combination 
of multiple firms. It occurs in industries that exhibit decreasing average long run costs due to their size (i.e. economy of scale).  
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Other components which are important in maintaining the security and reliability of a 
restructured ESI are the system operator and the ancillary services such as frequency keeping, 
various types of reserves and black – start services (Stoft 2002). System operation can be done 
by the transmission company, as is done in New Zealand. Ancillary services are generally 
offered by generation companies which have the required capabilities
5
 to the system operator, 
at certain charges.  
Besides the three main sectors, most fully deregulated countries perform the sale of electricity 
via a competitive retail market where the customers can choose their electricity suppliers. 
Retailers purchase the electricity from generation companies in a wholesale market and sell it 
to the consumers.  
2.4 General ESI structures and their evolution 
In their book “Competition and Choice in Electricity”, Hunt and Shuttleworth 1996 formulated 
that the restructured ESI market could take one of three possible generic forms. Although in 
practice there may be numerous variations to these models, they believed that the major 
concept is captured within these three models. These models are the single purchaser, 
wholesale competition and retail competition models. The models are defined by their degree 
of competition and choice (Sabai 2001).  
2.4.1 Single purchaser model 
The single purchaser model is the second step in the movement from a traditional monopoly 
model to one that introduces competition. Competition is introduced in this model in the 
generation services only. Choice is conferred upon the single purchaser. The main concept of 
the model is that a single purchaser is assigned the power to purchase electricity from 
                                                 
5 The capabilities to provide the different required ancillary services depend on the types of power plants the generation companies 
own 
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competing generation companies to sell to the distributors (or directly to consumers if 
transmission and distribution remain integrated). Generating companies would compete to 
construct and operate power plants. The single purchaser undertakes its purchase by means of 
long-term contracts called Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). Figure 2.3 shows the structure 
of the model.  
 
Figure 2.3: Single purchaser model structure (Sabai 2001) 
 
The generator companies are referred to as Independent Power Producers (IPP) which may be 
created from existing utilities by divestiture or new entries who enter the market when new 
plant are required. The risk for the construction and operation of the plant lies with the IPPs, 
thus reducing the risk borne by the customers as is the case for the monopoly model. Since on 
average, roughly half of the cost of a kWh of electricity is associated with the construction and 
operating costs associated with power generation, this risk movement is of extreme importance 
to the industry and the consumers. The single purchaser model provides the opportunity for 
companies that are particularly good at construction and operation of power plants to expand 
their market and while doing so set a new standard for prudent practices upon which utilities’ 
investment will be evaluated. 
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The model is particularly appealing to countries where the state is unwilling to completely 
divest control and ownership of the industry for strategic reasons. It is possible in this model to 
allow the incumbent utility to continue to have a stake in the generation segment although this 
may lead to discriminatory practices by the single purchaser in favour of the utility if the single 
purchaser is a division of the incumbent utility (Sabai 2001).  
2.4.2 Wholesale competition model structure 
In the case of the wholesale competition model, the only difference it has from the single 
purchaser model is that there are multiple distribution companies exclusively serving smaller 
areas. Figure 2.4 shows the structure of the wholesale competition model. The essence of this 
model is that the privilege of choice has now moved to the distribution companies and large 
consumers.  
 
Figure 2.4: Wholesale competition model structure (Sabai 2001) 
 
In this model, all three segments of the industry must be totally separated. Wholesale 
competition requires sales of electricity from generation companies to distribution companies 
through the high voltage transmission network, owned and operated by the transmission 
provider. A neutral transmission provider is required to transport electricity from the generator 
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to distribution companies or to large consumers, a concept known as wholesale wheeling. 
Generation companies competitively bid to supply the distribution companies while the 
transmission provider charges the generator, the distribution companies or both for transport 
services. 
In the wholesale competition model, lines companies form the only non-competitive segment 
that remains. With the exception of large consumers, other consumers are subjected to the price 
charged by the lines companies. It is therefore common to find that the transmission and 
distribution segment remains highly regulated and remains subjected to rate-of-return pricing 
(Sabai 2001).  
The wholesale electricity market differs from other commodity markets because electricity 
cannot be stored and it is not possible to distinguish which generator produced the electricity 
consumed by a particular customer. Because of this feature, the wholesale electricity market 
uses the concept of a pool where all the electricity output from generators is centrally pooled 
and scheduled to meet the electricity demand. Furthermore, as it is impossible to guarantee that 
each generator can generate exactly the amount needed at the scheduled time to distribution 
companies’ demand (nor can the distribution companies guarantee that it can consume the 
amount provided), there is bound to be considerable imbalances in the actual trading that takes 
place from the contracted trading. There are two distinct trading arrangements that exist today 
to deal with wholesale electricity markets, i.e. the Power Pool model and the Multi-Market 
model.  
2.4.2.1 Power pool 
The power pool mechanism was introduced by the England and Wales electricity industry and 
is characterized by a central electricity pool where generation companies sell their power to, 
and where distribution companies buy their power from. In the power pool model, generation 
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companies bid to supply to the pool (grid) by spot market bidding only, which is conducted by 
the Market Operator (MO), typically one day in advance. Participation in the pool is mandatory 
for generation companies and distribution companies alike. The basic time unit for market 
clearing price and settlement is hourly or half-hourly slots, implying either 24 or 48 price 
sections per day. The system operator (SO) will dispatch generators according to a schedule 
based on the MO’s market clearing price (defined as the price at which supply equals demand-
all demand at or above this price has been satisfied, and all supply at or below this price has 
been purchased), and the generation companies will be paid the Pool Purchase Price (PPP). 
Generation companies can be paid in two ways (Stoft 2002; Evans and Meade 2005): 
(i) Through uniform pricing – All generation companies receive a single uniform price, 
representing the price where supply and demand coincide 
(ii) Through ‘pay as bid’ pricing – Each generator receives the prices that they bid for 
each unit of generation they offered to supply 
Centralised wholesale markets can be set up as voluntary or compulsory. Under voluntary 
arrangements, parties may also trade bilaterally through mutually agreed contracts. The 
distribution companies can and are normally encouraged to enter into long-term bilateral 
financial contracts with the generation companies to hedge the price risk for both parties. These 
bilateral financial contracts are done outside the pool. On the other hand, in a compulsory pool, 
all energy trading must be done through the pool (Evans and Meade 2005; Ministry of 
Economic Development New Zealand 2009). England and Wales, Argentina, Australia and 
Singapore have adopted the power pool model. 
2.4.2.2 Multi-Market mechanism 
An alternative to the power pool model is the decentralised power exchange. Under the 
exchange, generation companies and purchasers contract bilaterally for supply and to cover any 
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imbalances in supply and demand. Affected parties are required to pay the price differences via 
a balancing market, usually managed by the market operator (Stoft 2002; Evans and Meade 
2005).  
The Multi-Market mechanism (Nordic-style), which was first implemented in Norway and later 
adopted in New Zealand, California, and Spain, is more complex than the pool model. For one, 
it is not mandatory (it is also often referred to as a voluntary pool system) for generation 
companies and distribution companies to participate in a central electricity pool. Generation 
companies and distribution companies (also large consumers) enter into bilateral contracts and 
schedule their contracts through the MO. Generation companies dispatch their own generators 
based on their physical delivery contracts entered with the distribution companies by means of 
bilateral contracts. As its name suggests, there are multiple markets involved, which are the 
long-term physical trades, the day ahead, hour ahead balancing and real-time. The trading of 
most electricity is achieved by means of long-term trade-able contracts while spot markets exist 
to provide a degree of flexibility at the margin for an addition or reduction in power anticipated 
one day ahead. The balancing market provides settlement for the actual imbalances that occur 
from the contracted and the spot market trading.  
2.4.2.3 Pools versus exchanges 
There is no one simple solution in deciding a wholesale energy market structure for a country. 
To date, the designs of power markets are still plagued by controversies on which architecture 
is better. Even though the decentralised exchanges are simpler to organise, it is less efficient 
and reliable due to a lack of coordination. On the other hand, a pool is susceptible to gaming 
opportunities and can be biased and inefficient due to side payments. The complexity and non-
transparency of pools can also lead to design mistakes that are hard to discover and correct 
(Stoft 2002).  
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2.4.3 Retail competition model structure 
One of the difficulties faced with regulators in implementing the wholesale competition model 
is where to draw the boundary for a consumer to qualify as a large consumer and therefore have 
the ability to purchase power directly from a generator and not from a distribution company. 
Giving choice to all classes of consumers would prevent price discrimination by distribution 
companies against small captive consumers and provide consumers, as end users, the 
opportunity to negotiate their power purchase and obtain a better deal. It is also believed that if 
consumers as end users can purchase directly from the generation companies (normally through 
a retailer), this would open up the industry further towards competition and would ultimately 
result in lower prices to consumers. This is the rational for the retail competition model, which 
is shown in Figure 2.5. The essence of the retail competition model is that choice is now 
conferred to the end-user, i.e. the consumer. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Retail competition model structure 
 
In this model, the distribution company performs the same function as the transmission service 
provider that provides transport facilities, i.e. as a network company, and does not involve itself 
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with the retail function. This is known as retail wheeling, or transporting electricity from the 
transmission grid over the distribution grid into homes, factories, and businesses. It therefore 
means that the retail function, which is subjected to competition and is unregulated, is further 
unbundled from the distribution function which remains regulated. The retailer functions as an 
aggregator of electricity. It purchases electricity from generation companies at competitive 
prices and schedules the transport of electricity through the transmission and distribution 
networks to the consumers. Consumers will be charged separately for the various components, 
i.e. energy, the transmission service charge, the distribution network charges and finally the 
retailer’s commission for its services. Consumers now have the choice to switch retailers to get 
a better deal, which therefore introduces competition in the retailing segment, hence, the name 
“retail competition”. Retailers too could provide options for the consumers to select the 
generator of their choice. This model ensures that commercial, industrial and residential 
electricity consumers can successfully negotiate the lowest price directly with sellers or 
indirectly through retailers.  
2.5 Comparisons between the ESI structures 
Table 2.4 summarises the major attributes of the four reform models discussed in the previous 
sections, whereas the benefits and deficiencies of each model are listed in Table 2.5.  
Table 2.4: Summary of major attributes of ESI market models 
       Monopoly Single 
Purchaser 
Wholesale 
Competition 
Retail 
Competition 
Choice is conferred on: - Purchaser Retailer Consumers 
Market risk borne 
primarily by: 
Consumers Consumers Generation 
companies/ 
Consumers 
Generation 
companies/ 
Consumers 
Obligation to supply is 
with: 
Utility Purchaser Distribution 
companies 
- 
Hidden subsidies is: Easy Easy Difficult Difficult 
Transaction cost is: Low Low Higher Higher 
Incentives to lower cost 
is: 
Low Moderate High High 
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Table 2.5: Benefits and deficiencies of the reform models (Sabai 2001) 
Model Benefits Deficiencies 
Monopoly  Economies of scale 
 Easier to implement social 
development objectives 
 State has better control 
 Low transaction cost 
 Lower risk, therefore lower 
cost of capital 
 No incentives for better 
performance 
 Bad investments are compensated 
for 
 Poor accountability 
 Risk is carried by customers 
 Customers are not given any 
choice 
 Industry can be politicised  
Single 
Purchaser 
 Efficient construction and 
operation of power plant 
 Relatively low transaction cost 
 Low risk therefore lower cost 
of capital 
 Attractive to investors 
 Customers are not given any 
choice 
 Customers bear most of the risk 
 Policing the PPA is difficult 
 
Wholesale 
Competition 
 Efficient construction and 
operation of power plant 
 Competition may result in 
lower price to consumers 
 Generation is depoliticised 
 
 Higher transaction cost 
 Need for efficient IT and on line 
metering 
 Market power in generation may 
hurt consumers 
 
Retail 
Competition 
 Efficient construction and 
operation of power plant 
 Competition may result in 
lower price to consumers 
 Consumers have the ultimate 
choice of supplier 
 Industry is completely 
depoliticised 
 Higher transaction cost 
 Need for efficient IT and on line 
metering 
 Market power in generation may 
hurt consumers 
 
 
2.6 Reform process 
The ESI market reform is generally done in various stages in time and follows a sequence of 
phases.  The phases are summarised from (Sioshansi 2006) and are as follows: 
i. Phase 1: Acknowledgement of problems and/ or deficiencies associated with the 
existing system - Common perceived problems are like gross inefficiencies in the ESI 
operations or performance, poor system reliability, high prices and supply inadequacies. 
ii. Phase: A debate is made on what dysfunctional and how best to fix it – In most cases, 
new laws must be passed and the organisation of the ESI must be changed before a new 
market structure can be implemented. 
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iii. Phase 3: New market rules and institutions are implemented – In many cases, 
technically sound principles do not translate well in practice, resulting in problems and 
chaos. 
iv. Phase 4: On-going process, generally starts with the realisation that the introduction of 
the initial market reform initiatives did not necessarily or automatically lead to many of 
the expected benefits and outcomes – In nearly all cases, initial market reform has led to 
unforeseen and unintended consequences, which must be addressed in subsequent 
“reform of the reforms” (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger 2006). The process of modifying 
and adjusting the original reforms continues in most markets. 
 
2.7 Hybrid Markets 
There is general recognition that, in many parts of the world, electricity markets have evolved, 
or are evolving, into hybrid forms, where they are not completely unbundled, privatized, nor 
fully competitive. Text-book prescriptions of integrated markets with decentralized players are 
not necessarily the norm. In the U.S., for example, a relatively vibrant and competitive 
wholesale market has evolved despite the fact that most consumers continue to receive service 
under capped, regulated tariffs that do not reflect variations in hourly prices in the wholesale 
market.  
Hybrid markets fall into three basic varieties (Sioshansi 2006): 
(i) Markets that have been liberalized but are not fully privatized, as in some European 
markets or in Australia; 
(ii) Markets that are privatized but are not fully liberalized, in the sense that competition 
is restricted, and  
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(iii) Markets that, in theory, are privatized and behave competitively but the government 
or the regulator routinely intervenes in the decisions of the market players, e.g., 
regarding prices or investment. 
In some cases, the current hybrid status may be regarded as a mere transitory stage. In other 
markets, however, there does not appear to be even an intention and/or the means of moving 
towards a fully liberalized state. In these cases, policy makers must contend with a mixed bag 
of regulated, state-owned, and vertically integrated companies operating side by side with 
competitive, private, and unbundled companies on a distinctly uneven playing field. Some 
hybrid markets appear to be stuck in a no man’s land, no longer fully regulated nor fully 
competitive, where some segments remain state-owned while others are in private hands, where 
some decisions are made by regulatory fiat while others are left to private investors and 
markets. Scholars are divided on how serious a problem this may be. In some cases, such as 
Australia, competition among the players remains vibrant and the problems do not appear to be 
serious. 
However, two decades after the introduction of market reform, many previously unbundled 
companies have re-bundled, usually by combining generation with retail business. Moreover, 
there is empirical evidence to suggest that such combinations are efficient, can manage risks 
and price volatility better, and may be preferred by investors. Additionally, there is evidence, 
not universally accepted, that vertical integration – despite its obvious shortcomings – might 
have offered economies of scale after all. Faced with the new evidence, scholars are examining 
issues related to vertical integration, industry ownership, and organization. 
2.8 Global restructuring trends 
England and Wales embarked on a major privatization and liberalization scheme in 1989, 
which has been widely studied and copied  (Sioshansi 2006). The basic structure, with 
variations, has been repeated in a number of countries. Generally, pioneers of the power system 
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restructuring in different continents of the world embrace the idea of introducing competition in 
the wholesale supply and purchase of electricity combined with an open access regime for the 
use of electricity networks (Zhang 2010). The diversity of approaches can be seen in looking at 
some examples worldwide as discussed in the following sections.  
2.8.1 Great Britain 
The British market has gone through at least three distinct reform stages, from the original, 
central, mandatory pool in 1989 to the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) 
introduced in 2001, to the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
(BETTA), introduced in 2003 (Sioshansi 2006). The details on the pool and NETA market  
mechanisms are provided by Lai et al (Lai 2001) and Beder (Beder 2003).  
The reform commenced in 1989 with the breakup of the Central Electricity Generation Board 
(CEGB) into one transmission company, National Grid Company (NGC) and three generation 
companies - National Power, PowerGen, Nuclear Electric. The distribution networks were 
privatised into twelve regional electricity companies, with each being effectively a combination 
of a distribution company and a retail company. They compete independently to buy power 
from the generation companies through a mandatory power pool. The daily power pool 
commenced on 1 April 1990 (Sabai 2001) and was operated by NGC. The Pool was then 
replaced by NETA in 2001 which established a framework for bilateral trading and power 
exchanges. BETTA then commenced in 2005 to extend NETA to the regions of Scotland so 
that one single wholesale electricity market is for the whole of Great Britain (Zhang 2010).  
2.8.2 Nordic countries 
The ESI of the Nordic countries includes Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Norway was 
the first Nordic country introducing market competition in June 1990 (Lai 2001). The Swedish 
restructuring was decided in 1995 leading to the establishment of a common Norwegian-
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Swedish Exchange (Nord Pool). This electricity market completely opened to trade across 
national borders starting in 1996. Finland joined the common market in 1998 followed by West 
Denmark in 1999 and East Denmark in 2000. It is currently the only truly international market. 
It has one market operator (Nord Pool) and five system operators (Zhang 2010).  
2.8.3 Continental Europe 
The liberalisation in the EU has been a top down process driven by the directives of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. The directives lay down the general principles and 
conditions to assure the creation of a single Internal Electricity Market (IEM) in Europe. The 
first liberalisation was enforced in 1996 to unbundle activities in the ESI. IEM is divided into 
submarkets according to the control zones of the various transmission system operators (TSO). 
Most wholesale trade volume there is, trades bilaterally in forward and over the counter types 
of markets. Most consumption portfolios are covered by long term and forward contracts. A 
small fraction of the trade volume is traded in daily or even hourly contracts in the spot markets 
due to incomplete predictability of real time consumption. Although member states of the EU 
have similar electricity market architectures, these markets are weakly integrated across 
national borders. The association of European Transmission Operators (ETSO) was founded in 
1999 in response to the emergence of IEM. It was then integrated into a larger association in 
2009 and was called the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E). 
ENTSO-E pursues the cooperation of the European TSO and has an active and important role 
in the European rule setting process in compliance with EU legislation. To improve cross 
border exchanges, a compensation mechanism for cross border flows of electricity, the setting 
of guidelines and principles on cross border transmission charges and the allocation of available 
transmission capacities between national transmission systems were developed (Zhang 2010). 
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2.8.4 Australia 
The reform of the Australian ESI commenced in the early 1990s. Separate commercial 
structures have been developed for the monopoly transmission and distribution functions and 
the competitive generation and retailing functions of the industry. The major reform in the 
Australian ESI involved the establishment of the National Electricity Market (NEM) that 
operates in southern and eastern Australian regions. The NEM operates in the states of New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital 
Territory. The market operator for the NEM is the National Electricity Market Management 
Company (NEMMCO). It was established in 1996 to fulfil the roles of both market and system 
operator of the NEM. It is responsible for generator dispatch, reliability management and 
financial settlement in the NEM. The owners of the company are the five states and the territory 
within which the NEM operates. The NEM operates one of the world’s longest interconnected 
power systems. The NEM comprises a spot market with energy traded through a commodities 
type pool and a spot price set every 5 minutes by the most expensive generator selected to run. 
The interconnection constraints within the NEM regions can cause the marginal spot prices to 
separate (Zhang 2010).  
2.8.5 United States of America 
In the U.S., the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 launched a national effort to restructure the ESI to 
allow greater reliance on markets. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took 
the lead in 1996 by opening the access to the electric transmission grid via Order 888 (Beder 
2003). This triggered the formation of independent system operators (ISO) including the 
California ISO (CalISO), New York ISO (NYISO), ISO New England (ISO-NE), 
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM), Midwest ISO (MISO), Southwest Power Pool 
(SPP) and Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The ISOs have the responsibility of 
ensuring the reliabilities of their control areas and to post the information of the available 
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transfer capabilities of their major transmission paths on an Open Access Same-Time 
Information System (OASIS). Bilateral trades are then facilitated by submitting transmission 
requests to the control areas whose networks are used for the energy transactions.  
There was an intense debate regarding the bilateral model and the pool model of market design 
in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile a few ISOs that had a background of operating as power pools 
started creating voluntary spot markets. The uniform or zonal pricing approach was initially 
adopted in these markets, such as the 1997 PJM market and the 1999 ISO-NE market. FERC 
Order 2000 encouraged the formation of Regional Transmission Organisations (RTO) which 
had larger authorities and responsibilities than the ISOs to oversee a region to ensure proper 
market operations and system reliability. In 2000, California had its electricity crisis which 
demonstrated that power interruptions or blackouts can significantly impact the economy, and 
market design and reliability assurance are closely related issues and should not be addressed 
separately.  
At the same time, an alternate market model based on Location Marginal Pricing (LMP) and 
the concept of a multi settlement system with financial transmission rights as a financial 
instrument to hedge against transmission congestion risk, had emerged in North America. Since 
then, more RTOs/ISOs started to follow a similar market model and later enhanced their 
wholesale energy only markets with ancillary service markets. The deregulated ESI had 
recognised that system reliability is an integral part of a properly designed electricity market 
and ancillary services should be simultaneously co-optimised with energy (Zhang 2010). 
2.9 Problems with restructured markets 
While market reforms have addressed many of the shortcomings of the regulated or centrally 
planned era, they have introduced new problems (Sioshansi 2006). Currently, most if not all, 
ESI market designs are implemented without any explicit testing (Doorman and Botterud 
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2008). Untested market designs cause real world market failures
6
. Woo et al. (Woo, Lloyd et al. 
2003) analysed electricity market reforms in the UK, Norway, Alberta (Canada) and California 
(USA) and concluded that the introduction of a competitive generation market has failed to 
deliver a reliable service at low and stable prices. They attributed the failure to the following 
factors:   
 market power abuse by a few dominant sellers (especially at times of transmission 
congestion) 
 poor market design that invites strategic bidding by suppliers  
 the lack of consumer response to price spikes  
 capacity shortage caused by demand growth not matched by new capacity 
 thin trading of forward and futures contracts that are critical for price recovery and risk 
management 
Even though the theory of market supply and demand has long been established as one of the 
fundamental theories of economics, there are some unique characteristics with electricity that 
makes it difficult to completely liberalise the ESI with market forces. Some of these unique 
characteristics are (Stoft 2002): 
a) Electricity is consumed continuously by essentially all customers at all times 
b) Electric energy cannot be stored easily and economically 
These physical properties result in a product whose marginal cost of production and delivery 
cost fluctuates rapidly. Electricity demand is also inelastic, where the demand is not responsive 
to the change in prices. This forms a severe market flaw (Stoft 2002). The power system is also 
complex, where it extends over long distances and must have all its components synchronised. 
The voltage has to be maintained within a 5% limit at all locations to avoid system failure or 
blackout (Stoft 2002).  
                                                 
6 Market failure occurs when freely functioning markets fail to deliver an efficient allocation of resources 
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Another problem that happens in a deregulated market is market power
7
. Market players are 
quick to take advantage of market design flaws. One of the conditions for perfect competition is 
that the price of electricity is not determined by the amount generated by the generation 
companies. In other words, generation companies do not have market power and therefore 
cannot control the price. However, in reality, this assumption is invalid because most 
generation companies can exercise market power and control the price of electricity. For 
example, during peak electricity usage time when the difference between supply and demand is 
small, a generator can have extreme market power because it is the only one capable of meeting 
the demand. It can then set any price for its generated supply and this must be paid by the 
consumers. Market power has been a major impediment to price reduction in the England and 
Wales Pool and the Californian Pool in the past (Lai 2001). 
 
2.10 Chapter summary 
The deficiencies associated with the traditional monopoly structure of the ESI have led to the 
industry’s restructuring in the late 1980s. Globally, several market structures have emerged and 
the most liberal structure is the “Retail competition model” structure. However, the new 
structure does not come without any problem. Problems such as abuse of market power and 
supply shortages have caused many markets to be refined or redesigned. Despite considerable 
experience gained in the last two decades, a number of contentious market design and 
implementation issues still remain.  
 
                                                 
7 Market power refers to conditions where the providers of a service can consistently charge prices above those that would be 
established by a competitive market 
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3 POWER GENERATION EXPANSION PLANNING METHODS 
This chapter discusses generation expansion planning methods before and after ESI 
restructuring. After providing the important aspects of generation expansion planning, the 
different approaches taken before and after ESI restructuring are discussed.  
Generation expansion planning refers to the long term planning process to expand the 
generation capacity to keep up with the increasing demand. Under a regulated monopolistic 
environment, this was done by the relevant government department. However, after the ESI 
has been deregulated, the generation expansion planning lies on individual investors, driven 
by the profit incentives provided by the market.    
3.1 Fundamentals of generation expansion planning 
Power system planning and investment process consists of three main stages (Sullivan 
1977):  
a) the development of a load forecast  
b) the analysis of generation requirements (based on the load forecast) including 
reliability, sizes and timing of new investments and  
c) the use of power flow studies and reliability analysis to decide where and when 
transmission should be built or upgraded.  
Each of the stages is sequential, with the overall goal of the process to ensure reliability of 
supply at least cost (Newham 2008). 
The aim of generation planning is to seek the most economical generation expansion 
scheme achieving a certain reliability level according to the forecasted demand for a certain 
period of time. In any generation expansion planning, the following questions are to be 
answered (Wang and McDonald 1994):  
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a) When to invest in new generation units? 
b) Where to invest in new generation units? 
c) What type of generating units to install? 
d) What capacity of generating units to install? 
The investment timing is crucial in ensuring that the required generation capacity is 
available when needed. If investment is delayed, shortages can occur and if prolonged, may 
cause severe economic and social impacts. If investment is too soon, then the capital is 
stranded without the capacity being utilised.  
The plant location is influenced by the energy resource location and the transmission costs. 
Thermal plants need to take into account the transportation aspects in determining their 
location. For example, a coal plant might need to be near the sea with port access if the coal 
has to be imported by ship from abroad. A hydro plant is usually in remote places where 
the available hydro resources are. Ideally the plants have to be near an existing 
transmission grid network to reduce the cost of constructing new power lines. 
The plant type is an important consideration in determining its usability and investment 
risks. The plant capacity depends on the forecasted demand and when it needs to generate 
electricity. Electricity is a unique commodity in the sense that it cannot be stored and must 
be produced simultaneously with demand. Since load varies considerably across an hour, 
day, and year, the electricity generation from power plants must match demand (and system 
losses) at all times. ESI has traditionally recognized three different classifications for power 
plants: base load generation, intermediate or cycling generation, and peaking generation.  
Base load generators are operated at a continuous rate to service minimum system load. 
Generally, base load plants have high capital cost but low fuel operating cost. While these 
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units are the most efficient to operate, they are costly to start up from a cold shut down, 
therefore, they are usually run at a near-constant rate. Intermediate load plants are brought 
online during periods of forced or planned outage of base load units. They can also be used 
to bridge the dispatch of base load and peaking units during periods of unusually high 
demand. Peaking units are plants that have the ability to generate electricity immediately 
and serve temporary spikes in demand, such as during a heat wave when residential and 
commercial air conditioning demands begin to surge. 
In the past, electric utilities dispatched generating units to meet demand on a lowest- to 
highest-cost basis. This form of dispatch is commonly referred to as “economic dispatch.” 
The marginal or incremental cost of dispatching units is traditionally the benchmark used to 
rank order available generators. These marginal costs, in the very short run, are typically 
associated with changes in fuel costs and other variable operating and maintenance (O&M) 
costs. Historically, base load units, almost always large capacity coal, hydro, or nuclear 
generation units, had the lowest marginal costs per kWh generated and were dispatched 
first to meet load. In New Zealand, geothermal power plants are also used as base load 
units. As load increased during the day, or across seasons, less efficient intermediate or 
cycling units, which generate electricity at slightly higher costs, were brought online. 
Peaking plants have relatively low fixed costs per kW of capacity but relatively high 
marginal cost per kWh generated. Peaking units would be the last types of units brought 
online under an economic dispatch regime. The cost of the last dispatched unit therefore 
defines the system marginal costs, often referred to as the system “lambda.” With increased 
generation from renewable resources, some grid operators dispatch their renewable plants 
39 
 
first to utilise the free energy resources, and supplement their variation in the supply (since 
nature is uncontrollable and varies with time) with other conventional plants.     
Besides supplying electrical energy for consumption, power plants also have other 
functions in maintaining the supply security and integrity. These functions are summarised 
in Table 3.1. Not all generating units are capable of doing all the functions, and hence these 
functions have to be accounted for at the planning stage.  
Table 3.1: Other functions of generation unit 
Function Role Generating unit type 
Frequency 
control  
To help regulate the power 
system frequency (50 or 60 Hz). 
A change of  5% can cause a 
cascaded system failure
1
  
Generating units with free governor 
action
2
  
Voltage 
and 
reactive 
power 
control 
The voltage has to be regulated 
within a certain limit to avoid 
damage to connected appliances   
Synchronous generator that is 
capable of generating or absorbing 
reactive power. Most generating 
units are of this type but large 
reactive power control requires 
additional investment during plant 
construction 
Black start 
capability 
To provide standby generating 
facility to generate enough power 
to support the running of the 
main generating unit’s auxiliary 
plant in the case of total power 
system collapse (e.g. during a 
national blackout) 
Generating units that are able to 
start up and generate by themselves 
without depending on external 
power 
 
3.2 Plant technology and its impacts on planning 
Based on how the power plant is planned to be operated and utilised, the relevant fuel and 
technology can be decided. Open cycle thermal plants are typical peaking plants since they 
have a short start-up time and are able to respond quickly to the change in energy demand. 
However, they have low thermal efficiency and generally run on expensive fuels, so they 
                                                 
1 One unit tripping can cause the frequency to fall, which leads to another unit tripping, which lowers the frequency even 
further and causes other generators to trip. This is commonly known as cascade failure and could lead to a blackout 
2 The generating unit spins at partial or zero output to act as a standby in the case of frequency drop. This is known as spinning reserve 
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are not economic to run on a long term basis. Base load plants, in contrast, have lower 
marginal costs per kWh generated. Generally, base load plants are made up of large hydro, 
nuclear or combined cycle gas turbines. Table 3.2 shows the qualitative comparison 
between different generation technologies. 
Table 3.2: Qualitative comparison of generation technologies (Sabai 2001) 
Technology Lead 
time 
Capital 
cost/kW 
Operating 
cost 
Fuel 
cost 
Carbon 
emissions 
Open Cycle Gas Turbine 
(OCGT) 
Short Low Low High Medium 
Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) 
Short Low Low High Medium 
Coal Long High High High High 
Nuclear Long High High Low Nil 
Hydro Long High Low Nil Nil 
Wind Short High Low Nil Nil 
Geothermal Short High Low Nil Nil 
 
 
The plant type and technology have an important influence in generation planning. Gas-
fired technologies have relatively low capital costs and short lead times, providing 
significant advantages to investors. On the other hand, natural gas price uncertainty remains 
a large risk to the investor.  
Nuclear power plants, by contrast, have a relatively low proportion of fuel and operating 
costs but high capital costs. Furthermore, economies of scale have tended to favour very 
large plants (1000 MW and above) resulting in a relatively large capital commitment to a 
single construction project and hence associated investment risk. Newer designs are more 
flexible with regard to operations. The potential economic advantages of building smaller, 
more modular nuclear plants are also being explored by some nuclear power plant 
designers. However, potential hazards from radiation remain a public concern. 
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Coal power projects have also tended to become more capital-intensive to take advantage 
of economies of scale, to meet tighter environmental standards more economically, and to 
improve fuel efficiency. As with nuclear plants, lead and construction times for coal-fired 
power plants can be long. Large capacity hydro plants also demand substantial lead times 
and are exposed to considerable risks during their construction phase as the length of a 
project can be subject to delays, the construction costs can also change and increase the 
total costs of a project. Their operation by contrast, can be highly flexible, enabling an 
advantage to be taken of market conditions to optimise profitability. Variation in rainfall 
quantity is another risk factor. Wind plants have some very attractive low-risk 
characteristics, including very short lead times, no fuel costs or emissions, and low 
operating costs. However, the variability of output of wind power reduces the value of the 
power produced. 
Besides the factors above, resource availability is also becoming a serious consideration in 
planning for a power plant. Fossil fuels, which have been a major electricity resource in 
many countries, are believed to be depleting. This has encouraged research and innovation 
to explore more renewable resources and to tap them for electricity generation.  
3.3 Power system planning under a regulated ESI 
Dyner and Larsen described the ESI under the regulated traditional monopoly model as 
having stable prices, information sharing across the ESI sectors and predictable demand 
forecast (Dyner and Larsen 2001). This reduces the uncertainties in the variables that 
influence generation planning.  
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3.3.1 Power system planning methods 
Power system planning under a regulated ESI is usually conducted under the guidelines of 
national economic planning and energy resources policy (Wang and McDonald 1994). 
These policies determine the development planning of energy resources planning in order 
to investigate comprehensively the effective use, coordination and substitution relationship 
of various primary energy resources such as coal, hydro and natural gas. The reason that 
motivates the government to administer the ESI was because electricity became a very 
important subsystem in any national economy that fuels development growth especially in 
industries. In return, power system development is influenced by the future electrical 
demand and national long term plans. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
  
 
The load forecast forms the basis of power system planning and provides information on 
expected consumption increase, load curve profiles and load distribution. Generation 
expansion planning, which is the focus of this research, is discussed in the next sections. 
Power system load forecast 
Electricity generation planning 
Electricity network planning 
National planning and energy policy 
Energy planning 
Figure 3.1: Structure of power system planning under a regulated ESI 
(Wang and McDonald 1994) 
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3.3.2 Generation expansion planning methods 
Algorithms used for generation expansion planning under the traditional monopoly 
structure can be broadly classified into the following three methods: 
(i) The generation planning problem is divided into several constituents, which are 
coordinated separately. Typically, planning is divided into generation 
investment and optimal production simulations to reduce the dimensionality of 
each constituent problem  
(ii) The heuristic method is used rather than the rigorous operational research 
optimisation method where simplifications and modifications are made. Various 
sources cite this method as the linear programming method, the non linear 
programming method and the dynamic programming method 
(iii) Simplifying assumptions are made, e.g. linearisation of generation unit 
investment, linearisation of the coal consumption curve or sectionalized 
linearisation are frequently used  
They are all the result of some simplifications and appropriate tradeoffs between rigour in 
the mathematics and the amount of computation (Wang and McDonald 1994).  
An assumption that is widely adopted in several generation planning models is that all the 
electrical load and generating units can be considered to be on a single nodal point as far as 
generation planning is concerned. Some models utilizing this assumption are the Wien 
Automatic System Planning Package (WASP) (Department of Nuclear Energy 2010) of the 
International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and Westinghouse Interactive Generation 
Planning (WIGPLAN) of the American Westinghouse Electrical Company. They are 
known as single nodal point generation planning models. Among these models, WASP is 
the most widely used in developing countries for power system planning (over 100 
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countries) (Department of Nuclear Energy 2010). With this assumption, the model is 
simplified because geographical factors are not necessary in generation planning and the 
generating units of the same category can be grouped together. Optimisation is carried out 
according to the categories of generating units. However, these models are limited to the 
power system covering a relatively small region, with a strong transmission system in 
existence. To solve this problem, other models have been developed since 1980 such as 
Jiaotong Automatic System Planning Package (JASP) of Xi'an Jiaotong University, China. 
Linear programming was one of the first optimisation techniques to be applied to the 
planning problem. Linear programming works well in simplified systems but fails to 
adequately model complex planning problems and detailed systems. With increases in 
complexity, the generation planning problem becomes a non linear, mixed integer 
optimisation, and development and application of other optimisation techniques become 
necessary (Newham 2008). Dynamic programming has been one of the most widely used 
optimisation techniques for the planning problem but this suffers from the ‘curse of 
dimensionality’. The overwhelming state space resulting from real world problems has 
required development of heuristics such as tunnel based constraints that allow the user to 
specify particular allowable states. Other heuristic techniques aim to reduce the state space 
by reducing the number of scenarios studied or restricting the investments available 
(Newham 2008).  
Other optimisation techniques such as genetic algorithms, stochastic optimisation, decision 
analysis, trade-off analysis and artificial intelligence have been applied to various power 
system investment planning problems. Regardless of the type of optimisation technique 
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used within the investment planning process, all rely on the characteristics of a regulated 
system such as transparency of information, financial certainty and industry co-operation. 
The introduction of deregulated or restructured markets has removed much of the certainty 
of power system investment planning and the tools used for planning and optimisation are 
no longer as relevant in their current forms (Newham 2008). 
3.4 Generation planning after ESI restructuring 
 
 
ESI restructuring introduces additional investment risks for generation expansion. The new 
risks introduced depend on the new structure implemented. As shown in Table 2.4, the 
wholesale market and retail competition structure places higher risks onto generation 
companies. Their business risks include (International Energy Agency 2003): 
a) Economy-wide factors that affect the demand for electricity or the availability of 
labour and capital. 
b) Factors under the control of the policy-makers, such as regulatory (economic and 
non-economic) and political risks, with possible implications for costs, financing 
conditions and on earnings. 
c) Factors under the control of the company, such as the size and diversity of its 
investment programme, the choice and diversity of generation technologies, control 
of costs during construction and operation. 
d) The price and volume risks in the electricity market. 
e) Fuel price and fuel availability risks. 
f) Financial risks arising from the financing of investment. 
 
The degree of uncertainties that exist within the monopolistic market and the competitive 
market are summarised in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Change with respect to uncertainty as utility companies are restructured (Dyner and 
Larsen 2001) 
Planning input Uncertainty in key planning input 
Monopolistic market Competitive market 
Price Low Medium/high 
Information Low High 
Demand Medium High 
Consumer choice Low Medium/high 
Regulation Low High 
 
 
Under a competitive market, prices fluctuate, not only during the day and week but also 
depending on the season and weather conditions (e.g. summer/winter, amount of rain, etc.). 
Information becomes limited as no company would like to provide information to 
competitors. Demand forecasting becomes more difficult because the demand is no longer 
simply a growth or decline in the trend, but will depend more on the reliability and service 
provided as well as the price and marketing. With more competition in place, consumer 
choice is increased. Most governments encourage consumers to switch electricity suppliers 
regularly by providing simple switch over platforms (e.g. Powerswitch in New Zealand). 
ESI restructuring also took years to complete and there are many regulations that are set up 
from time to time, making it difficult for companies to plan many years ahead.  
As the level of uncertainty increases, optimisation and hard modelling approaches need to 
be complemented with other planning methods such as behavioural simulation, financially 
based methods and scenario analysis. Dyner and Larsen suggested the planning and 
strategy methods for different decision making level as shown in Table 3.4 (Dyner and 
Larsen 2001). The methods are summarised in Table 3.5. Chapter 4 follows up on the 
methods that have been considered for this study. 
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Table 3.4: Planning and strategy methods according to the decision making level (Dyner and Larsen 
2001) 
ESI structure Strategic (Long 
term) 
Tactical (Medium 
term) 
Operational (short 
term) 
Monopoly Hard modelling Hard modelling Hard modelling 
Competitive 
markets 
Hard modelling, 
strategic 
simulations, 
scenarios 
Hard modelling, 
strategic 
simulations 
Hard modelling, 
gaming 
 
Table 3.5: Common planning methods used in the ESI after restructuring (Dyner and Larsen 2001; 
Newham 2008) 
Method Descriptions 
Agent modelling Provide understanding on the interdependencies in a system 
where individual actors in the industry can be represented and 
modelled in a variety of ways. Typically used to determine the 
optimal bidding strategy into a spot market 
System/Business 
dynamics 
Provide understanding on the interdependencies in a system 
based on explicit recognition of feedback and time lags on an 
aggregated approach 
Competitive 
analysis/traditional 
strategy analysis 
Allow companies to perform internally focused analysis such 
as their operations, staffing costs, competencies and 
capabilities and decide what they should outsource, (e.g. 
billing, meter reading etc.)  
Financial risk 
modeling 
Provide understanding on the risk related to contracting: what 
level of contracting and what kind of contracts should the 
company engage in to match a particular risk profile 
Financial modeling Provide understanding on the finance function in the company, 
i.e. concern with what type of debt to engage, the treasury 
function, etc. in the company 
Game theory To determine the best bidding strategy, it is necessary to take 
into account what the others might bid, given their constraints 
and objectives 
Real options Provide a framework for identifying the optimal investment 
time. Useful when there is an environment with a high degree 
of irreversibility and uncertainty.  
Scenarios A planning, strategy and communication tool by companies as 
a way of thinking about the long-term future where the degree 
of uncertainty is too large 
 
 
3.5 Market interaction with generation investment 
This section presents a theoretical model that describes how the power market can 
determine generation investment, extracted from Leveque 2006 (Lévêque 2006). This 
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model considers two types of generation capacity: peaking and base load. Figure 3.2(1) 
shows the marginal costs of the two types of plants. Peaking plants have relatively low 
fixed costs (intercept with y-axis) but relatively high marginal costs per energy generated 
(steeper slopes). In contrast, base load plants have higher fixed costs but lower marginal 
costs per MWh.   
The total annual costs in operating the plants depend upon the number of hours per year for 
which the plant is operated. If the station is required to run for T* hours or less per year, 
then it is cheaper to run a peaking plant. But if it is required to run for more than T* hours, 
then base load plants have lower total costs. The bold line in Figure 3.2(1) gives the lower 
envelope of the two linear total cost functions, showing the efficient cost of meeting a 
demand lasting for any given number of hours.  
Figure 3.2(2) shows the load duration curve (LDC) where the hours of the year are ranked 
in order of the demand for electricity, so that the hour with the highest demand is placed at 
the right hand end. The vertical axis then shows the demand in that particular hour. The 
demand during the T*th highest hour is thus B GW. This is the gross demand for 
electricity, including transmission losses and the amount of plant that has to be kept part 
loaded or available at short notice, for reserve. In other words, there are T* hours in which 
this gross demand for electricity is B GW or more. This implies that if it is wanted that base 
load plants meet all the demands for electricity that last for T* hours or more of the year, 
then it should be ensured that B GW are available.  
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Figure 3.2: The determination of electricity capacity and prices (Lévêque 2006) 
Legend: 
CP = marginal cost of peaking plants; CB = marginal cost of base load plants 
 
In the traditional ESI structure, information on T* and B are sufficient for regulators to set 
the electricity prices and ensure that the ESI was able to recover its average costs.  In a 
wholesale market structure, it is assumed that under perfect competition, bidders will set 
prices to be equal to marginal costs.  
Figure 3.2(3) is a reflector used to move the capacities shown in the vertical axes of Figure 
3.2(2) to the horizontal axis of panel 4. If the marginal (operating cost) of base load plant is 
equal to CB, then CB will be the marginal cost of the industry whenever demand is equal or 
50 
 
less than the capacity of this type of plant – assumed to be B GW at the optimal solution. 
At times of higher demands, the marginal cost will equal CP, the marginal cost of peaking 
plants.  
In terms of total capacity, Figure 3.2(2) has been drawn on the assumption that the price in 
the first T* hours of the year is equal to CP and that the price for the rest of the year is CB.  
At the price of CP, the maximum demand for electricity is equal to D GW. If the industry 
had this much capacity, then that demand could be met in full, but the price would never 
exceed the marginal cost of the peaking plants, CP. 
The slope of a total revenue line (per MW per year) for a peaking plant is identical to the 
slope of the total cost line for peaking plants over the period between P and T* hours. 
Hence the total annual revenue for a peaking plant per MW, RP is equal to 
RP = CP*(T*-P) 
Base load plants are generally used throughout the year, less the hours of planned or 
unplanned outages, and hence their total annual revenue per MW is  
RB = CB*(8760-hours of outages) 
From these equations, it can be deduced that base load plants make a contribution towards 
their fixed costs since the price exceeds their variable costs for the first T* hours of the 
year. On the other hand, if the market price never exceeds CP, peaking plants would not be 
able to cover their fixed costs. This is clearly not sustainable in a market which investors 
are free to leave, and will not enter without a clear expectation that they will cover their 
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costs, including an appropriate return on capital. The inadequacy of the market to 
encourage investments on peaking plants provides an excuse for generation companies to 
exercise their market power at the time of high demands to recover their peaking plants 
fixed costs. The next sections consider several possible scenarios for the electricity market. 
3.5.1 Scenario 1: Capacity not sufficient to meet demand  
When total generation supply capacity is unable to meet the demand D GW in full, the 
system operator (SO) may be able to reduce the amount of reserve plant that it is carrying 
so that customers are not immediately affected, although this increases the risk of failures 
disrupting supply to larger numbers of customers. The cost of such as failure, multiplied by 
its probability, gives the value of additional generation at these times. With a shortage of 
capacity, generation companies are able to exercise their market power and bid up to this 
expected cost, and it would be rational for the SO to pay it, even when it is greater than the 
generator’s marginal operating cost. It is also possible for the SO to ask for load 
management, and can start to pay some customers to reduce their demand. Bids from these 
customers might set the price in a real time market directly, or generation companies might 
raise their bids above their marginal cost, knowing that their competition now comes not 
from one another (since all generation plants are needed) but from the demand side.  
This is demonstrated in Figure 3.2(4) where the downward sloping line represents the 
maximum demand. If there were D GW of capacity available, the price would be CP. 
However, with less capacity, the price must rise to clear the market. If there is only K GW 
of capacity available, then the price will rise to PR to ration demand to the level of the 
capacity. PR can be set by either the variable operating costs of the last plant available, the 
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bid set by the generation company who wishes to exercise its market power, or the 
opportunity cost of a consumer that has decided to reduce its demand.     
Figure 3.2(5) shows the price duration curve. At the highest demand hour, the price must 
clear at PR but lower prices are possible in hours with lower demands. After P hours, the 
LDC of Figure 3.2(2) shows that the demand at a price of CP has fallen to K GW and can 
be met in full by the supply capacity. In terms of load actually served, the LDC thus has a 
flat segment at K GW; the area above represents ‘unserved’ load due to the supply 
shortage. Between P and T* hour, the price in a perfectly competitive market is equal to CP. 
But from T* onwards, none of the peaking plant is needed, so the marginal cost falls to CB.    
3.5.2 Scenario 2: Wrong mix of generation capacity  
The previous model and scenario discusses the scenario of an optimal mix of peaking and 
base-load generation capacity. This is shown again in Figure 3.3(1). The other panels in 
Figure 3.3 show other possible combinations of generation mix. As discussed in the 
previous section, if there is too little total generation capacity, peaking plants can make a 
supernormal profit. On the other hand, if there is too much total capacity, they will make 
losses. If there is too much base load capacity, then base-load stations will make less profit 
per MW-year because the market clearing price can be set lower than the base-load 
marginal price. If the base load is too little, then the market clearing price can be set higher, 
and peaking plants will need to run more often, causing the average wholesale electricity 
price to increase.  
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3.5.3 Scenario 3: Wrong level and mix of generation capacity  
Figure 3.3(5) shows a scenario when the total generation capacity is too large compared to 
demand and there is too much base load capacity. In this case, a shortage of total capacity 
means that prices exceed CP for more than P hours, making the total revenue line move 
above the total cost line for peaking plants. It then runs parallel to that line for some hours, 
until demand falls to the level of base load capacity and those plants become marginal. This 
can cause all the base load plants into losses, because prices would be set at CB longer than 
they should be. 
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Figure 3.3: The impact of capacity mix on wholesale prices  
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3.6 Impacts of restructuring on generation investment 
 
In Section 2.1.2, it was mentioned that investments under a regulated ESI were perceived to 
be inefficient because even a bad investment is guaranteed to be profitable. Hence, one of 
the functions of the restructured market is to stimulate suitable generation investments at 
the correct time, i.e. providing adequate and correct mix of supply, in time to meet the 
growing demand.   
In principle, deregulation dictates that decisions on generation investments are left to 
market participants, based on commercial principles. Capacity expansions are thus driven 
by expectations of future prices and return on new investments (Doorman and Botterud 
2008). Some systems are mainly based on these market principles, e.g. present UK model, 
the Australian market, Nord Pool and the New Zealand Energy Market (NZEM). 
Generation investment under this market principle is solely based on the wholesale 
electricity market price. A high price that is sustained for a certain long duration indicates 
that the margin between the electricity supply and demand is small and there is a need for 
new generation investment to meet the demand. Any generation company that feels that 
they can gain profit by constructing a new plant will then proceed to develop it.   
In the past, with regulated planning, the generation capacity is maintained at a certain level 
to ensure that the supply can meet demand at all times. Even though this was interpreted as 
over investment and inefficient, no blackouts or crises occurred due to supply shortage. On 
the other hand, in a deregulated market, it is difficult to maintain an adequate level of 
generation capacity (Doorman and Botterud 2008). This has caused boom and bust cycles 
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in generation capacity in many places such as the US, Europe and New Zealand, as 
discussed by several publications (Ford 1999; Kadoya, Sasaki et al. 2005; Lévêque 2006).  
3.6.1 Generation capacity trends in some countries  
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Figure 3.4: Capacity margins in several countries after they deregulated their ESI (Lévêque 2006) 
  
Figure 3.4 shows the capacity margins in England and Wales, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
and the United States after they deregulated their ESI in the early 1990s (Lévêque 2006). 
The figure was summarised from the study done by Richard Green and published in the 
book “Competitive Electricity Markets and Sustainability” (Lévêque 2006).  The original 
figures from the analysis are included in Appendix A. The capacity margin is defined as the 
excess of generation capacity over peak demand, as a proportion of that peak demand. The 
next paragraphs discuss the situations that caused the change in capacity margins in the 
countries shown in Figure 3.4. 
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In England and Wales, prior to their ESI restructuring in 1990, the generation capacity 
margin was more than 30%, above the planning margin of 28% used by the national 
Central Electricity Generating Board. After restructuring, many plants were closed down 
by major generation companies, making way for new entrants and keeping plant margins 
from rising (Lévêque 2006). Hence, capacity margins declined steadily through the 1990s. 
As for the U.S., Figure 3.4 shows only the nationwide averages. The trends in individual 
regions may vary. In particular, low capacity margins in the western states contributed to 
the California crisis of 2000-01. On a national scale, capacity margins were high in the 
early 1990s. Low investment took place in those years causing the margin to fall with 
increased demand. The investment delay was due to uncertainties introduced by the 
restructuring causing most investors to wait until policy was decided. Investments took 
place around 1998 with new capacity of over 20% added between 1999 and 2002, well 
beyond the optimal level of investment. This is an example of a bust period followed by a 
boom period in generation capacity after deregulation. 
In Norway, the capacity margin fell sharply in the first half of the 1990s, after liberalisation 
in 1991. Very little investment took place. However in 1997, the capacity margin rose, but 
due to lower peak demands rather than an increase in the generation capacity. As a hydro 
dominated system, Norway will always require a relatively high margin of generation 
capacity over peak demand, because the average hydro plants there can only store enough 
water to operate for about half the year. Over the 1990s, Norway had made up for a decline 
in its capacity margins by importing increasing amounts of power in dry years (Lévêque 
2006).  
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Finland liberalised its market in 1996. There have been very few plant closures since then. 
There was a significant amount of investment in the years immediately after liberalisation 
(which will have been planned before liberalisation took effect). Very few new plants have 
been commissioned since then, resulting in a decline in the capacity margin. However, 
more plants are needed as demand grows and old power plants retired. Work started in 
spring 2005 to build a 1600MW nuclear reactor (Lévêque 2006).  
In Sweden, capacity margins were high at the start of the 1990s. The country has a mix of 
hydro and thermal resources, so the appropriate margin will be lower than for Norway. 
After the liberalisation in 1996, Sweden’s capacity margin fell when many old plants were 
retired. The Swedish system operator, Svenska Kraftnät, was concerned with the low 
margins and paid plants to be brought back into service as capacity reserve after 
mothballing in 1998 and 1999 (Lévêque 2006). These reinstated plants accounted for 
nearly 75% of the capacity added between 2001 and 2003. 
As for New Zealand, the generation capacity is also affected by its ESI restructuring at 
around the mid 1980s. Figure 3.5 shows that the installed generation capacity fell for the 
first time in 1988. This can be most probably attributed to the uncertainties introduced 
when the government was considering ESI privatisation and restructuring during those 
years.  
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Figure 3.5: A plot of installed generation capacity, peak demand and capacity margin in New 
Zealand from 1974 to 2008 
 
The installed capacity was on a plateau for over a decade, causing the margin between the 
supply and demand to become smaller within those years and reducing the capacity margin. 
The installed generation capacity increased after 2000 and rose steadily with increasing 
demand. Despite the reduced capacity margin, New Zealand did not have any problem 
meeting peak demands. It did, however, have a problem meeting energy demand during dry 
winter years due to the reduced hydro inflows. This problem can be analysed further by 
calculating and plotting the energy capacity margin (ECM) as shown in Figure 3.6. Energy 
capacity margin is a measure of excess energy generation capacity per energy consumption. 
The calculation of the ECM is discussed in Chapter 6. A low ECM indicates the possibility 
of an energy constraint where there is not enough electric energy generated to meet 
demand. The maximum annual electricity generation in Figure 3.6 is the product of the 
total annual generation capacities with their typical operating hours.        
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Since 1988, four shortages have been observed. The first power crisis occurred in 1992 
when the ESI was privatised and operated under the Electricity Corporation on New 
Zealand (ECNZ). Three more shortages were observed in the winters of 2001, 2003 and 
2008 after the New Zealand Energy Market (NZEM) commenced operation in October 
1996 (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2009) 
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Figure 3.6: A plot of generation capacity and electricity consumption trends in New Zealand from 
1974 to 2008  
 
 
Comparing the trends in these countries, it can be observed that liberalisation has often 
been accompanied by a reduction in capacity margins. But this was not necessarily to a 
level that posed a danger to the security of supply even though some places like California 
and New Zealand were affected by the low generation levels. When capacity margins 
become very low, investments follow. However, due to the uncertainties of profit returns 
with changing wholesale electricity prices, investors wait for the time they deem would 
give them most profits.       
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3.6.2 Reasons for investment cycles in a market driven industry 
In reality, many market driven capital intensive industries are prone to investment cycles. 
This has been observed in many industries such as real estates and copper industries (Ford 
1999; Lévêque 2006; Sterman 2000). The electricity industry is also vulnerable to similar 
problems. 
At first, the industry may be short of capacity and prices will be high. This acts as a signal 
to investors to start adding capacity. In the absence of coordination, they are in danger of 
over-reacting. Too many investors read the high prices as a signal that their own investment 
will be profitable and somehow fail to take their competitors’ actions into account. Once 
the new capacity comes on stream, it will depress prices. This will be sufficient to halt most 
new investments but the existing capacity is likely to stay in service. Scrapping decisions 
are irreversible and will not be taken unless the price falls sufficiently below the variable 
costs of staying in operation. Eventually, the energy capacity margin will fall as plants are 
retired or demand rises, pushing the prices up again to the point where investment is again 
perceived as profitable. The industry is then in danger of repeating the cycle (Lévêque 
2006). 
3.6.3 The impacts of generation capacity cycles 
The generation capacity cycles make it difficult to predict whether a country will have 
enough electricity supply to meet demand. Extra capacities can be deemed as inefficient 
stranded investments, but on the other hand, capacity shortages are not easily addressed as 
power plants take years to be developed. When a country faces an electricity shortage and 
undergoes curtailments, it means that some productivity opportunities are lost. If the 
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condition is prolonged, millions of dollars can be lost and social and political problems 
might arise.  
In some countries, the authorities were not comfortable with leaving the decisions on 
generation investment completely to the market and introduced several policies to support 
the market structure. Such policies are capacity payment systems (as in Spain and South 
America), capacity obligation systems (US), capacity adequacy system based on reliability 
options (theoretical) and capacity subscription (Botterud 2003). However, the effectiveness 
of these systems has yet to be proven. Wolak claimed that capacity payment systems can 
lead to over investments and higher electricity prices. They also do not address the 
problems of market power abuse (Wolak 2001). 
 
3.7 Chapter summary 
Theoretically, generation planning consisted of developing and having a portfolio of 
generation facilities available to meet the various types of electricity loads that occurred in 
any given hour, across any given day, in any given season. Under the traditional monopoly 
market model, reliability tended to be the most important planning consideration, followed 
closely by cost. Thus, generation planning strategies consisted of constructing and 
operating enough power plants to meet demand. Regulators were responsible to ensure 
supply reliability.  
Under a deregulated market structure, energy security is no longer the driver for generation 
investments. Investments are driven solely by revenues and this has introduced boom and 
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bust cycles in generation capacities. Boom periods can cause inefficient stranded 
investments whereas bust periods can cause supply shortages that may take years to fix. 
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4 RESEARCH METHOD: SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
The various optimisation techniques to plan regulated power systems were discussed in 
Chapter 3. However, due to the linear nature of the method, it cannot be used to study 
boom and bust cycles.  This research uses a System Dynamics (SD) method to analyse the 
impact of the market structure on generation expansion. The first section of this chapter 
provides a brief description of this method. It then briefly discusses two other methods that 
are used to study similar problems. Section 4.3 then describes the advantages of the SD 
method. The chapter concludes by mentioning other publications and research on ESI using 
SD.  
4.1 SD descriptions 
SD is a descriptive modelling method based on explicit recognition of feedback and time 
lags (Forrester 1961; Sterman 2000). It is a type of behavioural simulation modelling. It 
was created during the mid 1950s by Professor Jay Forrester of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. Initially it was applied almost exclusively to corporate/managerial 
problems. After the late 1960s, its application started to expand into other fields such as 
energy, ecology, social studies and economics. Rather than applying the method to study 
one system, it can also be used to study the interactions between different multidisciplinary 
systems. 
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4.2 Other methods used to study electricity market interaction with generation 
expansion  
Among all the methods mentioned in Table 3.5, the two other methods besides SD that are 
applied to study the interaction between the electricity market and generation investment 
are game theory and real options theory. As mentioned in Section Error! Reference 
source not found., with a restructured ESI, additional risks and factors have to be taken 
into consideration before making an investment decision, such as uncertainties in the 
market environment and competition from other investors. 
4.2.1 Real options theory 
Real options theory has been used to analyse the uncertainty and timing of individual 
generation investments in power systems. The theory originated in finance and is used to 
assess the value of deferring investment that is subject to uncertainty. It assesses the 
additional value in waiting for uncertainty to reveal itself so that the investor can delay 
making an irreversible investment. An uncertainty is described as a stochastic process. In 
other words, real options create a shift from the traditional ‘‘fear of uncertainty’’ to a view 
of ‘‘seeking gains from uncertainty’’(Dyner and Larsen 2001). Some examples of studies 
which used real options theory to study generation investments are listed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4. 1: Examples of research using real options to study generation investment 
Researchers Research objectives Result 
Smit and 
Ankum (Smit 
and Ankum 
1993) 
Studied the value of investment 
deferral using real options under the 
different competitive scenarios of 
perfect competition, oligopoly and 
monopoly 
Under perfect competition, there is a 
tendency to invest early to avoid the 
erosion of investment value by 
competitive investment. In a monopoly, 
there is no loss of value due to 
postponement so there is tendency to 
delay projects. Oligopoly lies between 
competition and a monopoly where 
cooperation between investors tends to 
delay investment but as soon as one 
makes an investment, the others will 
follow immediately. 
Keppo and Hao 
(Keppo and Lu 
2003) 
Studied the effect of large 
investments on future prices 
Showed that production’s price effect has 
to be considered in the investment 
analysis if the company is not able to 
hedge the price effect in the financial 
markets. 
Botterud et al. 
(Botterud, Ilic 
et al. 2005) 
 Studied optimal investment 
decisions when demand growth 
and hence future prices are 
uncertain.  
 Used an explicit power market 
model that utilises linear supply 
and demand curves to calculate the 
electricity price.  
 Studied investments in both 
restructured and regulated 
environments and identifies the 
option value of delaying 
investment.  
 
Showed how price caps and price 
feedback can affect the timing of 
investment decisions. 
Marreco and 
Carpio 
(Marreco and 
Carpio 2006) 
Studied the optimum value for 
capacity payments to incentivise 
generation investment and 
availability 
Concluded that a financial subsidy is 
mandatory for the economic feasibility 
and increased thermo power capacity in 
the Brazilian Power System. Their model 
was able to solve for the flexibility value 
as a fair premium incentive to 
investments. 
Botterud and 
Korpas 
(Botterud and 
Korpås 2007) 
Investigated how fixed or variable 
capacity payments affect investment 
decisions in the Norwegian power 
market.  
Capacity payments can induce earlier 
investments but that the kind of payment, 
i.e. fixed or variable, affects the timing of 
investment decisions. 
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Real options theory is a useful and promising technique for an individual investor to assess 
the value of an investment and the value of deferring an investment. It is best suited for use 
by individual investors to investigate investment choices and timing under uncertainty. It 
does not help with coordination of investment planning throughout the power system as 
each real option analysis considers a single investment option and fixed location. 
4.2.2 Game theory 
One aspect that contributes to price volatility is competition between market participants. 
Competitive behaviour affects both short term prices, where generation companies compete 
in the real time spot market, and long term prices, where generation investors can influence 
the long term electricity price by the size, type and timing of new investments. Competition 
causes investors to face higher risks and therefore seek higher returns. It also results in 
investment decisions affecting other investors’ profits and decisions. The interaction, 
competition and resulting outcomes for deregulated power markets have been studied using 
game theory. Some examples of studies which used game theory to study generation 
investments are listed in Table 4.2.  
Smit and Ankum (Smit and Ankum 1993) use a combination of real options and game 
theory to study the interactions between competitive investors when uncertainty is 
considered. Previous work has shown that competition may force an investor to invest early 
and therefore the option value in deferring the investment is lost. Smit and Ankum consider 
the reduction in investment value for differing scenarios of market power of investors. 
They show that in an oligopoly it may be beneficial for all investors to defer investment if 
the project value is low and demand is uncertain. In contrast, in a very competitive 
 68 
 
environment, firms are likely to invest immediately in order to preempt an investment by 
another party. This can result in a suboptimal solution. 
Game theory has been used to study a range of competition issues in power systems. A 
number of the studies undertaken offer promise in terms of identifying potential behaviour 
of rival investors, but only Smit and Ankum consider uncertainty within the model. The use 
of game theory in power system planning would seem to be in identifying specific actions 
by investors at a potential point in time but it is less suited to a system wide planning 
perspective. One aspect of game theory that has not been discussed is the assumption that 
all players, or investors, act rationally. Rational actions in this context relates to an 
investment being made on a financial basis where an investment decision is based purely 
on profit. While profit and income is a driving factor for investment, other factors also 
likely to make an impact are things such as work force requirements, company vision and 
the political environment. Hence, investors cannot be merely considered as acting 
rationally and as a result, the outcome predicted by game theory may not eventuate 
(Newham 2008). Another difficulty in using the model is that finding a Cournot 
equilibrium
1
, if one exists, becomes progressively more difficult for more detailed models. 
                                                 
1 Cournot's theory, firms choose how much output to produce to maximize their own profit. However, the best output for one 
firm depends on the outputs of others. A Cournot equilibrium occurs when each firm's output maximizes its profits given 
the output of the other firms.  
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Table 4.2: Examples of research using real options to study generation investment (Newham 2008) 
Researchers Research objectives Result 
Kleindorfer et al. 
(Kleindorfer, Wu 
et al. 2001) 
Studied the strategic gaming 
interactions of market participants 
during real time operation and 
dispatch and ancillary services 
contracting.  
Developed a model termed Electric 
Power Strategy Simulation Model 
(EPSIM) that can be used by market 
participants to test strategic plans 
before implementation. 
 
Chuang et al. 
(Chuang, Wu et 
al. 2001) 
Used Cournot theory to model 
generation expansion in a 
competitive electricity market. A 
Cournot equilibrium is reached 
when an investor cannot better their 
financial position by changing their 
investment decision, with respect to 
their competitors’ investment 
decisions.  
 
Their numerical results pointed to 
greater industry expansion and system 
reliability under Cournot competition 
than under centralized expansion 
planning; and higher probabilistic 
measures of reliability from multi-
player expansion than from expansion 
by a traditional monopolist with an 
equivalent reserve margin requirement.  
Diego (Diego 
2002) 
Studied the use of non cooperative 
game theory to analyse the 
economic behaviour of generating 
companies with respect to the real 
time power pool market.  
 
A model which can be used to 
investigate the market rules and their 
impacts on incentives and the 
following actions of generation 
companies.  
Murphy and 
Smeers (Murphy 
and Smeers 
2005) 
Studied three different generation 
investment models- traditional 
expansion planning, oligopolistic 
market environment where capacity 
is simultaneously built and sold in 
long-term contracts where there is 
no spot market (similar to power 
purchase agreements) and a spot 
market where investment and sales 
are separated. 
 
Prices and quantities produced in a spot 
market fall between the traditional 
planning model and the oligopolistic 
model. This is a result of the spot 
market mitigating market power with 
the resultant price being lower than that 
of the oligopolistic model.  
 
4.3 SD advantages 
 
Due to the disadvantages of the methods described in Section 4.2, they have not been used 
in this study. On the other hand, there are advantages offered by the SD method that makes 
it suitable for this study. A behavioural type of simulation such as SD can provide an 
understanding of how competitors behave and how the market might move, as it is unlikely 
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that it will follow an economically rational path (Dyner and Larsen 2001). What makes SD 
different from other methods is that it utilises feedback loops, stocks and flows which helps 
in studying nonlinearity in a system. Traditional simulation models have tried to include as 
much detail as possible, and thereby generate better predictions. SD models, on the other 
hand, have increasingly focused on understanding the dynamic path into the future. The 
focus has been on learning: facilitating a better understanding of how the industry (or the 
system generally) evolves over time, understanding which variables are critical and where 
to intervene in the system to create a desirable outcome (Lomi and Larsen 1999).  
One further advantage of using the SD method is that the framework can be tested at a very 
early stage of restructuring, where most other methods do not work because there is little if 
any data.  A good understanding of how the regulatory framework will play out can still be 
obtained (Larsen and Bunn 1999; Lomi and Larsen 1999).  
 
4.4 Past work using SD to study the ESI 
The earliest significant application of SD models was for the energy sector in the U.S since 
the 1970s (Backus 2009). Initially, the Federal Energy Administration used Project 
Independence Evaluation System (PIES) for policy evaluation. The successor to the PIES 
model was then supplemented by a policy oriented model based on SD called FOSSIL1 
because:  
   It allowed faster computation (12 seconds versus 100 hours)  
   It allowed policy analysts to easily explore various options before presenting them 
   The SD method provided a casual explanation understandable to policy makers 
 71 
 
   It allowed exploration of various policy considerations and turn them into passable  
legislation. It is believed that FOSSIL1’s ability to reveal the varied, shifting impacts of 
energy policy over time played a large part in achieving national oil and gas 
deregulation legislation.   
Under the championship of Roger Naill, FOSSIL1 morphed into FOSSIL2 and was used 
from 1978 through to beyond 1995 as the U.S. National Energy Policy Model by most U.S. 
and international energy analysts. Even though FOSSIL2 was later taken over by another 
model called National Energy Modelling Systems (NEMS), it was further advanced by 
George Backus into another SD model called ENERGY2020. SD applications in energy 
modelling have been widely published (Naill 1992; Naill, Belanger et al. 1992; Dyner 
2000; Backus 2009; Chin-Yen, Burns et al. 2009). 
Applications of SD models specific to the ESI started in 1983 when the Economics Group 
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, U.S. developed an SD model called Electric Utility 
Policy and Planning Model (EPPAM) to study the spiral of impossibility in the electric 
utility industry prior to the ESI restructuring (Ford and Youngblood 1983). The spiral of 
impossibility happens because of the long lead time of power plants’ construction. Before 
construction, the utility company raises the price of electricity to fund the construction. The 
higher price dampens demand growth, making the consumption less than what has been 
initially forecasted by the utility. This makes the built capacity more than the required 
consumption, causing a shortfall of revenues. When the utility raises the price further to 
cover the fixed cost of the plants, the demand growth is dampened further and the utility 
faces what is known as the “spiral of impossibility”. Their study showed that the spiral can 
pose substantial planning problems for utility companies with long lead time power plants 
and serving customers that react strongly and quickly to changes in the price of electricity. 
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The best policy in minimizing the spiral’s effects is to shift to generating technologies with 
shorter construction lead times.  
In 1992, Bunn and Larsen used SD to study the impact of ESI restructuring in the U.K 
(Bunn and Larsen 1992). Their study examined the effectiveness of the 1992 pool market 
mechanism in stimulating investment in electricity generating capacity. Their work showed 
that if generation companies responded simply to the capacity element as generated by the 
daily market for electricity, then severe cycles of under and over capacity would result. In 
1999, they performed an evaluation of their 1992 paper and showed that the broad insight 
from the early study had in fact been correct, whereby the problems raised in the study had 
been seen in the industry during the 1990s (Larsen and Bunn 1999).  
In 2001, Andrew Ford applied SD to study the California electricity crisis (Ford 2001). His 
study showed that the American western ESI were prone to boom and bust cycles that 
appear in commodity markets. Without fundamental changes in the wholesale market 
structure, their next construction boom would come too late to prevent a decline in reserve 
margins and the reappearance of price spikes as happened in 2000 and 2001. He suggested 
that wholesale markets could be improved if private investors receive an additional 
incentive in the form of fixed capacity payment. Ford has also used SD to analyse various 
issues in the ESI such as: 
 Effects of energy conservation practices on utility performance (Ford, Bull et al. 
1987; Ford and Bull 1989) 
 Impact of efficiency standards on utility planning (Ford and Geinzer 1990) 
 Impacts of electric vehicles on utilities (Ford 1994) 
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In his recent studies of the ESI, Ford has also combined SD models with other approaches 
such as the engineering approach (Dimitrovski, Ford et al. 2007).  
In 2005, Kadoya et al (Kadoya, Sasaki et al. 2005), used SD model to study the long term 
stability of the deregulated industry. They modeled two power producing regions in the 
U.S. - Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) and the Independent 
System Operator – New England (ISO-NE) and validated the models against 20 years of 
data. Applying Monte Carlo analyses to their models suggested that for a realistic range of 
assumptions, deregulated wholesale power markets are substantially more cyclical than 
they would have been under a regulated monopoly regime.  
Two studies that utilized SD to model electricity systems for hydro dominated countries are 
Olsina’s (Olsina 2005) on Argentina’s power system and Vogstad (Vogstad 2004) and 
Botterud (Botterud 2003) on the Nordic electricity market. SD has also been used to test 
new market mechanisms in a restructured ESI. Some examples on this kind of work are: 
 Development of improved mechanism for capacity payment (Hobbs 1995; Hobbs, 
Hu et al. 2007; Assili, Javidi D.B et al. 2008) 
 Analyses on alternative regulations in the Colombian electricity market (Arango, 
Smith et al. 2002) 
SD has also been used to provide some insights on how the ESI in developing countries 
could be impacted after they are restructured. In 2006, Kiani et al. (Kiani, Jadid et al. 2006) 
used SD to examine the impact of ESI restructuring on generation capacity growth in Iran. 
In 2009, Balnac et al. used SD to study privatisation policy impacts onto the ESI in 
Mauritius.   
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4.5 Chapter summary 
Real options and game theories are capable of being used to study some aspects of 
generation investments. However, for this study, SD methods have been chosen to fulfil the 
research objectives. 
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5 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN NEW ZEALAND 
This chapter provides a background of the ESI in NZ with emphasis on restructuring. The 
current New Zealand market structure, the problems faced and the past energy shortages 
are elaborated on. The chapter then focuses on the generation expansion issues in New 
Zealand. Planning methods and relevant national policies that impact the sector are then 
discussed.  
5.1 Geography of New Zealand 
New Zealand is a country in the south-west Pacific Ocean, lying between latitudes 33º and 
48º South and longitudes 165º and 179º East. Its land covers an area of 268,680 square 
kilometres. Most of its land mass is made up of two islands – the North Island and the 
South Island – but there are also a number of smaller islands. Its capital is Wellington, 
situated at the southern end of the North Island.  
Its latitudes pass through the temperate zone of the world, but the climate is influenced by 
the surrounding sea. The weather of any particular area varies due to its mountainous 
terrain in certain regions.  With a total population of about 4 million people, New Zealand 
has a low population density. About 80% of the population lives in cities, particularly in the 
North Island cities of Auckland and Wellington. New Zealand has abundant natural energy 
resources of coal, natural gas and hydro, though current natural gas fields are rapidly 
declining (International Energy Agency 2006). 
5.2 Early history of electricity usage in New Zealand   
The first recorded use of electricity in New Zealand was in 1861 for a private telegraph line 
between Dunedin and Port Chalmers. In 1863, the first government lines installed by a 
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provincial council connected Christchurch to the port of Lyttelton. The first substantial use 
of electricity for the public was for lighting. After several private lighting installations, 
various electrical companies came into the picture in 1882 (Martin 1998). The first major 
hydroelectric generation of power in New Zealand was in 1886, powering the Bullendale 
gold mine in Otago. Following that, in 1888, a company, Reefton Electrical Transmission 
of Power and Lighting, was formed with 65 shareholders. Electricity was offered for sale to 
the public there for the first time from sunset to sunrise (Martin 1998). 
5.3 Initial roles of the government 
During the early development stage of electricity in New Zealand, the government’s role 
was to only regulate the electricity supply. The initial physical infrastructures were mainly 
set up by private companies. In 1865, the Electric Telegraphic Act established a central 
government monopoly over the transmission of messages and provided for state 
construction, maintenance and regulation of telegraphic telecommunication (Martin 1998). 
The act was consolidated in 1875 and then incorporated in the Electric Lines Act 1884 to 
extend the coverage of government legislation to electric lighting of public places and to 
telephones. The Electric Lines Act ensured proper quality and care of the electric lines 
(Martin 1998).  
The government then started to get involved in electric power generation. The Electrical 
Motive Power Act of 1896 emphasised that any generation or use of electricity for motive 
power should get permission from the central government rather than the local authorities. 
The Water-Power Act 1903 gave the government the sole right to use water for generating 
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electricity. These two Acts were then incorporated into the Public Works Act 1908 (Martin 
1998).  
The Aid to Water-Power Works Act 1910 authorised the raising of ₤500,000 by the 
government for the construction of electric power works and use of water for power 
generation. In 1910, the Water-Power Works Account was established (later named 
Electric Supply Account). All loans raised for hydro electric schemes and income received 
from electricity sales went to this account. This provided the commercial basis for the 
government’s bulk supply of electricity. The government’s financial role was formalized in 
the State Supply of Electrical Energy Act 1917 (Martin 1998). 
Lake Coleridge was the first major government hydroelectric project, constructed from 
1911 to 1914 (Martin 1998). The success of this first scheme led to several large scale 
hydroelectric schemes, which have been in operation thereafter. This gave the concept of 
an integrated system of stations to provide power across the country. 
In 1918, Evan Parry, the first Electrical Engineer in the Public Works Department, 
proposed the creation of a linked network of electricity with the aim of a fully integrated 
system with a standardized voltage supplying various people and needs. The Electric Power 
Board Act 1918 was passed with the aim of setting a pattern for the reticulation of 
electricity (Martin 1998). This formed the foundation for the transmission network in New 
Zealand. 
The Municipal Corporations Act 1920 gave the municipalities the right to build power 
stations, distribute electricity and to transfer funds from their profitable electricity 
 78 
 
departments to other activities, actions which were prohibited by the previous Electric-
Power Boards Act (Martin 1998). The new Act provided a faster track in giving the rural 
districts early access to electricity. All the distribution networks in New Zealand then came 
under the local municipals until they were privatised later. 
5.4 Prior to Restructuring 
By the mid-1980s, electricity generation and transmission were the responsibilities of a 
government department, the Ministry of Energy. This Ministry was also responsible for 
policy advice and regulatory functions. Regional electricity distribution and supply were 
the responsibility of sixty-one electricity supply authorities who were also the local 
municipalities. They were electorally selected and became the statutory monopolies in their 
respective regions (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2009). 
5.5 Factors for the ESI reforms 
The ESI restructuring in New Zealand started in the mid 1980s (Ministry of Economic 
Development New Zealand 2009) for various reasons. In terms of electricity supply, there 
was extensive political involvement in generation investment decisions. Project 
management was said not to have met the correct standards. Wholesale pricing was 
claimed to have been determined by political factors. Since the electricity supply was done 
by the local government, there was no competition and the consumer did not have any 
choice. This was claimed to be inefficient (Ministry of Economic Development New 
Zealand 2009).  
This set of circumstances coincided with increasing concern about New Zealand's overall 
economic performance. Outcomes sought included economic growth through efficient 
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resource use, driven by clearer price signals, and, where possible, by competitive markets 
(Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2009). In the early 1980s, a major inter-
departmental review of the Crown's role in the electricity industry was commenced, 
looking to separate operation from other functions, and to improve performance by 
introducing commercial disciplines for trading activities. 
5.6 The transition to the present structure 
The Electricity Amendment Act 1987 came into force on 1 January 1988, removing the 
need for the Minister of Energy to approve all new hydro generation proposals. The 
Ministry of Energy was then abolished, effective from December 1989. Its policy, 
regulatory and other non-commercial roles were transferred to the new Energy and 
Resources Division (now the Resources & Networks Branch) of the Ministry of Commerce 
(now the Ministry of Economic Development). A small number of residual and transitional 
Ministry of Energy commercial responsibilities were transferred to The Treasury (Ministry 
of Economic Development New Zealand 2009). 
5.6.1 Electricity generation and transmission reforms - Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand (ECNZ) 
The Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) was formed on 1 April 1987 under 
the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act, with the aim to commercialise the government’s 
trading departments (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2009). It owned 
and operated the electricity generation and transmission assets of the Ministry of Energy. 
Policy and regulatory activities were separated out and largely retained in the Ministry of 
Energy (prior to their abolishment). The expectation of the new corporation was that it 
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would perform more efficiently while investing prudently, and that it would lead the way in 
the economic reforms.  
The SOE Act was a component of the Government's moves to improve the performance 
and accountability of the public sector. SOEs are companies in which nominated Ministers 
hold all the shares, and the enterprises negotiate annual Statements of Corporate Intent 
(SCIs) with shareholding Ministers. SOEs operate with commercial structures and 
incentives and with the principal objective of being successful businesses (Ministry of 
Economic Development New Zealand 2008). 
ECNZ was based around three business units: 
1. Electricorp Production – to operate the power stations 
2. Electricorp Marketing – to market the electricity 
3. Transpower – to operate the national grid 
There was a fourth unit, PowerDesignBuild, constituted as a subsidiary, to perform design 
and construction work (Martin 1998).  
The low lake inflows of the South Island from November 1991 until June 1992 resulted in 
a shortage of power that lead to energy conservation by the public. The government cleared 
ECNZ of the crisis stating that the primary cause of the shortage was the prolonged 
drought, exacerbated by an unexpected increase in demand. However, the allegation was 
made that ECNZ was derelict in its duty for deliberately misusing the system. The 
Electricity Shortage Review Committee concluded that there was no evidence to support 
the allegation and gave a strong vote of confidence to ECNZ. It was claimed that the 
occurrence of such a drought was statistically once in every 100 years. The power crisis in 
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1992 resulted in a loss of public confidence in ECNZ and the media blamed the corporation 
for the crisis (Mohamed 2004).  
In May 1993, the government announced the decision to separate the transmission 
subsidiary, Transpower from ECNZ. Transpower was set up as a stand-alone SOE, 
effective from 1 July 1994 (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2009). This 
marks the start of legal separation of generation and transmission in New Zealand. 
5.6.2 Electricity distribution and retail reforms 
As described in section 5.3, electricity distribution was initially done primarily by local 
municipalities. In July 1992, the Energy Companies Act 1992 came into effect, calling for 
the corporatization of the ESAs. Diverse ownership patterns resulted ranging from trust 
ownership and private shareholding and combinations of the two. In April 1993, the 
Electricity Act 1992 became effective whereby the following took place: 
 Deregulation (the removal of distributors' statutory monopolies and of the 
obligation to supply) 
 Information disclosure, focused particularly on natural monopolies 
 Temporary provision for price control for domestic consumers 
 Compulsory maintenance of line services until 2013 (20 years) 
This was the first stage of removal of statutory distribution and retail monopolies (and the 
obligation to supply), allowing competition for sales to retail consumers. In July 1998, the 
Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 was effective whereby under the Act, corporate 
separation of lines and energy businesses was to be achieved by 1 April 1999 and full 
ownership separation no later than 31 December 2003. In response to the event, the 
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industry chose to move more quickly, completing full ownership separation before 1 April 
1999. On that date, there were seven retailers, many owned by generation companies. 
Merger activity over the period of ownership change was less pronounced among line 
businesses, of which there were 32 on 1 April 1999 (Ministry of Economic Development 
New Zealand 2009). This later reduced to 28 in 2004 (Evans and Meade 2005). 
5.6.3 Wholesale electricity market formation 
By October 1992, the generation sector was still relatively less reformed compared to the 
distribution and retailing sectors. With the push from the private sectors, in June 1995, the 
government made the following steps to form the wholesale electricity market - ECNZ was 
split into two competing SOEs (ECNZ and Contact Energy). ECNZ's Maui gas contract 
was transferred to Contact Energy. ECNZ's proposal for a new Taranaki plant was sold 
(including associated gas supply). Six small hydro plants owned by ECNZ were sold. 
Special constraints on ECNZ were applied until its market share fell to 45% (cap on 
building new capacity, ring-fencing new capacity, and high level of firm capacity to be 
offered by tender for long-term contracts).  
In 1993, the Electricity Market Company (subsequently renamed M-Co) was set up, to 
support the electricity market framework for wholesale trading. It was an on-line secondary 
market in trading of ECNZ's hedge contracts, including provision of market information. A 
market surveillance committee was established to admit new entrants and supervise 
conduct. This committee was not government regulated and made up of the ESI 
representatives. A Metering and Reconciliation Information Agreement (MARIA) was 
administered to record and reconcile flows to meet the needs of parties contracting in the 
wholesale and retail markets. Under the MARIA agreement, Transpower, as the National 
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Reconciliation Manager, reconciles information against contracts and passes information 
for billing back to market participants (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 
2009).  
In October 1996, the competitive wholesale electricity market started under the New 
Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM). M-co was contracted to act as Market Administrator, 
Clearing Manager and Pricing Manager. Transpower took the role of the System Operator, 
i.e. the scheduler and dispatcher of energy from generation source to the distribution 
network. At that time, the available generation companies were only Contact Energy and 
ECNZ. The retailers were companies such as Pacific Energy (formed by a number of 
distribution companies), Energy Brokers (formed by major commercial and industrial 
customers), Power Buy and other companies made of combined distribution companies. 
These retailers were displaced in 1999 when ECNZ was separated into competing 
generation companies and vertical integration of generation and retailing occurred. The 
generation companies are Genesis, Meridian Energy and Mighty River Power (see section 
5.6.5). When they started their retailing arms, they were able to force other retailers out of 
business by their bidding strategies. 
Electricity prices in NZEM are based on bids and offers from market participants (i.e. 
generation companies, purchasers and traders), and the price is not capped. Initially, the 
spot market is supplemented by trading of longer term hedge contracts. However, from 1 
March 2004, the NZEM pool was made into a compulsory pool, with the exception of the 
New Zealand Aluminium Smelter, which has long term contracts in place for the delivery 
of electricity (Evans and Meade 2005). 
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5.6.4 The sale of Contact Energy 
In February 1996, Contact Energy commenced operations as an SOE generator, in 
competition with ECNZ. Contact Energy took on the former ECNZ power stations at 
Roxburgh, Clyde, New Plymouth, Wairakei, Ohaaki, Otahuhu, Stratford and Whirinaki, 
which represented 22% of the total electricity production. Contact Energy also took over 
ECNZ's contracts for Maui gas. In March 1999, the sale of a 40% shareholding in Contact 
Energy was made to U.S.-based Edison Mission Energy for $NZ1.208 billion. The 
government subsequently sold its remaining share of Contact Energy in May 1999, to more 
than 225,000 investors at $NZ3.10 per share (Ministry of Economic Development New 
Zealand 2009).  
5.6.5 Further reforms 
In April 1999, the ECNZ was split into three competing state-owned generation companies. 
With the final break up of ECNZ, it now remained only to manage its hedge and debt 
obligations whilst winding up its other activities. 
The new companies, which commenced trading on 1 April 1999 were:  
 Genesis Power Ltd  - based in Manukau City, owned the Huntly thermal plants and 
Tongariro hydro power stations  
 Meridian Energy Ltd - based in Wellington, owned the South Island's hydro 
Waitaki river and Manapouri power stations.  
 Mighty River Power Ltd - based in Auckland, owned the Waikato river hydro 
system.  
The way these assets were divided posed some opportunities for these companies to 
exercise their market powers. Following winter shortages in 2001 and 2003, in March 
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2004, new electricity market arrangements were established under the Electricity 
Governance Rules and Regulations (enacted in December 2003). The new arrangements 
terminated the former operations under MARIA. The Electricity Commission (EC) took 
over responsibility for operating the electricity market (see 5.6.7.2 for further details on the 
EC). It is also responsible for managing the supply security during dry years by 
implementing the reserve energy scheme (elaborated further in section 5.12.1). 
However, another dry year occurred in the winter of 2008 prompting the government to 
again review the ESI structure. Several changes were again done to the ESI, this time 
through the Electricity Industry Bill 2009. These changes are generally known as the 
Ministerial Review 2009. These review resulted in some measures to improve prices, costs 
and competition and to improve security of supply.  
The measures introduced to improve prices, costs and competition were: 
 reconfiguration of SOE assets to reduce some generators market power in the 
wholesale market in dry years 
 requirement for all major electricity generation companies to put in place an 
accessible electricity hedge market; 
 permission for lines companies to get back into electricity retailing, subject to strict 
controls; and  
 establishment of a $15 million fund over three years to promote customer switching 
between retailers. 
Initiatives to increase the security of supply included: 
 requiring generation companies or retailers to compensate consumers in the event 
of conservation campaigns or a dry-year power cut; 
 abolishing the reserve energy scheme; and 
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 increasing the attractiveness of gas exploration and development. 
Initiatives to ensure effective governance included: 
 abolishing the Electricity Commission and replacing it with a slimmed-down 
Electricity Authority, with far fewer objectives and functions than the Commission; 
 establishing a Security and Reliability Council to monitor Transpower's 
performance and advise on security of supply; and 
 transferring responsibility for grid upgrade approvals to the Commerce 
Commission. 
These changes were made effective in October 2010 (Ministry of Economic Development 
New Zealand 2010).  
5.6.6 The present ESI structure in New Zealand 
Following twenty years of gradual transformation of the New Zealand electricity supply 
industry, the ESI has arrived at its present structure. The New Zealand electricity market is 
split into the following areas: regulation, generation, administration and market clearing, 
transmission, distribution and retailing (see Figure 5.1). The details on each area are 
provided in the following sub sections. 
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5.6.7 Regulators 
The main regulator for the competitive ESI as well as other competitive industry in New 
Zealand is the Commerce Commission (CC). Another regulator that is specific to the ESI is 
the Electricity Authority (EA) which replaced the Electricity Commission (EC) in October 
2010.  
5.6.7.1    The Commerce Commission (CC) 
In the early New Zealand electricity market reform, the industry was set up to self regulate 
using demand and supply theory. The only regulator that oversees the industry as well as 
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of the New Zealand Electricity Supply Industry – adapted from (Evans 
and Meade 2005) 
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other competitive industries was the Commerce Commission (CC). This setup was 
generally known as light handed regulation. 
The Commerce Commission is New Zealand's primary competition regulatory agency and 
was established under section 8 of the Commerce Act 1986. The Commission is an 
independent Crown entity and is not subject to direction from the government in carrying 
out its enforcement and regulatory control activities. The Commission’s purpose is to 
promote dynamic and responsive markets so that New Zealanders benefit from competitive 
prices, better quality and greater choice (Commerce Commission 2009). 
The Commerce Commission enforces legislation that promotes competition in New 
Zealand markets and prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct by traders. The 
Commission also enforces a number of pieces of legislation specific to the 
telecommunications, dairy and electricity industries. The Commission also has both an 
enforcement and adjudication role in the electricity industry under the Electricity Industry 
Reform Act 1998.  
Due to the absence of competition in the lines business, suppliers of electricity lines 
services are subject to the regulatory provisions under subpart 9 of Part 4 of the 
Commerce Act 1986 (the Act) from 1 April 2009. They have to adhere to information 
disclosure regulation and certain performance standards.   
5.6.7.2 Electricity Commission (EC) 
 
Prior to 2003, the New Zealand’s ESI was self-regulating and appointed an independent 
Market Surveillance Committee (NZMSC) to oversee its actions. However, because it was 
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appointed by the members of the industry and not backed by any formal government 
regulator, the NZMSC found it difficult to take positions contrary to the interests of the 
industry.  
New Zealand experienced a sustained period of extremely high wholesale prices during the 
period June to September of 2001 and again during the period June to September of 2003. 
In response to the initial period of extremely high spot prices in 2001, two market 
participants claimed that the high prices were due to the exercise of unilateral market power 
and prompted the NZMSC to investigate the matter. Despite average prices during June 
2001 that were more than 4 times the average prices for the previous year, the NZMSC 
concluded that, “the Committee does not find that an “Undesirable Situation” in the NZEM 
existed during 2001 (up to the end of June) and, in particular, in May and June of 2001.” 
As a consequence, few actions were taken to prevent almost the same sequence of events 
during the same time period of 2003 (Wolak 2004). The government then decided to 
abandon the light handed regulation. 
The Electricity Amendment Act 2001 allowed the Government to establish an Electricity 
Governance Board. It provides the Government with the power to make regulations on a 
number of matters, including: requirement to provide domestic consumers with a low fixed 
charge tariff option, electricity governance, a complaints resolution system, hydro spill and 
hedge prices (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2008). The Electricity 
Governance Regulations were established in 2003, with a seven-member Electricity 
Commission (EC) to take over governance functions. It began operations on 14 September 
2003. The costs of the Commission were recovered from the electricity industry via a levy. 
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In December 2003, the EC took over responsibility for operating the electricity market 
from MARIA. 
The Commission was responsible for securing reserve generation to ensure New Zealand's 
electricity needs could be met even in very dry years without power savings campaigns. 
This involved significant changes to deliver long-term electricity supply security and to 
curb extreme price volatility in the electricity spot market in dry years. The Commission 
was responsible for managing the electricity sector so that electricity demand could be met 
even in a 1-in-60 dry year, without the need for national power conservation campaigns. It 
did this by contracting with generation companies for the provision of dry year reserve 
generation capacity and fuel.  
The EC was also responsible for modelling and forecasting future demand and supply 
conditions in the industry and determining transmission investment and pricing. As part of 
this obligation, they published the Statement of Opportunities (SOO) (more details on SOO 
in section 5.13) once every two years to provide the market players with information on 
load demand forecasts and possible future scenarios resulting from various government 
policies. Based on the SOO, Transpower then needed to publish an Annual Planning 
Report (APR) to provide information to the ESI on its investment plans. These publications 
were intended to help the market players with their future investment decisions. 
5.6.7.3 Electricity Authority (EA)  
Since 1 November 2010, the Electricity Authority (EA) (Electricity Authority 2010) has 
overseen the New Zealand’s ESI.  The Electricity Authority is an independent Crown entity 
under the Crown Entities Act and is responsible for promoting competition, reliable supply 
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and efficient operation of the electricity market for the long-term benefit of consumers. The 
Electricity Authority's key functions include (Ministry of Economic Development New 
Zealand 2010): 
 making and administering the rules governing the electricity industry through an 
Electricity Industry Participation Code; 
 monitoring compliance with the code and other provisions in the Electricity 
Industry Act and regulations and take enforcement action; 
 undertaking market facilitation measures such as education and providing 
guidelines, information and model arrangements;  
 industry and market monitoring, and carrying out reviews, studies and inquiries into 
matters relating to the industry; and  
 contracting for market operation services and system operator services. 
The main difference between the EC and the EA is that the EA will have less control over 
the operations of the ESI (such as transmission expansion), is no longer involved with work 
on energy efficiency. With the Ministerial Review in 2009, through the abolishment of the 
reserve energy scheme and making it a requirement for retailers to pay consumers in the 
event of a conservation or dry year power cuts, EA it is not responsible for any future dry 
year shortages.    
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5.6.8 Generation companies 
Electricity generation in New Zealand today is dominated by five companies - Meridian 
Energy, Contact Energy, Genesis Energy, Mighty River Power and TrustPower. They are 
major players in New Zealand’s electricity supply industry where they are all active in 
generation, the wholesale market and retail sales of electricity. Table 5.1 shows the 
companies’ profiles which were obtained from their latest annual reports. These five 
companies combined produce or control more than 95% of New Zealand's total electricity 
generation.  
Table 5.1: New Zealand’s main generation companies  
 
Company 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Ownership   
Contact 
Energy 
2,070 Public  
Genesis 
Energy 
1,977 SOE 
Meridian 
Energy 
2,601 SOE 
Mighty 
River 
Power 
1,369 SOE 
Trust 
Power 
594 Public 
Some smaller generation power plants exist, most of which are associated with major 
industrial processes (cogeneration). There are a number of smaller companies in the 
electricity generation industry including WEL Networks, NZ Windfarms, Todd Energy, 
NZ Energy, MainPower and Top Energy (Electricity Commission 2008).  
Generation companies own and operate power stations across the country.  Most of New 
Zealand’s electricity is generated at remote locations and requires an efficient transmission 
system to transport it to the main demand centres.  Around 40 sites supply electricity to the 
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national grid. Some of the smaller scale generation is embedded and feeds directly into 
local distribution networks. 
Currently, approximately 60% of New Zealand's electricity is generated by hydro stations, 
with the balance from geothermal stations, gas, coal and oil-fired thermal stations, biomass 
plants and wind farms (New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development 2009). More 
details on the generation trends in New Zealand are provided in section 5.10.  
5.6.9 Spot wholesale electricity market 
The spot wholesale electricity market in New Zealand is known as the New Zealand 
electricity market (NZEM).  It was initially created by the ESI via a multilateral agreement 
as a voluntary self regulating market, and began full operation on 1 October 1996. Initially, 
about 80% of the electricity consumed in New Zealand was voluntarily traded through the 
NZEM. The remaining electricity was transacted through bilateral contracts between 
generation companies, retailers and major users outside the market. From 1 March 2004, 
the NZEM pool was made into a compulsory pool, with the exception of the New Zealand 
Aluminium Smelter, which has long term contracts in place for the delivery of electricity 
(Evans and Meade 2005). It is an energy only pool where the wholesale electricity prices 
are determined in NZD per MWh. 
At its establishment, the NZEM adopted guidelines given by the government to assess 
market participant behaviour and rule changes. They required the NZEM to collectively 
foster efficient and competitive markets, enable entry of new buyers and sellers, comply 
with the law, be robust and enforceable and maintain a certain process to set and change 
rules.  
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Initially, these were overseen by the NZEM Rules Committee, with compliance monitored 
by an independent Market Surveillance Committee. The monitoring function was then 
taken over by EC in 2003 and then the EA in 2010. M-Co (M-Co 2010) was initially set up 
by the industry as the Electricity Market Company and responsible for the development of 
the NZEM. It then acted as: 
 the market administrator  
 pricing manager  - calculates and publishes final prices based on actual supplies and 
demands 
 clearing manager – settles the market 
The operation of the NZEM is elaborated on in section 5.7. 
5.6.10 Transmission  
The transmission system in New Zealand has the following characteristics (Evans and 
Meade 2005): 
 Long and sparse lines due to New Zealand’s geography and load distribution 
 Completely isolated from the network of any other country 
 Major demand centres are in the North Island whereas the major hydro generation 
capacity is in the South Island. However, the largest electricity consumer is the 
New Zealand Aluminium Smelter at Tiwai Point, Bluff at the bottom of the South 
Island. It takes 15% of the annual electricity demand.  
 The 350kV high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines between Benmore in the 
South Island and Haywards in the North Island, comprised of 570km of overhead 
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lines and 40km underwater across Cook Strait, is vital in providing electricity 
exchange between the two main islands 
Transpower transmits power at high voltages to the distribution companies and also to 
some direct large power customers such as BHP NZ Steel (near Auckland) and Methanex 
(near New Plymouth). Besides acting as the dispatcher of electricity supply as determined 
from the spot wholesale market, Transpower also acts as the System Operator (SO) to 
manage the physical characteristics of electricity supply to ensure system-wide security and 
supply quality. 
5.6.11 Distribution 
As of December 2010, there were 28 lines companies that owned the local distribution 
networks throughout New Zealand. The ownership of distribution companies is a mix of 
public listings, shareholder co-operatives, community trusts and local body ownership, with 
most lines companies being owned by trusts (Evans and Meade 2005). Lines companies 
differ in size, with one company (Vector) making up one third of the sector (by number of 
connections), and the largest four (Vector, Powerco, Orion and Unison) supplying 66% of 
all connections. Vector operates in Auckland, Powerco in the lower North Island, Orion in 
Christchurch and Unison in Hawkes Bay, Taupo and Rotorua. The lines companies are 
connected to the national grid, and for the most part sell their services to retailers, although 
some distribution companies contract directly with connected consumers. Most consumers 
are connected to the local distribution networks. 
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5.6.12 Retail companies 
The retail market is a market where electricity retailers compete to sell the electricity they 
have purchased on the wholesale market to consumers, including small-scale industrial and 
commercial users and domestic consumers. Retailers can also purchase electricity directly 
from embedded generators (smaller generators connected directly to distribution networks 
such as from biomass, landfill, and wind turbine generation) (Electricity Commission 
2009). The retail space is dominated by the five main generation companies as discussed in 
section 5.6.8. 
5.7 NZEM operation 
In determining the prices for the wholesale electric energy, NZEM uses a transparent 
pricing mechanism to ensure balance between electricity supply and demand in 48 half-
hour periods, trading each day, at each of the 244 nodes on the national grid. Its operation 
is shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
COMIT Pre-dispatch 
schedule 
Dispatch  Reconciliation Registry 
Monthly 
settlement 
Final prices 
published daily 
Market rules 
Surveillance & Compliance 
Prudential security & monitoring 
National grid operation 
DEMAND 
Purchaser 
SUPPLY 
Generator 
offers 
bids 
Figure 5.2: New Zealand’s wholesale electricity market (Evans and Meade 2005) 
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NZEM services are provided via contestable contracts. The Commodity Information and 
Trading (COMIT) system provides an internet based means for generation companies to 
submit offers and purchasers to submit bids at each node up to 36 hours before dispatch 
(Commodity Information and Trading system (COMIT) 2010). Information on how 
generators are anticipated to meet demands is provided by the scheduler, Transpower, 
which, as dispatcher, also matches actual demands and supplies in real time to ensure 
physical balance (Evans and Meade 2005). 
Generation companies compete to generate based on the price they offer to generate at. 
These offers are submitted via a secure internet site, where they are loaded into a complex 
solving program known as Scheduling, Pricing and Dispatch (SPD)
 
which is set up to 
minimise the final cost to consumers for each trading period. This solving program 
considers the offers of generation companies, expected demand, constraints on high voltage 
lines, and line losses to produce an expected price and level of generation for market 
participants. Information is received by the various market participants on expected 
generation levels and prices, and from here they make further decisions on how they will 
conduct their trading activities.  
Transpower, the System Operator, then uses the above information to produce dispatch 
instructions
 
using the solving program, which it issues to all power stations around New 
Zealand via a computerised dispatch tool at least every half hour of the day. A dispatch 
instruction tells the generator how much to generate, how much reserve to be available, 
whether or not the station is the frequency keeper and information on other ancillary 
services such as voltage support. Generation companies receive payments for their output 
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by selling into the NZEM compulsory pool where it is transported from generation source 
to GXP
 
along the high voltage network, and from here it is paid for by consumers and 
retailers (Genesis Energy 2010). From 1 March 2004, the NZEM pool was made into a 
compulsory pool, with an exception of the New Zealand Aluminium Smelter, which has 
long term contracts in place for the delivery of electricity (Evans and Meade 2005). 
5.7.1.1 Price determination in NZEM  
In New Zealand, the prices are ex post where the payment is determined after the load 
dispatch when the actual load demand is already known and the actual price have been 
determined (from the actual intersection of the supply and demand curve) (Evans and 
Meade 2005) . Prices are determined at each GIP and GXP for each half hour trading 
period of the day. Prices are discovered from generation offers, demand, transmission 
constraints and line losses. An example is provided below to illustrate the price 
determination (Genesis Energy 2010). 
As an illustration, assume the NZEM has three generators - Gen 1, Gen 2 and Gen 3, each 
with 200 MW of installed capacity. For a particular trading period, all generators can offer 
in their generation using up to five price bands (NZD per MWh). Each price band must 
have a number of MW attached to it as shown in Figure 5.3. Each generator submits its 
offers to the Market via New Zealand’s Electricity Market trading platform COMIT and 
this information is then passed on to Transpower. Transpower gathers all the offers 
together and stacks them in order from lowest to highest price and then using its forecast 
demand, determines how much electricity it is going to need to meet demand for a 
particular half hour. 
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Figure 5.3: Price bands example offered by generators (Genesis Energy 2010) 
 
If for example the system demand was to be 530 MW for a particular half hour period, this 
would result in the price of $75.02 (as highlighted in Figure 5.3). All the offers below this 
price will then be accepted (successful bids) resulting in Gen 1 being dispatched to generate 
180 MW, Gen 2 being dispatched at 175 MW and Gen 3 also being dispatched at 175 MW. 
All generators get paid the marginal price for their generation. The price is set by Gen 2’s 
$75.02 price band, and as it is the marginal generator, it only gets dispatched 15 MW of its 
 100 
 
$75.02 band. In this example, the revenue for each generator is equal to (Price*MW)/2. 
Revenue is divided by two because the trading is done in half hour periods – not full hours. 
5.7.1.2 The financial flows in the market  
All electricity dealings are carried out via the compulsory pool which means that all 
electricity generated goes into a pool
 
and flows out of the pool via GXPs
 
dotted along the 
high voltage transmission network. The first step involves the discovery of price, as 
determined by the generators’ offers, level of demand, and transmission losses and 
constraints. This sets the price at each node
 
and generators get paid the price at their GIP. 
The electricity flows onto the national grid and then exits at over 250 different GXPs 
around New Zealand, flowing onto distribution networks where it is then delivered to end 
users. Each GXP sees different wholesale prices to take into account transmission costs. 
The different prices are known as Locational Marginal Prices (LMP). At the GXP there is 
also a price which is paid by either the retailing companies, customers paying spot prices, 
or generation companies providing a hedge contract. At the end of the month retailers 
determine how much their customers have used by reading meters at the Installation 
Control Points (ICP)
 
level and then sum them back to the GXP level for each trading period 
of the month, determining the totals they have to pay for spot purchases for a particular 
month. Figure 5.4 shows the overview of the price flow from the pool to the consumers. 
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Figure 5.4: Overview of the NZEM price flows (Genesis Energy 2010) 
 
5.8 Ancillary services 
Since the compulsory pool is an energy trading pool, the ancillary services are provided 
using other arrangements. The arrangements are done via a reserve market and a frequency 
keeping market.   
5.8.1 The reserve market  
As part of the System Operator responsibilities, Transpower is required to ensure that 
enough generation is kept in reserve to cover the risk of large generators or HVDC tripping,
 
and to ensure that the system frequency is kept at around 50 Hz in both the North and 
South Islands. Generation companies and load bearers (such as distribution networks) with 
interruptible load (i.e. controllable load such as water heating), offer the reserve capacity to 
Transpower. There are two types of reserve required – Fast Instantaneous Reserve (FIR) 
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and Slow Instantaneous Reserve (SIR). FIR is required to respond within 6 seconds of the 
frequency falling below the nominal frequency of 50Hz and sustain this extra generation 
for at least 60 seconds. SIR is required to respond within 60 seconds of the under frequency 
event and be maintained for up to 15 minutes if required.  
The pricing algorithm that the System Operator runs co-optimises the Energy and Reserve 
markets such that the lowest cost to the consumer is reached. This means that the energy 
and reserve markets can affect each other. When the market is short of reserve, a generating 
unit may be backed off to provide reserve even though its energy offers are below the 
clearing energy spot price. This may result in a higher spot price as it draws volume out of 
the energy market into the reserve market. In times when energy prices are lower than 
reserve prices, the risk setter may be backed off to reduce the amount of reserve required to 
produce the least cost to the market (Genesis Energy 2010).  
5.8.2 The frequency keeping market  
The frequency keeping market is a separate market from the energy market, in that the 
companies providing frequency keeping compete by offering a fee for the service for each 
half hour trading period. The frequency keeper is required to maintain frequency within a 
band of 50.2 Hz to 49.8 Hz as required by the System Operator’s primary objectives.  
As demand and generation fluctuates from second to second, the frequency either falls or 
rises and the frequency keeper must have a band of plus or minus 50 MW from its 
dispatched set point to keep frequency at the level identified above. Governors on each 
generator monitor the frequency and control the amount of water or steam flowing through 
the turbine to adjust the level of generation to suit the frequency level.  
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For example, if electricity generation is constant and demand suddenly increases, the 
frequency falls, requiring more electricity to be generated to get the frequency back to 50 
Hz. As a result of this, the frequency keeper increases its generation to stabilise the 
frequency. Conversely, if generation is constant and demand falls, then the frequency 
increases, which requires the frequency keeper to decrease output (Genesis Energy 2010).  
5.9 Unique characteristics of NZEM 
The principles behind the NZEM are very similar to other markets around the world; 
however, geographic features bring a uniqueness to it. They can be summarised as follows: 
(i) Hydro dominance in the generation mix 
(ii) Long and sparse transmission network 
(iii) The importance of the HVDC link in balancing the price between the two main 
islands 
(iv) Trading behaviours  
These features are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
5.9.1 Hydro dominance in the generation mix 
New Zealand’s mix of generation is highly skewed towards hydro generation, with at least 
60% of generation coming from hydro sources, as shown in Figure 5.5. The data table is 
provided in Appendix B3. New Zealand’s hydro storage capacity is also relatively small in 
comparison to other hydro reliant countries around the world (Genesis Energy 2010). 
Hence, the NZEM is highly influenced by hydro storage levels and prices can reach high 
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levels during dry weather. As the gap between supply and demand diminishes – the risks 
associated with dry years are exacerbated. 
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Figure 5.5: The electricity generation fuel mix in New Zealand from 1974 to 2008 (Ministry of 
Economic Development New Zealand 2008) 
 
5.9.2 The impact from the transmission networks 
New Zealand is a long and relatively thin country, with major generation sources and 
demand centres separated not only by large land distances, but the Cook Strait separating 
the two main islands. Thus New Zealand relies on a high quality transmission network that 
allows generation companies to transport their electricity from generation source to end-
users without significant losses. New Zealand’s high voltage transmission network has 
220kV and 110kV a.c. lines with a high voltage direct current (HVDC) overhead 
line/submarine cable system joining the North and South Island networks. Network 
congestion and failures can have strong impacts on wholesale electricity prices. 
The two main islands in New Zealand have different demand and supply characteristics. 
The North Island (NI) has the two major cities, Wellington and Auckland, and 80% of the 
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total population (International Energy Agency 2006). The 2009, electricity consumption in 
the NI was 23.8GWh as compared to 13.6GWh in the South Island (SI) (Electricity 
Commission 2010). In December 2008, the NI had an installed capacity of 5.8GW whereas 
the SI had 3.6GW (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2008). The power 
plants in the SI are all renewable, whereas the NI has all the thermal plants in New 
Zealand. However, the SI has the largest electricity consumer, the Tiwai Aluminium 
Smelter, consuming about 15% of the annual national electricity consumption (Evans and 
Meade 2005). As a consequence, the cheaper electricity resources are tapped from the SI 
and sent north, whereas during dry seasons, the electricity is supplied from the thermal 
plants in the NI. This is done using the HVDC link that connects the two islands.  
Figure 5.6 shows the electrical energy that has been generated in the NI and the SI 
respectively between 2003 and 2010. It shows that most of the time within the duration, 
more electricity is generated from the NI. The electricity generation from the SI which is 
hydro dominated is reduced during dry winters such as in 2003 and 2008 and during the 
HVDC loss in January 2004.  
Figure 5.7 shows the annual energy transfer using the HVDC link. Comparing the two 
figures, it can be deduced that most of the energy generated in the NI is consumed there, 
whereas most of the energy in the SI is sent northward except when hydro resources are 
limited due to the weather. 
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Figure 5.6: Electricity generated in New Zealand from 2003 to 2010 
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Figure 5.7: Annual energy transfer using the HVDC link from 1997-2009 
 
 
The typical generation and transmission scenario described in the previous paragraph 
balances the electricity prices in the two islands. The HVDC link can have a major impact 
on the spot market price as it can cause the wholesale price for the North and South Islands 
to decouple significantly if it breaks down. Figure 5.8 shows the plot of wholesale 
electricity prices at Otahuhu (North Island) and Benmore (South Island) in January 2004. 
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During an HVDC outage between 8
th
 and 13
th
 January, the prices in the two islands 
decoupled.  The electricity prices for the SI reduced (since the SI had ample cheap hydro 
supply) whereas the prices for the NI increased significantly due to the operation of thermal 
plants required to meet the demand there. 
Electricity prices at Hayward, Otahuhu and Benmore in 
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Figure 5.8: Electricity prices at Otahuhu (NI) and Benmore (SI) in January 2004 
 
    
5.9.3 Trading behaviours  
Another unique characteristic of the NZEM is that vertical integration is allowed between 
generation and retailing, resulting in the main retailers being generation companies (known 
as ‘gentailers’ (Evans and Meade 2005)). Generation companies generally sell their output 
to a retailer. However, the gentailers have to purchase the energy at a grid exit point before 
supplying electricity to the consumers. Therefore, they will have the cost of purchasing that 
electricity to consider when submitting their bids into the NZEM. High wholesale 
electricity prices increase generation companies’ profits while reducing retailers’ profits. 
Allowing vertical integration between generation and retail is believed to provide a natural 
and an efficient hedge against generation companies abusing their market power (Evans 
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and Meade 2005). On the other hand, due to the gentailers’ ability to bid strategically, they 
quickly forced out other competitors and dominated the retail sector.  
5.10 Generation trends in New Zealand  
New Zealand has mountainous regions and many water bodies allowing it to have a high 
hydro electricity potential. Thus, hydro has always dominated the generation mix (see 
Figure 5.5).   
As the demand for electricity continued to increase, a range of thermal projects based on 
technology using coal, gas and oil, were examined from the early 1960s.  The gas 
discovery at the Maui field in 1969 led the Power Committee to reintroduce the possibility 
of gas fired thermal plants. However, from 1975, the government became less keen on 
using gas for electricity and began to explore other possible uses of gas. This led to projects 
like ammonia-urea, methanol and synthetic petrol plants in Taranaki, converting natural gas 
into a variety of products in the early 1980s (Mohamed 2004). 
The use of oil in power plants in New Zealand was limited by the global oil price hike in 
the mid 1970s and cheaper alternative resources available from natural gas and from the 
hydroelectric generation in the SI. After the decommissioning of Marsden A in 1985, the 
new generation came from oil fired plants. Marsden B was an unused 250MW oil fired 
power station near the Oil Refinery at Marsden Point in Northland. Due to rising oil prices, 
the plant was mothballed in 1978 without ever being commissioned. In 2004, Mighty River 
Power proposed modification of Marsden B for operation on coal. The proposal received 
much opposition and had to be abandoned. There has been no coal plant proposed since 
then. The plant was sold and the components dismantled and shipped to India. Generation 
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from oil only commenced again in 2003 after the Electricity Commission decided to build 
the Whirinaki power plant to run during dry hydro years. 
Currently, wind power is on the rise in New Zealand. However, it has been observed that 
wind resources are less during dry years (Leyland 2009). Therefore, thermal plants still 
prove to be the reliable options to support hydro fluctuations. 
 
5.11 Generation costs in New Zealand  
The costs associated with building power plants in New Zealand is believed to be on the 
rise (Genesis Energy 2010). The costs associated with applying for resource consents via 
the Resource Management Act 1991 are extensive and the consents take a long period of 
time to be considered. They are not guaranteed to be granted. 
The marginal costs of operating thermal generation are also on the increase. Thermal 
generators use either coal or gas to fire their boilers and the cost associated with gaining 
access to these fuels has been on the increase. In particular, with the diminishing Maui gas 
field, it appears New Zealand’s cheap gas sources are drying up. Also, the costs associated 
with creating new coal mines is on the increase. On 1 July 2010 the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) commenced and included the electricity sector. 
The simplest economic rule states that price must be greater than marginal cost to make 
running of any type of plant economic in the short run. Therefore economic theory suggests 
that as short-run marginal costs (SRMC) increase, generators’ offers will reflect this, hence 
the upward movement of wholesale prices.  
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5.12 Problems faced in the NZEM 
Since the ESI restructuring in New Zealand, several problems have occurred. The problems 
concern dry year shortages and market power. 
5.12.1 Dry year winter shortages 
New Zealand, with its heavy reliance on hydropower, has one of the lowest electricity 
prices in the OECD. However, its high hydro dependence, coupled with its lack of 
interconnection with other countries, has created risks of a shortfall of electricity 
production capability when there is a lack of rainfall (World Energy Council 2004). Even 
though dry years are not new to New Zealand, they have caused more electricity shortages 
after the ESI restructuring. Shortages occurred around the winter time of 1992, 2001, 2003, 
2006 and 2008 due to high demand accompanied by a lack of hydro resources. The 
electricity demand in New Zealand is typically higher in winter due to space heating. 
In 2001, electricity prices soared through a combination of relatively low rainfall and 
colder than normal weather (Figure 5.9). Wholesale prices increased ten times (from NZD 
40 to 400/MWh), causing hardship to some retailers who had not adequately hedged. One 
large retailer was forced to leave the market. The government intervened through an energy 
conservation campaign that helped to avert further supply shortfalls (World Energy Council 
2004). 
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Figure 5.9: Monthly averages of New Zealand wholesale electricity prices (August 1999- July 2003) 
(World Energy Council 2004) 
 
Two years later, the electricity system went through a similar energy shortfall with prices 
beginning to rise in April 2003. The shortfall was caused by a prolonged period of low 
hydro inflows, and concerns about the availability of gas and coal for thermal generation. A 
successful energy conservation campaign combined with higher rainfall heading into the 
winter averted power shortages. 
 
After the 2003 shortage, the government concluded that the electricity market did not 
provide enough incentive to invest in generating capacity that would provide sufficient 
supply in very dry years. The government was particularly concerned that some of the 
existing thermal generating capacity would be scrapped because of insufficient commercial 
incentives to keep it operating. Its main policy proposal was to create an Electricity 
Commission to take reasonable steps to ensure security of supply even in a “1 in 60” dry 
year without the need to resort to an emergency conservation campaign. The commission 
was to contract for reserve energy to be withheld from the market during normal years and 
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made available only during dry years. The reserve energy would be offered into the market 
once the spot price began to exceed a certain level and was expected to reduce price 
volatility. The government stated that this policy should avoid the industrial production 
losses caused by the high spot prices as well as the public inconvenience associated with 
the energy savings campaigns (International Energy Agency 2003). 
In July 2003, the government announced that a new 155MW oil-fired power plant would 
be built before winter 2004 to help provide increased certainty of electricity supply. It was 
sited at Whirinaki, Hawkes Bay, to provide reserve generation for use during very dry 
periods when hydro lake inflows were abnormally low. It would also provide reserve 
generation to cover major breakdowns in other generating plant. Contact Energy installed 
and operated the government-owned plant at its Whirinaki site. This 155MW station was 
commissioned on 1 June 2004, and was intended to help provide increased certainty of 
electricity supply. It would only run when the limits of the electricity system were tested by 
problems such as low inflows to the hydro lakes or a major generation or transmission 
breakdown (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2009).  
5.12.2 Market power  
In May 2009, the Commerce Commission (CC) released a report on their investigation on 
market power abuse in the ESI in New Zealand. The investigation led the CC to the view 
that the four main generation companies – Contact Energy Limited (Contact), Genesis 
Power Limited (Genesis), Meridian Energy Limited (Meridian) and Mighty River Power 
Limited (Mighty River Power) - have a substantial degree of market power in the 
wholesale electricity market. The CC’s analysis, based upon quantitative evidence provided 
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by Professor Frank Wolak (Wolak 2009), suggested that since the formation of the NZEM 
in October 2003, the generation companies exercised their substantial market power to earn 
market rents estimated conservatively to be $4.3 billion. Over a period of six and a half 
years, the amount averaged to 18 percent of the total wholesale market revenues received 
by all generation companies. The exercise of market power to earn profits is not by itself a 
contravention of the Commerce Act, but is a lawful, rational exploitation of the ability and 
incentives available to the generation companies (Commerce Commission 2009). 
Due to the way ECNZ was broken up, the resultant generation companies were able to 
exercise some market power under different circumstances. For example, Genesis and 
Contact Energy had the thermal plants, whereas Meridian Energy had only hydro and wind 
plants. This allowed the thermal plant owners to set the wholesale market price during low 
hydro availability. The asset location of the companies may also have an impact on their 
market power (Meridian Energy’s plants were in the SI whereas the Genesis and Contact 
Energy plants were in the NI). 
Hence, starting October 2010, the following changes were made:  
 transferred Tekapo A and B power stations in the South Island from Meridian 
Energy to Genesis Energy, and the government-owned Whirinaki in the North 
Island to Meridian Energy; 
 requiring Meridian Energy, Genesis Energy  and Mighty River Power to undertake 
"virtual asset swaps" through a 15 year contract, ensuring the ability of each 
company to provide increased competition in the island where they currently had 
little or no generation capacity  
 
 114 
 
5.13 Electricity planning in New Zealand  
Prior to the ESI restructuring, the need for systematic planning arose as a consequence of 
severe problems of supply in 1953 to 1954 with the increasing demand in the North Island. 
In 1953, the supply authorities formed a Power and Finance Utilisation Committee to 
estimate future demand. They estimated that there would be an annual increase of 9.8% 
until 1958 and that the demand growth in the North Island would be more than in the South 
Island. In 1955, both the government and the supply authorities initiated planning reports. 
They produced the ‘First Report of the Combined Committee on the North Island Electric 
Power Supply’, which initiated a system for annual planning reports (Martin 1998). 
In 1976, the government changed the parameters of planning with restrictions on 
government spending. This resulted in a number of projects being deferred and the bulk 
supply tariff substantially increased. More emphasis was placed on energy conservation. 
The Electricity Amendment Act No. 1 of 1976 made it a goal to reduce the growth of the 
demand by promoting measures to achieve greater efficiency in electricity usage. People 
became more aware of ways to reduce their bills by home insulation and off peak storage 
heating (Martin 1998). 
In 1980, the Power Planning Committee and the Forecasting Committee combined and 
produced the first Energy Plan. Their reports suggested that considerable additional 
capacity would be required from 1985. This initiated a number of other projects. The last 
Energy Plan was published in 1985, and after a less thorough Energy Issues Paper in 1986, 
the publication of public planning documents of the kind produced since the mid 1950s 
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came to an end (Mohamed 2004). Long term planning in New Zealand ceased with the 
abolition of the Ministry of Energy in December 1989. 
After 2003, with the establishment of the EC, a new kind of coordinated planning was 
introduced with the publication of the Statement of Opportunities (SOO) once every 2 
years (Electricity Commission 2009). The basic assumptions made in formulating the 
model for the SOO is based on the New Zealand energy policies (discussed in the 
following sections). The purpose of the SOO was “to enable the identification of potential 
opportunities for efficient management of the grid, including investment in upgrades and 
transmission alternatives (Electricity Commission 2008).” Unlike central planning, the 
SOO was not a plan for future development of the grid or generation but provided the 
market players with information for their future investments under various future scenarios. 
The first SOO was published in 2005, followed by others in 2008 and 2010. Under the new 
ESI arrangement with the EA, it is not certain whether there will be another publication of 
a SOO and who will be publishing it.  
This research used the Statement of Opportunity 2008 (SOO2008) as its main reference in 
the model development. The SOO2010 was only finalised in September 2010 (Electricity 
Authority 2011) when all the analyses had been completed in this research. Some of the 
updates that were made for SOO2010 are: 
 Updated load forecasts 
 Price updates for coal and lignite and carbon charge 
 Assumptions for all scenarios remain the same except for the high coal utilisation     
scenario. In SOO2010, it is no longer assumed that the demand side management is 
high 
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 Introduce photovoltaic and reciprocating engine technology as energy resources 
These updates are minor and do not affect the fundamental principles of the SD model 
developed in this research.   
The scenario development process for the 2008 generation scenarios are described in detail 
in Chapter 7. Five scenarios were developed, intended to provide reasonably credible future 
possibilities, while encompassing most of the uncertainties (Electricity Commission 2008). 
The five scenarios were Sustainable Path, South Island Surplus, Medium Renewables, 
Demand Side Participation and High Fas Recovery. They will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. These scenarios were suggested by the New Zealand Energy Strategy 2007 
(NZES2007) (see Section 5.14.1).  
 
5.14 New Zealand’s energy policy  
The abolition of the Ministry of Energy in December 1989 ended the government’s direct 
regulation over the industry.  However, in June 1992, the Government confirmed its energy 
policy framework to be the following:  
"The Government's key objective in the energy area is to ensure that energy services 
continue to be available at the lowest cost to the economy, consistent with sustainable 
development.  This will be achieved by the efficient and effective provision of energy 
services through properly functioning commercial systems with competitive incentives. 
These systems will work within an effective and stable regulatory environment and take 
energy conservation into account." (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 
2008) 
In June 1993, the policy on renewable energy was declared. The framework consisted of 
the following objective:  
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"To facilitate the development of cost-effective renewable energy consistent with the 
Government Energy Policy Framework." (Ministry of Economic Development New 
Zealand 2008) 
The government's energy sector reforms were seen as a good basis for encouraging 
renewable resources. Enhancements of the opportunities for the cost-effective application 
of renewable energy were announced, including work on identification of the barriers to 
renewable energy. In October 2000, a revised Energy Policy Framework was released in 
line with the major restructuring conducted in 1998. The Government’s overall objective 
was:  
“to ensure the delivery of energy services to all classes of consumers in an efficient, fair, 
reliable and sustainable manner.” (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 
2009) 
To provide New Zealand energy needs while maintaining a clean environment to live in, a 
sustainable development approach was adopted by the government. Sustainable 
development is defined as “development which meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Ministry of 
Economic Development New Zealand 2007). Achieving sustainable development involves 
a different way of thinking and working. It requires looking after people’s needs, taking 
long-term views into consideration, taking account of the social, economic, environmental 
and cultural effects, and encouraging participation and partnerships from all parties 
involved. In view of sustainability, the New Zealand government’s energy policy 
objectives were outlined in policy statements on natural gas and electricity and in the 
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government’s energy strategies. New Zealand’s government identified three essential 
building blocks for a sustainable energy future, which were - energy efficiency, energy 
conservation and renewable energy systems.  
In implementing the policy, two strategies have been prepared: 
(i) New Zealand Energy Strategy (NZES) and 
(ii) National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy (NZEECS)  
Both the strategies were formed to achieve higher energy efficiency with improved 
comfort, lower costs and reduced greenhouse gas emissions (Ministry of Economic 
Development New Zealand 2007). The government set a target for 90 per cent of electricity 
to be generated from renewable sources by 2025. 
5.14.1 New Zealand Energy Strategy to 2050 (NZES) 
The first New Zealand Energy Strategy (NZES) is known as “New Zealand Energy 
Strategy to 2050 – Powering Our Future” which was published in October 2007 (Ministry 
of Economic Development New Zealand 2007).  Through the first NZES, the government 
laid out their energy vision for New Zealand to be “a reliable and resilient system 
delivering New Zealand sustainable, low emissions energy services, through: 
 Providing clear direction on the future of New Zealand’s energy system 
 Utilising markets and focused regulation to securely deliver energy services at 
competitive prices  
 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions, including through an emissions trading 
scheme 
 Maximising the contribution of cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation of 
energy 
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 Maximising the contribution of cost-effective renewable energy resources while 
safeguarding our environment 
 Promoting early adoption of environmentally sustainable energy technologies 
 Supporting consumers through the transition. 
The main features of the NZES 2007 are summarised in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: The targets and strategies in NZES 2007 
Targets Strategies 
Resilient, low carbon 
transport  
 
 Updating the New Zealand Transport Strategy in 2008 
 Developing policies to encourage greater provision of public transport, 
cycling and walking  
 Developing a New Zealand Domestic Sea Freight Strategy 
 Developing average fuel economy standards for light vehicles at point of 
import 
 Establishing an expert advisory group to look at future vehicle technologies, 
such as bio fuels and electric cars 
 Introducing the Biofuels Sales Obligation on 1 April 2008 
Security of electricity 
supply  
 
 Reviewing the reserve energy policy to determine whether any additional 
measures are required 
 Developing national guidance under the Resource Management Act for 
electricity transmission 
 Introducing amendments to the Electricity Industry Reform Act to relax 
some conditions around investment by lines companies 
 Promulgating regulations for distributed generation 
 Developing gas wholesale and transmission market arrangements to make it 
easier to establish more flexible and secure gas supply arrangements 
Low emissions 
power and heat 
 Deciding “in-principle” to introduce an emissions trading scheme 
 Providing a clear message to state-owned electricity generation companies 
about the government’s view that there should be no need for new base-load 
fossil fuel generation for the next ten years  
 Considering regulatory options under the Electricity Act 1992 for limiting 
new base-load fossil fuel generation over the next ten years 
 Developing a national policy statement for renewable energy in 2008 
 Providing greater guidance on “call-in” under the Resource Management 
Act  
Using energy more 
efficiently 
 Implemented through the NZEECS (described in the next sub section 
Sustainable energy 
technologies and 
innovation  
 Introducing tax credits for research and development expenditure  
 Providing a contestable fund of $8 million over four years for the 
deployment of marine generation devices in New Zealand 
 Establishing a contestable fund of $12 million over three years to support 
new low-carbon energy technologies  
Affordability and 
wellbeing  
 
 Amending regulations for the low fixed tariff option for domestic electricity 
consumers to take into account regional climate variations that impact on 
heating costs 
 Considering the provision of assistance for households to adjust to higher 
electricity prices arising from the introduction of emissions trading 
 Supporting the provision of high-quality energy information to householders  
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In November 2008, the New Zealand governing political party changed from the Labour 
Party to the National Party. The approach and attitude of the government on natural 
resources have changed drastically since then. The current government released the “NZES 
2011-2021 – Developing our Energy Potential” in August 2011 (Ministry of Economic 
Development New Zealand 2011). Among the changes in approach is that the current 
government wishes to explore more untapped local natural resources. In the foreword of 
the updated NZES, the Minister of Energy and Resources, Hon. Gerry Brownlee stated: 
“What is less well known is that along with our renewable resources, we also have an 
abundance of petroleum and mineral resources. More than 1.2 million square kilometres of 
our exclusive economic zone are likely to be underlain by sedimentary basins thick enough 
to generate petroleum. Recent reports put New Zealand's mineral and coal endowment in 
the hundreds of billions of dollars. For too long now we have not made the most of the 
wealth hidden in our hills, under the ground, and in our oceans. It is a priority of this 
government to responsibly develop those resources.” 
The current government's goal is for the energy sector to maximise its contribution to 
economic growth. Hence, to achieve that, the NZES 2010 has set four priorities areas: 
i. Diverse resource development 
ii. Environmental responsibility 
iii. Efficient use of energy 
iv. Secure and affordable energy 
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The update has been taken into account by the EC in preparing the SOO2010 (Electricity 
Commission 2010) but since the SD model in this research uses the SOO2008, the 
SOO2010 will not be discussed in detail in this thesis.     
5.14.2 National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy (NZEECS) 
The strategy’s purpose was “to give effect to the government’s policy on the promotion in 
New Zealand of energy efficiency, energy conservation and the use of renewable sources of 
energy”. It is an action plan for many of the programmes in the NZES, and its programmes 
are complementary to the Emissions Trading Scheme in achieving emissions reductions. 
The NZEECS targets actions in areas such as homes, businesses, transport and electricity 
systems.   
As required by the Act, the NZEECS has to be revised every 5 years and hence the 
NZEECS 2007 was released to replace the NZEECS 2001. It was launched alongside the 
NZES 2007. It provides an action plan to promote sustainability as part of New Zealand’s 
national identity, improve the quality of life for New Zealand families and drive economic 
transformation in business. The NZEECS 2007’s two main non-binding targets are a 20% 
energy efficiency improvement and an increase of 30 PJ (0.7 Mtoe) per year of renewable 
energy, both by 2012 (International Energy Agency 2006).  
With the NZES draft being released in July 2010, the NZEECS 2010 draft was also 
released to support the updated strategy. In the NZEECS 2010, the government's proposed 
energy efficiency target is for the NZEECS to deliver 55 PJ of saving across the economy 
by 2015 (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2010). 
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5.15 Resource Management Act 
Another important regulation that has a big impact in power system development is the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). Most development in New Zealand, including in 
the energy sector, involves the RMA. It was enacted in 1991 and has since become the 
most dominant and important piece of environmental legislation in New Zealand. Its 
objective is to ensure sustainability in managing the country’s resources and plan for the 
future of the environment. In keeping with restructuring in the energy sector, the RMA 
aims to decentralise decision making and empower territorial and regional authorities to 
take control of activities within their locality (Pedley 2007).  
The overriding purpose of the Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources (Ministry for the Environment 1991). The definition of sustainable 
management is provided in section 5(2) which states: “In this Act, sustainable management 
means managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in 
a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while  
 sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
 safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
 avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment 
The government bodies involved in looking after the environment are the Ministry for the 
Environment and the Department of Conservation. The Ministry for the Environment gives 
advice to the government on environmental issues and helps the Minister for the 
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Environment keep an eye on the way councils do their jobs under the RMA. The 
Department of Conservation and the Minister of Conservation have a particular role under 
the RMA to help protect New Zealand’s natural and historic heritage. 
Local councils have one of the biggest jobs under the RMA. There are three types of 
councils in New Zealand (Ministry for the Environment 2006) as shown in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Different kind of local authorities involved in RMA 
 
Council type Quantity 
(throughout 
New 
Zealand) 
Role 
Regional 
councils 
12 Manage the rivers, the air, the coast, the soil and 
resources that are not generally owned by individuals 
City or 
district 
councils 
69 Monitor land usage that can affect the  environment e.g. 
new subdivisions and land development; plans to clear 
native bush, change historic buildings, or anything else 
that might affect what the community has agreed to be 
important 
Unitary 
authorities 
5 Authorities which do the jobs of both regional and 
district councils 
 
Most areas in New Zealand have both regional councils and city/district councils except for 
Wanganui, Tasman, Marlborough, Nelson and Timaru, which have unitary authorities. The 
RMA structure is shown in Figure 5.10. The RMA implementation means that any new 
development in the energy sector requires the application of resource consents from 
regional, district and city councils or the Department of Conservation. 
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Figure 5.10: RMA structure (Ministry for the Environment 2006) 
 
The different types of resource consents are listed in Table 5.4, along with the consent 
authorities responsible for issuing them, and examples of when resource consents might be 
required. 
Table 5.4: Consent types and the consent authorities involved (Ministry for the Environment 2006) 
 
Consent type Consent authority responsible Examples 
Land use consent Regional councils and/or 
district and city councils 
To construct a building  
Subdivision 
consent 
District and city councils To divide a property into two or 
more new titles 
Coastal permit Regional councils To discharge storm water into 
coastal waters 
Water permit Regional councils To take water from a stream of 
an irrigation scheme; to build a 
dam in the bed of a river 
Discharge permit Regional councils To discharge storm water 
directly into a lake; to discharge 
exhaust fumes into the air 
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An important principle that underlies the RMA is that those whose activities have the 
potential to adversely affect the environment should bear the costs of avoiding, remedying 
or mitigating the consequences of their actions. This principle has significant practical 
implications for the energy sector and any development proposal that may be put forward. 
The two main ways in which the RMA ensures adherence to this principle is through rules 
in regional and district plans, and via the resource consent process.  
The introduction of the RMA triggered various responses and criticism. Some view it as a 
hindrance to development as potential projects can easily be opposed by environmentalists 
and the general public whose common attitude is ‘Not in my back yard’. While there are 
time limit guidelines for decisions from the Rulings Panel of the Environment Court under 
the Resource Management Act, these time limits are not mandatory. This introduces 
uncertainty as to when a hearing will be scheduled or a decision rendered. Both of these 
factors increase uncertainty for companies operating in the energy industry in New 
Zealand, and could therefore inhibit investment (International Energy Agency 2006).  
In relation to the electricity sector, a widely held criticism is that compliance with the 
provisions and procedures under the RMA causes unnecessary delay and expense. In the 
majority of circumstances, a proposal to establish a new form of electricity generation will 
require resource consent. In order to obtain this consent, a significant amount of 
consultation and investigation into potential effects must be carried out. It is frequently 
commented that these requirements place an unacceptable burden on developers and 
prevent valuable and otherwise viable projects from taking place. In submissions put 
forward to the Commerce Commission, the New Zealand Geothermal Association 
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describes the RMA procedures as a major obstacle to further geothermal and wind power 
developments.
 
They put forward a common criticism, that the up-front costs and delays 
inherent in the current process make many new developments uneconomic (Pedley 2007). 
However, some energy sectors benefitted under the Act. Under section 10 of the RMA, 
certain existing uses in relation to land are protected. This section allows land to be used in 
a manner that contravenes a rule in a district plan if the use was lawfully established before 
the rule became operative or by way of a designation. In both circumstances, the effects of 
the existing use must be the same or similar in character, intensity and scale to those which 
existed before the rule became operative or the designation was removed. Transpower 
frequently utilises these rights to carry out maintenance, repairs and upgrades of its existing 
power transmission lines and substations. 
Although the RMA focuses on empowering local authorities to make decisions, central 
government still has an important role to play. The RMA provides several methods by 
which central government may intervene in resource management policy and regulatory 
decision making that would otherwise be under the jurisdiction of local authorities. The 
powers of national intervention have recently been modified by the passing of the Resource 
Management Amendment Act 2005. One of the main focuses of this Act was improving 
national leadership in the context of the RMA. The amendments attempt to address the 
difficulties associated with local authorities considering projects of national significance in 
a policy environment that provides little guidance on how competing national benefits and 
local costs should be weighed. The national importance of a secure and reliable energy 
supply makes these amendments particularly relevant to the energy sector (Pedley 2007).  
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The impact of the RMA in the energy sector has prompted the government to do several 
amendments such as:  
 a 2004 amendment to the RMA to put greater emphasis on the benefits of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency 
 a 2005 amendment to the RMA to improve processes for decision-making on issues 
of national importance, including energy infrastructure 
 a National Policy Statement (NPS) is being developed under the RMA for 
renewable energy 
 developing a NPS on electricity transmission under the RMA 
to ensure that the national energy security is not jeopardised by RMA process issues. 
 
5.16 Chapter summary 
 
New Zealand’s ESI has undergone several restructuring since late 1980s and is still 
undergoing some changes. Several dry year shortages had been observed. It is currently 
unclear how the issue is being addressed especially since the newly formed Electricity 
Authority is not even made responsible for ensuring energy or supply security. With a 
continually high reliance on hydro resources, the NZEM is potentially susceptible to 
shortages during future dry winter years. 
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6 SD MODEL DEVELOPMENT FOR GENERATION EXPANSION IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the SD model that has been 
developed to study the generation expansion in New Zealand. It then explains 
how the model has been validated using past data.  
6.1 Model components 
Figure 6.1 shows the three main components of the model – power plant 
development loop, investment decision loop and the market–investment 
interaction loop.  The full model is shown in Appendix F. 
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Figure 6.1: Main components of the SD model 
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6.1.1 Power plant development loop 
The ‘Power plant development loop’ accounts for the different plant types in 
New Zealand. The plant types are hydro, coal, integrated gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC), combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), open cycle gas 
turbine (OCGT), wind, geothermal, cogeneration, pumped storage and wave. 
Pumped storage, IGCC and wave plants are currently not available in New 
Zealand but are introduced in some of the projected future scenarios in the 
SOO2008 (Electricity Commission 2008).  
There are four main phases in the development loop which are:  
 proposal  
 planning  
 approval  
 construction  
Table 6.1 shows the plant development phase durations that were used in the 
model. The base values are the typical values in a simulation run. If all the 
base values for the various phases are added up, they are equal to the plant 
lead time. Under delay conditions, the values are allowed to vary within the 
ranges given in the ‘Medium delay’ and ‘Long delay’ columns in Table 6.1. 
These values were obtained by enquiries made from experienced people in the 
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New Zealand industry as well as referring to some literature (Ford 1999; 
Meridian Energy 2006). 
Base values provide the fastest time a plant can come on line. The allocated 
base times may seem short, but they cater for plants with small capacities 
which are more common under a deregulated market environment. However, 
in most cases, plants take longer than the allocated base times to be ready for 
commissioning. Hence the model can also be run with medium and long 
delays as shown in Table 6.1. Due to the long development duration for a 
power plant, delays are likely to occur for many reasons, depending on the 
size, type and location of the plants concerned.  
Table 6.1: Plant development phase durations and modelled delays 
Plant type Plant lead time 
(year) 
Planning 
duration (year) 
Approval duration 
(year) 
Construction 
duration (year) 
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Hydro 5 7.5 10 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 
Coal/IGCC 4 5.5 7 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 2 2.5 3 
CCGT 3 5.5 7 0.5 1.5 2 0.5 1.5 2 2 2.5 3 
OCGT 2 5 7 0.5 1.5 2 0.5 1.5 2 1 2 3 
Wind 
 
3 5.5 8 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 1 2 3 
Geothermal 3 5.5 8 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 1 2 3 
Cogeneration 3 5 7 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 
Pumped 
storage 
8 10.5 13 1 2 3 2 2.5 3 5 6 7 
Wave 5 6.5 8 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 3 3.5 4 
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6.1.1.1 Proposal phase 
A power plant’s development starts from the proposal phase where the project 
site is identified and feasibility studies are done. Renewable energy plants 
might take a longer time to study as it is important to obtain some historical 
data on the natural resource that is wished to be tapped. If weather data are not 
readily available from the meteorological departments, they may have to be 
recorded locally at site.  
The model allocates a year for the proposal phase and allows for variations of 
up to 3 years. Gas plants are given only 6 months as they are mainly concerned 
with location constraints and do not have to take into account the natural 
resources to be tapped.  
The cost benefit analyses for the proposed plants are also determined in this 
phase. At the end of the proposal phase, the generation companies should have 
a list of power stations for consideration. The generation companies will most 
probably rank the possible plants according to their long range marginal cost 
(LRMC) and they are most likely to build the cheapest plant, or the one that is 
likely to give the highest return, first. 
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6.1.1.2 Planning phase 
Once a plant is proposed, the planning phase is for the technical plans to be 
drafted up. Since this stage usually requires external expertise from 
consultants, there is a substantial cost involved. For this reason, the model 
checks the spot market price before taking the plants from the proposal phase 
to the planning phase.  At the end of the planning stage, the generator 
companies would have the plants ready to be approved. As shown in Table 
6.1, renewable energy plants take longer to plan as there is extra planning 
required to manage the renewable resources. For wave plants, a longer 
planning duration is allocated given that it is a new type of technology in New 
Zealand requiring a longer learning curve. In the model, once plants are 
planned, the generator companies will wait for the right market price before 
proceeding into the approval phase. 
6.1.1.3 Approval phase 
The approval phase involves technical approval as well as seeking the resource 
consents that are made compulsory under the Resource Management Act 
(RMA), as discussed in section 5.15. The RMA may cause a substantial delay 
in the development phase if the initial resource consent application is not 
successful and the generator companies have to appeal the decision. If the 
appeal involves a substantial litigation cost and drags on for a long time, the 
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plant can be cancelled from being constructed. An example of a project that 
was cancelled after a long approval process was Project Aqua (Pedley 2003).   
The approval time allocated for a gas power plant is shorter (6 months) since it 
is perceived as clean and usually does not receive much public opposition as 
compared to plants using other resources. Except for wave and pumped 
storage, other plants are allocated one year for the approval phase. Hydro 
plants may be opposed due to the fact that some areas will be submerged to 
provide for lake storage. Pumped storage is allocated a longer approval time of 
2 years because two lakes are required rather than one. Even run of river hydro 
plants have longer approval times compared to thermal plants because water 
consents need to be applied for under Section 14 of the RMA (Ministry for the 
Environment 2006; Environment Canterbury 2010). The consent is required 
for damming, diverting, taking or using natural water, whether underground 
water or surface water. This also includes the extraction of heat from 
geothermal water. Wind power plants are not popular with local people as 
wind farms are considered unsightly and noisy. Wave power plants are 
allocated 1.5 years because given that they are a new technology, a longer 
mitigation process might take place as there is no precedence in New Zealand. 
Once plants are approved, they are ready for construction. 
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6.1.1.4 Construction phase 
The construction phase is the longest phase within the plant development 
phase. It may take longer to construct plants in remote areas where access 
roads and transmission lines will also need to be constructed. These are 
usually the case for renewable energy plants like wind and hydro. Pumped 
storage takes even longer as two reservoirs are required. Thermal power plants 
for coal and CCGT plants take longer to build rather than OCGT plants due to 
the steam boiler installation. Wave plants are allocated a minimum of 2 years 
for construction because wave power is a new technology in New Zealand and 
it might encounter some challenges due to a lack of experience with it. 
Once the construction phase is complete, the plants are commissioned and 
their installed capacities are added to the national installed capacity. These 
plants will then exit the plant development loop and will be included in the 
market-investment interaction loop. 
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6.1.2 Market-investment interaction loop 
 
 
The market-investment loop shown in Figure 6.2 captures the market 
mechanism that takes place in New Zealand. The commissioned plants from 
the plant development loop add to the existing total installed generation 
capacity. This increases the country’s available electric energy supply to meet 
the demand. The difference between available energy supply and the 
electricity demand influences the spot market price.  
A small difference between the supply and demand gives rise to a higher spot 
market price. This is usually the case during winter when the electricity 
 
Investment 
decision loop 
Plant 
development 
loop 
Market – 
investment 
interaction 
loop 
Installed 
capacity 
Electric 
energy 
demand 
Energy 
capacity 
margin 
Spot 
Market 
Price 
Figure 6.2: Market–investment interaction loop 
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demand is higher due to space heating. The price can also go exceptionally 
high during dry winters. This is because hydro accounts for about 60% of the 
generation mix in New Zealand and the lack of rainfall will call for the need to 
use expensive thermal plants instead to meet the demand. Conversely, lower 
summer demands give rise to larger differences between supply and demand, 
and the spot market price is expected to fall. 
Once a plant gets installed at the end of the plant development loop, the total 
installed capacity increases. If the added capacity is more than the demand 
increment, the difference between supply and demand increases. This reduces 
the spot market price. The price remains low until the difference between 
supply and demand becomes tight again. This happens when some old plants 
get decommissioned or the demand increases. It may take years for this to 
happen. 
A new investment occurs when a scheduled power plant gets through from a 
proposal or planning phase into the next phase. Given that all power plants 
take a long time to be approved and constructed, it will take several years for 
the new plants to come on line and add to the total installed generation 
capacity.    
 137 
 
6.1.3 Investment Decision Loop 
Without any coordinated planning in place, the only signal for investment 
under the current market mechanism in New Zealand is a high spot market 
price that is sustained for a certain long period. In this model, a monthly 
moving average spot market price is used to trigger new investment. When the 
price exceeds a plant long range marginal cost (LRMC), the plant will be 
moved from the proposal phase to the planning phase of the plant development 
loop. During the time that lapses between each plant development phase, the 
spot market price may change within the period. Hence the model checks the 
spot market price again before allowing the planned power plants to proceed 
into the approval phase. If the market conditions are not conducive at that 
point in time, the plants are delayed until the spot market price is high enough 
to provide profits. A similar process is applied before moving a plant into the 
construction phase. This decision process is illustrated in Figure 6.3.    
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Figure 6.3: Investment decision process used by the SD model 
 
Given that there are several generator companies in New Zealand, it is likely 
that plants from other companies will come on line while a generator company 
is developing a plant. This may cause a delay in the plant coming online. For 
example, generator company X is developing a hydro plant A from 2010. 
Generator company Y also develops a CCGT plant B from 2010. It is assumed 
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that the spot market price is high enough to allow both plants to proceed into 
their planning and approval phases. However, plant A faces some public 
opposition and takes longer to get approved. Hence, when plant B is 
commissioned, plant A is still seeking approval. When plant B gets 
commissioned, the installed capacity is higher and the spot market price 
becomes lower. By the time plant A gets approved, Generator company X 
might find that the new market price is no longer conducive for them to 
construct it and decides to delay the construction until the price is up again.  
This model considers the market to be conducive for new investments when 
the spot market monthly moving average price is higher than the plant’s 
LRMC. When this happens, all the plants that are waiting to be moved from 
one phase to another will be allowed to proceed.  
6.2 Model Outputs 
There are 3 main outputs that can be obtained from the model. They are:  
a) Installed capacity 
b) Capacity margin (CM) 
c) Energy capacity margin (ECM) 
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6.2.1 Installed capacity 
The total installed capacity is the amount of real power (MW) of all 
generators.  It is obtained by summing the resultant installed capacities from 
each plant development loop: 
Total installed capacity = ∑ Installed plant capacity (hydro, coal, IGCC, 
CCGT, OCGT, wind, geothermal, cogeneration, pumped storage and wave)    
Equation 1 
  
6.2.2 Capacity margin 
The capacity margin is defined by  
demandy electricitPeak 
 demandy electricitPeak  -capacity  installed Total
  (CM)Margin Capacity   
Equation 2 
 
It is a measure of the electricity system’s ability to meet the peak demand. The 
CM is usually expressed in terms of a ratio or percentage.  
6.2.3 Energy capacity margin 
New Zealand has faced problems in meeting energy demands during dry 
winter years. This has happened in 1992, 2001, 2003 and 2008 (Ministry of 
Economic Development New Zealand 2009).  To enable the model to measure 
the system’s ability to meet the energy demand in any one year, the following 
term is introduced:  
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 demandenergy  Electric
 demandenergy  Electric -energy  electric  available Total
  (ECM)Margin Capacity Energy 
 
Equation 3 
 
The available electric energy (MWh) for a plant for one year is calculated as:  
Available electric energy = Installed capacity <plant type> * <plant type> 
availability factor*8760 
Equation 4 
 
The total available electric energy is then taken by summing up all the energy 
available from each plant type:  
Total available electric energy = ∑ Available electric energy (hydro, coal, 
IGCC, CCGT, OCGT, wind, geothermal, cogeneration, pumped storage and 
wave)    
 Equation 5 
 
6.3 Model validation 
Before the model was used to provide future projections, it was necessary to 
validate the model using historical data. The applicable data used for the 
validation were those recorded after the power market started in New Zealand 
in October 2006. These data were used in the validation process to provide 
initial conditions to the model as well as driving the model forward until the 
year 2009. The results were then compared to the actual data to provide a 
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measure of fitness for the model. The validation process is discussed in detail 
in the following sections. 
6.3.1 Input data 
In the model verification stage, several exogenous variables were used to drive 
the model. They were:  
(i) Electricity demand data 
(ii) Spot market price  
(iii) Installed/Scheduled power plants 
(iv) Power plants’ LRMC 
(v) Power plants’ availability factors 
These data were fed into the model using Excel files and the Vensim equation 
editor.  
 
6.3.1.1 Electricity demand data 
The electricity demand data used in the model verification stage were the 
actual monthly consumption data recorded from January 1997 till December 
2009 for all of New Zealand. The data was fed into the model to allow the 
calculation of outputs such as CM and ECM, as shown in Equation 3 and 
Equation 4. 
Monthly electricity consumptions vary throughout the year. Typically, the 
winter (May-August) consumptions are high due to space heating, whereas 
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consumptions are low around the end of December and early January due to 
Christmas holidays (when shops and companies close). The data is plotted in 
Figure 6.4. These data were obtained from the Electricity Commission from 
their Centralised Database web interface (Electricity Commission 2010). They 
are listed in tabular form in Appendix B1. 
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Figure 6.4: New Zealand monthly consumption data from January 1997 to December 
2009, used in the model verification stage 
 
6.3.1.2 Spot market price 
The spot market prices were taken from the Marketplace Company (MCo) 
online database called COMIT (MCo 2010). The prices obtained were the 
monthly prices at three different locations: Haywards, Otahuhu and Benmore. 
The prices are shown in Appendix B2. Since this model was used to study the 
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installed capacity at the national level rather than at the regional level, the spot 
prices for the three locations were averaged for each month and used to feed 
into the model. To take inflation into account, the real prices were then 
calculated. The base year that was used to verify the model was 2006 because 
the LRMC values used were the values for that year, as made available in the 
report Options, Choices and Decisions (Meridian Energy 2006).  
The annual inflation rates, f, that were used are shown in Table 6.2. The data 
from the year 1996 till 2006 were obtained from the MED’s Energy Data File. 
The file contained values of Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the year 1946 
till 2006, using the year 1970 as a base. The CPI values from the year 1996 till 
2006 are also included in Table 6.2.                    
Table 6.2: Annual inflation rate values used in the model verification stage 
Year 
CPI  
 
Annual 
Inflation 
rate (%), 
f 
1996 888.38  
1997 898.82 1.17 
1998 910.39 1.29 
1999 909.26 -0.12 
2000 933.08 2.62 
2001 957.58 2.63 
2002 983.21 2.68 
2003 1000.45 1.75 
2004 1023.37 2.29 
2005 1054.45 3.04 
2006 1089.93 3.37 
2007  2.50 
2008  3.40 
2009  3.00 
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From the given CPI values, the annual inflation rates were calculated using the 
formula (DeGarmo, Sullivan et al. 1993): 
irate)inflation  annual (CPI = fi = 
1
1
)(
)()(


i
ii
CPI
CPICPI
*(100) 
Equation 6 
 
The annual inflation rate values for the year 2007 till 2009 were obtained from 
the New Zealand Inflation Calculator from the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand’s website (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2010).   
Using the annual inflation rates, f, and prices in actual dollars(A$), the real 
dollars (R$) for any year i can then be calculated using 2006 as a base 
(DeGarmo, Sullivan et al. 1993) using the general formula:  
(R$)i = (A$)i (
2006
1
1

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Equation 7 
 
The formula was developed with f constant each year. For a more realistic 
calculation where f varies each year, the formula is modified to:  
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for the years after 2006  
 
for the years before 2006 
Equation 8 
 
Based on Equation 8, yearly multipliers were calculated using Equation 9 to 
ease the monetary values conversion. The calculated multipliers used for the 
conversion are shown in Table 6.3.  
 
 
 
 
Equation 9  
 
Table 6.3: The multipliers used in converting actual prices to real prices with 2006 as 
the base year 
Year 
Yearly 
multiplier 
 Effective 
multiplier  
1997 1.0117 1.2126 
1998 1.0129 1.1972 
1999 0.9988 1.1987 
2000 1.0262 1.1681 
2001 1.0263 1.1382 
2002 1.0268 1.1085 
2003 1.0175 1.0894 
2004 1.0229 1.0650 
2005 1.0304 1.0337 
2006 1.0337 1.0000 
2007 1.0250 0.9756 
2008 1.0340 0.9435 
2009 1.0300 0.9160 
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The actual prices and calculated real prices that were used in the model 
verification are plotted in Figure 6.5. Due to inflation, the calculated real 
prices before the base year 2006 are higher than the actual prices and vice 
versa after 2006. For the year 2006, their values are the same since 2006 is the 
index year. 
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Figure 6.5: Actual and real average prices from January 1997 till December 2009 
 
6.3.1.3 Scheduled power plants 
Within the duration 1996 to 2008, several power plants were commissioned as 
shown in Table 6.4. The list of decommissioned plants during this period is 
shown in Table 6.5. Modifications and refurbishments within the duration that 
affected the installed capacity are shown in Table 6.6. The information in the 
tables had been  extracted from the Energy Data File 2009 (Ministry of 
Economic Development New Zealand 2009) and records from the Electricity 
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Commission (Electricity Commission 2010). The lists are not exhaustive as 
plants with lower capacities, especially cogeneration plants, were not 
accurately recorded. There was also a difficulty in obtaining an accurate record 
of decommissioned plants. 
Due to the data inaccuracy, the input for the model was derived from the net 
installed generation capacity in New Zealand rather than individual plants. The 
data is shown in Table 6.7 (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 
2009). The information is extracted from the 2009 Energy Data File as shown 
in Appendix B3. The yearly differences were then calculated and shown in the 
shaded columns. They were net of new installed capacities and 
decommissioned plants. They also include the updated capacities from 
refurbished or upgraded plants. 
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Table 6.4: Power plants commissioned between 1996 and 2008 
Plant Name Plant type Year 
Commissioned 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Edgecumbe  Gas (Cogeneration) 1996 10 
Hau Nui Wind 1996/ 4/8.5 
Christchurch 
City 
Wastewater 
Biogas 1996 3.2 
Southdown  CCGT (Cogeneration) 1997/2007 125/175 
Whareroa  CCGT (Cogeneration) 1997 68 
Rotokawa Geothermal 1997/2002 16/34 
Poihipi Geothermal 1997/2008 55/75 
Kinleith  Biomass/Coal 
/Gas (Cogeneration) 
1998 40 
Kapuni  CCGT (Cogeneration) 1998 23 
Taranaki  CCGT 1998 385 
Ngawha Geothermal 1998/2008 10/25 
Tararua Wind 
Farm 
Wind 1999/2004/2007 31.7/68/161 
Otahuhu B  CCGT 2000 380 
Te Rapa  Gas (Cogeneration) 2000 44 
Blue Mountain 
Lumber 
Cogeneration 2000 1.4 
Mokai Geothermal 2000/2005/2007 18/95/112 
Onekaka Hydro 2002 0.94 
Watercare 
Mangere 
Cogeneration 2003 7 
Whirinaki Diesel 2004 155 
Huntly U6 OCGT 2004 50 
Te Apiti Wind 2004 91 
Auckland 
District Hospital 
Cogeneration 2004 3.6 
Pan Pac  Biomass/Coal/Gas 
(Cogeneration) 
2005 13 
Huntly U5 CCGT 2007 385 
White Hill Wind 2007 58 
Totora Valley Hydro 2007 2 
Kawerau Geothermal 2008 100 
Kawerau – 
KA24 
Geothermal 2008 8.3 
DeepStream Hydro 2008 5 
Mangahewa Gas  2009 9 
Te Rere Hau Wind 2009 30 
Matawai Hydro 2009 2 
West Wind Wind 2009 143 
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Table 6.5: Power plants decommissioned from 1996 to 2008 
Year Plant name Plant Type Decommissioned capacity 
(MW) 
1998 Stratford A               Thermal 110 
2003 Otahuhu A     Thermal 45.75 
2008 New Plymouth Thermal 600 
 
Table 6.6: Major plant refurbishment from 1996 to 2008 
Year Plant name Plant Type Modification work Modified 
capacity 
(MW) 
1997 Glenbrook Cogeneration - 
Coal/Gas Waste 
from steel mill 
Added a second plant +56  
1999 Teviot river scheme 
- Horseshoe Bend     
Hydro Added capacity to the hydro 
scheme 
+4.315 
Opuha Hydro Revived after a flood in 1997 +7.5 
Motueka 
 
Hydro Revival from decommissioning 0.24 
2000 Conical Hill   Thermal Added a steam turbine to a 
10MW boiler 
+1.4 
Teviot river scheme 
- George      
Hydro Two 500kW generators replaced 
by one 1MW 
+1 
2002 Manapouri  Hydro A second tailrace tunnel, and 
up rating of the turbines to 
120MW 
+120 (585 to 
700) 
Falls -                   
Irrigation dam near 
St. Bathans, Otago 
Hydro Upgrading of an old irrigation 
dam 
+1.25 
2003 Mangahao   Hydro A mini hydro addition +4 
2004 Wairua Falls 
 
Hydro Added a fourth generator made 
up of three 1·2MW Francis 
turbines 
+3.6 
Motukawa Hydro Added a turbine in the water 
race to lake Ratipiko  
+0.2 
2005 Monowai   Hydro Refurbishment to three 2·6MW 
turbines 
+7.8 
Wairakei Geothermal Addition of a low-temperature 
isopentane system. 
+14 
 
2007 Poihipi Geothermal Upgraded to provide additional 
capacity 
+40  
2008 Manapouri Hydro Refurbishment work (starting in 
2002) 
+30 (700 to 
730) 
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Table 6.7: The net installed generation capacity by plant types from 1996-2008 
December 
Plant capacity (MW)  
  
Hydro Difference 
Geo-
thermal 
Difference Wind Difference 
Coal/ 
Gas 
Difference CCGT Difference OCGT Difference 
Cogeneration 
rations 
Difference Total Difference 
1996 5192   276   4   1000   0   1134   228   7834   
1997 5192 0 373 97 4 0 1000 0 0 0 820 -314 499 271 7888 55 
1998 5192 0 383 10 4 0 1000 0 385 385 472 -348 499 0 7935 47 
1999 5199 7 383 0 36 32 1000 0 385 0 372 -100 494 -5 7869 -66 
2000 5202 3 365 -18 36 0 1000 0 765 380 372 0 543 49 8283 414 
2001 5202 0 365 0 36 0 1000 0 765 0 372 0 545 2 8284 2 
2002 5342 139 365 0 36 0 1000 0 765 0 372 0 529 -16 8409 125 
2003 5348 6 370 5 72 36 1000 0 765 0 372 0 533 4 8460 51 
2004 5345 -3 370 0 166 94 1000 0 765 0 567 195 539 6 8753 292 
2005 5346 1 425 55 168 2 1000 0 765 0 467 -100 579 40 8751 -2 
2006 5346 0 425 0 169 1 1000 0 765 0 477 10 609 30 8792 40 
2007 5349 2 443 18 320 151 1000 0 1150 385 477 0 656 48 9396 604 
2008 5376 27 577 134 322 2 1000 0 1150 0 294 -183 661 4 9380 -16 
 
Even though the yearly difference in the actual installed capacity shown in this table may be contributed by several 
plants, the model sees it only as one plant with a total capacity of the sum of the contributing plants. This is 
reasonable because due to lack of available data, currently the model is not able to analyse each plant by its own 
property such as its capacity and development duration. It uses an average value for each plant type instead.  
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6.3.1.4 Power Plant’s LRMC 
 
The LRMC values used in the validation process are shown in Table 6.8. They 
were obtained from the 2006 publication by Meridian Energy (Meridian 
Energy 2006). No value is required for coal plants during the duration as there 
was no coal plant proposed.  
Table 6.8: LRMC values for different plant types 
Plant type LRMC 
(NZD/MWh) 
Hydro 62 
Wind 60 
Geothermal 60 
OCGT 100 
CCGT 70 
Cogeneration 50 
Coal N/A 
 
6.3.1.5 Power Plants’ Availability Factors 
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, one of the useful outputs from the model was 
the calculation of available energy from the installed capacity in New Zealand. 
The resultant installed capacity from the plant development loop provided the 
values to calculate the potential monthly generation. The potential generation 
was calculated based on the plant type availability factors. The factor indicated 
the annual plant availability to generate electricity when required, as a 
percentage of its theoretical maximum availability, i.e. all the time. It took into 
account the energy resource’s availability and the annual maintenance and 
outages. The values that were used in this validation process are shown in 
Table 6.9. The values were consistent with the values of plants availability 
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factor (termed as “load factors” in SOO2008) used by EC in their SOO2008 
analyses (Electricity Commission 2008). It was assumed that from 1996 to 
2050, technology does not change so much as to affect a plant’s availability 
factor. 
 
Table 6.9: Availability factor for each plant type 
Plant type Availability 
factor  
Hydro 0.5 
Wind 0.35 
Geothermal 0.9 
OCGT 0.9 
CCGT 0.9 
Cogeneration 0.7 
Coal 0.9 
 
The potential monthly generation (MW) is calculated as: 
Potential monthly generation = installed capacity*availability factor 
Equation 10 
 
 
6.3.2 Model validation steps 
There were several items in the model that require validation. They were: 
(i) The plant development and investment decision equations 
(ii) The price equations  
(iii) The overall model validation 
 
The plant development and investment decision equations needed to be 
verified as they provided the main outputs from the model. The price equation 
was important because to make future forecasts using the model, there was no 
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market price prediction available to drive the model. Hence, the model needed 
to derive the market price based on the margin between the electricity supply 
and demand. Once the two parts had been verified independently, the overall 
model was then evaluated to ensure that it would yield good and reliable 
results when used for forecasting. If the SD model was able to replicate the 
historical trends, it was assumed that its forecasts would be reliable.  
Taking these reasons into account, the model validation was undertaken in the 
following separate progressive stages: 
Stage 1 
To validate the development phase and investment decision equations, 
historical prices and consumption data were used as exogenous inputs to drive 
the model. A power plant development schedule was drafted based on the 
installed capacity between 1997 and 2008. The resultant installed capacity and 
the actual installed capacity were then compared. If the model used the correct 
framework and equations in the plant development and investment decision 
loop, the resultant installed capacity should not differ much from the actual 
installed capacity. This work is discussed in Section 6.3.2.1.  
Stage 2 
To validate the price equation, the historical  generation supply (actual 
installed capacity) and demand data were used as exogenous inputs to the SD 
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model. The resultant price was then compared to the past price to provide a 
goodness of fit measure. 
 
 
Stage 3 
To evaluate the model’s overall effectiveness, the derived price equation and 
plant schedules were used to drive the model. The resultant installed capacity 
and price were then compared to the past data to test for goodness of fit.  
6.3.2.1 Model validation – development phase and investment decision 
equations 
This validation was done to ensure that the timing allocated for each 
development phase was reasonable and realistic. It also checked whether the 
investment decision equations work in providing timely investment, given the 
right market conditions. The investment decision framework has been 
discussed in section 6.1.3 and illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
The development phases and investment framework were processed by: 
 Feeding the model with scheduled capacities subtracted with the base 
lead time at the planning stage using step functions. Step functions were 
used because of discrete and lumpy nature of power plant capacities and 
the plant unit comes on line as a whole rather than in fractions, e.g. after 
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commissioning, a unit of 100MW will have 100MW available from it 
rather than just 10MW. 
 When the market condition was correct (spot market monthly moving 
average real price>plant type LRMC), the capacities were moved to the 
next phase. Otherwise, they were delayed (as illustrated in Figure 6.3). 
6.3.2.2 Inputs 
A power plant schedule was drafted based on the yearly difference of actual 
installed capacities for different types of plants as shown in Table 6.7. The 
obtained plant development schedule is shown in Table 6.10. The schedule 
uses the plant lead time and development duration as shown in Table 6.1. The 
lead times and development durations for these plants were extracted from the 
base duration values of Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.10: Plant schedules for model validation 
Plant type New plants Retired plants 
Start Year commissioned Capacity 
(MW) 
Year 
decommissioned 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Hydro 1994 1999 7 2004 -3 
1995 2000 3 
1997 2002 139 
1998 2003 6 
2000 2005 1 
2002 2007 2 
2003 2008 27 
Wind 1996 1999 32 - - 
2000 2003 36 
2001 2004 94 
2002 2005 2 
2003 2006 1 
2004 2007 151 
2005 2008 2 
Geothermal 1994 1997 97 2000 -18 
1995 1998 10 
2000 2003 5 
2002 2005 55 
2004 2007 18 
2005 2008 134 
Cogeneration 1994 1997 271 1999 -5 
1997 2000 49 2002 -16 
1998 2001 2 
2000 2003 4 
2001 2004 6 
2002 2005 40 
2003 2006 30 
2004 2007 48 
2005 2008 4 
OCGT 2002 2004 195 1997 -314 
2004 2006 10 1998 -348 
1999 -100 
2005 -100 
2008 -183 
CCGT 1995 1998 385 - - 
1997 2000 380 
2004 2007 385 
Coal - - - - - 
 
Years in italics are outside the simulation range but taken into account by the model (refer 
to following texts). 
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Table 6.11: Plant base lead time and development duration 
Plant type Plant  
lead time  
(year) 
Planning 
duration 
(year) 
Approval 
duration  
(year) 
Construction 
duration  
(year) 
Hydro 5 1 1 3 
Coal  4 1 1 2 
CCGT 3 0.5 0.5 2 
OCGT 2 0.5 0.5 1 
Wind 3 1 1 1 
Geothermal 3 1 1 1 
Cogeneration  3 1 1 1 
 
Once the information on plant commissioning and decommissioning wass 
derived, a starting date for the plant development was obtained by applying the 
base lead time to the plant. For example, applying the 2 year lead time to an 
OCGT plant, the first OCGT capacity was fed into the model as a time step of 
195MW in the year 2002. If the model correctly captured the market 
mechanism, this capacity should come on line around the year 2004 as 
happened historically. 
The model validation simulation was run from the year 1997-2009. Some of 
the capacities were already under development in 1997. The affected 
capacities are shown in italics in Table 6.10. The capacities that came on line 
in 1997 were fed into the model as step functions effective in 1997. The 
capacities that came later but were started before the simulation duration, were 
placed in the respective development phase as shown in Table 6.11. For 
example, the hydro capacity to be commissioned in 1999 should be under 
construction in 1994 and hence is fed into the construction phase of the model.    
The refurbished plants were treated as new installed plants. This was because a 
major refurbishment work may take a long time, similar to building a new 
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plant. Since 1991, any refurbishment work must also obtain a resource consent 
under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) and hence requires an 
approval stage. It was therefore reasonable to treat refurbishment work as a 
new plant under the base lead time. An example of such refurbishment is the 
construction of the second tailrace tunnel at Manapouri. The work started in 
June 1997 and it was commissioned in 2002 (Meridian Energy 2011). The five 
year construction duration was the same as the base time allocated for a new 
hydro power plant development. Ideally, the model can be accurate if the 
development of each plant is known (when it was proposed, planned, approved 
and constructed) and fed into the model. However, this data was not publicly 
available.  
To demonstrate how the model captures the framework, Figure 6.6 shows the 
transition of wind power plants from the proposal to planning phase, whereas 
Figure 6.7 shows the comparison of the spot market price with wind power 
plant LRMC. From Figure 6.6, it can be seen that 36MW was proposed in 
2000 and 94MW in 2001. These capacities were in agreement with the 
scheduled capacities shown in Table 6.10. Initially, from Figure 6.7, it is 
observed that the market price was below the LRMC value. The price was first 
above the value in early 2001 and hence both the proposed plants were 
allowed by the model into the planning phase. After a year, the plants would 
have completed the planning stage and were waiting for the correct market 
condition to proceed to the approval stage. 
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Figure 6.6: Wind power plants phase transition from proposal to planning 
 
 
 Figure 6.7: The real monthly moving average spot market price compared to the wind 
power plant LRMC 
6.3.2.3 Results 
The simulation results for the validation of the development phase and 
investment decision equations stage are shown in Figure 6.8 to Figure 6.14.  
As mentioned in Section 6.3.1, the historical real prices and consumption data 
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were used to drive the model. The resultant   installed capacity from the SD 
model is compared to the actual installed capacity shown in Table 6.7). 
 
Figure 6.8: Hydro capacity comparison 
 
Figure 6.9: Geothermal capacity comparison 
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Figure 6.10: Wind capacity comparison 
 
 
Figure 6.11: CCGT capacity comparison 
 
 163 
 
 
Figure 6.12: OCGT capacity comparison 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13: Cogeneration capacity comparison 
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Figure 6.14: Total capacity comparison 
 
All the figures show that the simulated results are close to the actual historical 
data. Some of the resultant capacities from the SD model appear slightly ahead 
or later than the actual installed capacities. This is because the actual capacities 
record is updated annually in December whereas the SD model can update its 
result at any time according to the model time resolution.  
The actual total installed capacity provided by the MED (Ministry of 
Economic Development New Zealand 2009) was taken at December of each 
year. Figure 6.15 takes the SD model validation results annually in December 
and compares it with the MED annual data.  
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Figure 6.15: Comparison of actual data with the SD model results taken annually 
 
When comparing both results annually in December as shown in Figure 6.15, 
the SD results were very close to the actual installed capacity. Therefore it can 
be concluded that the development loop and the market-investment loop in the 
model worked well in modelling the power market mechanism. 
 
6.3.2.4 Model validation - price equations determination 
The model validation results in Section 6.3.2.3 were obtained using historical 
price (real price) and consumption data. To allow the model to be used in 
performing future projections, equations must be derived to determine the 
future spot market prices. This section describes how the price equation is 
derived and validated.  
Theoretically, the spot market prices vary depending on the differences 
between the amounts of supply and demand. Realistically, the prices are also 
affected by transmission congestions. In New Zealand, the spot market prices 
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in the north and south islands decouple and vary significantly when the HVDC 
link connecting the two islands is down. This model only used the supply and 
demand differences in formulating the spot market prices. Figure 6.16 shows 
the spot market price determination loop. The loop was used to calculate the 
monthly average prices. 
 
energy capacity
margin
consumption
price change
initial price
potential monthly
generation
energy surpluseffective spot
market price
price constant
VOLL
 
Figure 6.16: Spot market price determination loop 
 
The monthly consumption data is also used to allow the calculation of energy 
capacity margin and energy surplus. The energy surplus is defined as the 
difference between the potential monthly generation and the consumption 
(monthly). The energy surplus then causes the price to respond accordingly 
where a small surplus will result in a higher spot market price and vice versa. 
The price constant is a proportionality constant that affects how much the 
price change variable responds to the energy surplus.  
Since the price is inversely proportional to the energy surplus, it is then 
defined as:  
Installed capacity from the 
power plant development 
loop 
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Price change = (price constant)/ (energy surplus) 
 
Equation 11 
 
As described in section 6.2.3, the ECM is defined as the ratio of the energy 
surplus and demand: 
Energy capacity margin= (Energy surplus)/ (Consumption) 
Equation 12 
 
As defined in Equation 3, the Energy Surplus is calculated as the difference 
between the total available electric energy and the electric energy demand. 
Another constant that is used in determining the spot market price is the initial 
price. The initial price is the monthly average market price at the start of the 
simulation. Any subsequent price is known as the effective spot market price 
and is defined as:  
Effective spot market price = (Initial price) + (price change) 
Equation 13 
 
The effective spot market price can be very high if the margin between energy 
supply and demand is very small. Hence the variable is capped to the Value of 
Loss Load (VOLL) for the electricity industry in New Zealand, as theoretically 
implied in market theory (Stoft 2002). The VOLL value has been determined 
by the New Zealand Centre for Advanced Engineering (Centre for Advanced 
Engineering 2004) to be NZD20.95/MWh. 
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Since the price is dependent upon the margin between energy supply and 
demand, the following steps were taken in determining the price constant in 
the price loop: 
 Using past generation supply availability data to calculate the energy 
surplus 
 Using past hydrological data to take into account hydro shortages in 
dry winters 
 The hydrological data is a useful input because hydro accounts for 
60% of New Zealand’s generation mix.  
 
6.3.2.5 Inputs  
 
Figure 6.17 shows the electricity generation and consumption data from 2003 
to 2010. The figure was plotted based on the records held by EC (Electricity 
Commission 2008). The monthly generation data is tabulated in Appendix B4. 
The detailed electricity generation prior to 2003 is not available. It is shown 
that the generation is always more than the consumption due to losses in 
delivering the energy from the power plants to the consumers. However, the 
generation trends follow the consumption trends because the energy has to be 
supplied instantaneously to meet demand, since electricity cannot be stored. 
The consumption data that was used in this stage is the same as the previous 
stage (Section 6.3.2.2). 
The actual supply generation mix within the duration is shown in Figure 6.18. 
The figure was plotted based on MED records (Ministry of Economic 
Development New Zealand 2008).  It can be seen that geothermal plants 
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mainly served as a base load. Generally, CCGT and coal plants also work as 
base load, whereas OCGT and diesel work as peakers. Hydro and wind 
generation varied with respect to weather conditions. 
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Figure 6.17: Electricity generation and consumption from 2003 to 2010 (plotted based 
on data from EC (ref)) 
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Figure 6.18: Main generation mix from 2003 to 2010 
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Figure 6.19: Installed capacity by resource type 
 
Figure 6.19 shows the actual installed capacity from 1996 to 2008 by the 
different plant types (plotted based on MED records (Ministry of Economic 
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Development New Zealand 2008). Based on this information, the actual 
monthly potential available energy is calculated as: 
Actual monthly potential energy generation = ∑ Actual <plant type> potential 
energy generation*8760/12 
Equation 14 
 
The actual potential energy generation for each plant type is calculated using: 
Actual <plant type> potential energy generation = Actual <plant type> 
capacity*Average <plant type> availability factor 
Equation 15 
 
The values for the plant availability factors are as previously shown in Table 
6.9. Figure 6.18 and 6.19 show the domination of hydro as a generation 
resource. However, hydro supply varies throughout the year and given that the 
hydro storage in New Zealand is not large, thermal plants are used more than 
usual during dry seasons to meet demand, as shown in Figure 6.20.  
Price history (Figure 6.21) shows that the wholesale market price is sensitive 
to the hydro availability. Comparing Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.21, price spikes 
occurred in 2003, 2006 and 2008 during low hydro availability. The lack of 
hydro resources are complemented by higher generation outputs from thermal 
plants. The higher costs of operating thermal plants push up the wholesale 
electricity prices. 
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Figure 6.20: Thermal and hydro generation from 2003 to 2010 Wholesale price
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Figure 6.21: The average monthly wholesale electricity prices for the years 2003-2009 
(Electricity Commission 2010) 
 
The big impact of hydro availability on prices makes it important for the SD 
model to consider it as an input. Hence, hydro availability data is fed into the 
model using past hydro inflow data. The past hydro inflow data (Electricity 
Commission 2010) is plotted in Figure 6.22. The data is tabulated in Appendix 
B5.  
Low inflows were observed in about March 2000, mid 2001 and April 2003, 
2005 and 2007. High inflows were observed in October 1996 and 1998, 
November 1999 and December 2002. Generally, the natural lake cycles in 
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New Zealand are high lake levels heading into summer, reducing levels during 
summer (November- January) and autumn, and increasing levels during winter 
(May-July) and spring (Opus International Consultants Limited 2009). 
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Figure 6.22: Hydro inflows in GWh from 1996 till mid 2008 
 
The summarised monthly flow dataset is provided in GWh by Opus 
International Consultants Limited for the Electricity Commission. The 
conversion factors are based on the current hydro system and may not be 
correct for past (or future) time periods where the system was configured 
differently. The current system includes data from the following seventeen 
hydro systems - Waikato, Waikaremoana, Tongariro Power Development 
(TPD), Matahina, Mangahao, Kaimai, Aniwhenua, Wheao/Flaxy, Patea, 
Waitaki, Clutha, Manapouri, Cobb, Coleridge, Waipori, Highbank and Branch. 
Based on the data, the corresponding hydro availability factor is calculated 
using: 
Hydro availability factor = Hydro inflows/Maximum monthly hydro energy 
Equation 16 
 
where the  
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Maximum monthly hydro energy = Installed hydro capacity*365*24/12 
Equation 17 
 
The calculated hydro availability factor is plotted in Figure 6.23. It is included 
in the model in the hydro development loop where the available hydro energy 
is calculated as: 
Available hydro electric energy = Installed capacity hydro *hydro availability 
factor 
Equation 18 
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Figure 6.23: Calculated hydro availability factor 
 
The total hydro energy is then taken into account by the variable potential 
monthly generation, which sums all the potential monthly energy generation 
from each plant type. As shown in the price determination loop in Figure 6.16, 
the generation data is then used to formulate the price. 
The simulation is run from the year 2000 to June 2008. The simulation starts 
in 2000 because before 2000, there are only two market players – Contact 
Energy and ECNZ (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 2009). 
ECNZ was split into Meridian Energy, Mighty River Power and Genesis only 
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in April 1999. The simulation stops at June 2008 because the hydro data set 
was only provided up to that date. 
 
6.3.2.6 Results 
To illustrate the model results for this verification stage, Figure 6.24 shows the 
monthly electricity supply and demand that resulted from the inputs fed into 
the model. Figure 6.24 shows the energy surplus, being the difference between 
the energy supply and demand. The figures show energy shortages in mid 
2001 and mid 2003, as historically occurred in New Zealand. 
 
Figure 6.24: Resultant electricity supply and demand 
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Figure 6.25: Resultant energy surplus 
  
Based on the resultant energy surplus, the SD model calculates the effective 
price as described in Section 6.3.2.1. The comparison between the calculated 
effective price and past prices are shown in Figure 6.26. The price works well 
for the values for the year 2000 till 2003 (Figure 6.27). After 2003, the 
effective price does not accurately reproduce the past real price. However, it 
captures the general trend where high prices were reproduced in 2003 and 
2006 as historically happened.  
The differences between the effective price and past prices could be due to 
some changes to the New Zealand market after 2003 that might have affected 
the price behaviours. These include the introduction of the Electricity 
Governance Rules and the Electricity Commission in 2003 and the 
commissioning of a government owned peaking plant, Whirinaki in 2004. The 
use of Whirinaki power plant during dry years has been said to have distorted 
the market price (Office of the Minister of Energy and Resources 2009).  
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Figure 6.26: Comparison between model output (effective price) and historical price 
(real price) data 
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Figure 6.27: Comparison between model output and historical price data from 2000 to 
2003 
 
The resultant price trends show that price increases during small energy 
surpluses and reduces when the surplus is great, as suggested by basic supply 
and demand theory. This shows that the model price equations are able to 
capture this feature well and can be used; it is not the model’s objective to 
perform accurate price forecasting. A further validation stage is undertaken 
and discussed in the next section to see the effectiveness of the price equation 
in triggering new generation investments.  
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6.3.2.7 Model validation – overall model verification 
This final stage of the model validation uses the derived price equation to drive 
the whole model. The resultant installed capacity is then compared to the 
actual installed capacity for comparison as shown in Figure 6.28-6.35. The 
figures show that the SD model results did not differ much from actual 
historical data. 
 
Figure 6.28: Comparison of hydro capacity 
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Figure 6.29: Comparison of wind capacity 
 
 
Figure 6.30: Comparison of geothermal capacity 
 180 
 
 
Figure 6.31: Comparison of OCGT capacity 
 
Figure 6.32: Comparison of CCGT capacity 
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Figure 6.33: Comparison of cogeneration capacity 
 
 
Figure 6.34: Comparison of total installed capacity 
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Figure 6.35: Comparison of actual data with the SD model results taken annually 
 
6.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter described how the SD model for NZEM was constructed and 
validated. The validation results showed that the SD model was capable of 
replicating historical trends in installed generation capacities. Hence, it is 
assumed that the developed SD model can produce realistic results when it is 
used to forecast future generation capacities. The use of the SD model to 
forecast generation trends for five different future market development 
scenarios are described in the next chapter.  
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7 SIMULATION INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This chapter discusses the inputs and assumptions that were used by the SD model. Since 
the SD model results were to be compared with the GEM results featured in the SOO2008, 
the SD model used the same inputs and assumptions as the GEM. The SD model 
simulations were performed to evaluate whether the generation capacity expansion 
schedules suggested in the SOO2008 will be able to meet the forecasted demand when the 
interaction between generation capacity and the electricity market is taken into account.  
The chapter first describes how the generation build schedules are formulated by the GEM 
model for the SOO2008. The schedules are prepared for five different possible future 
scenarios for New Zealand. The chapter then elaborates on the assumptions and inputs that 
are made common to both models.  
7.1 SD model updates for SOO2008 evaluation 
To evaluate the SOO2008, the SD model discussed in Chapter 6 was updated to consider 
future scenarios, relevant for the duration of the simulated time, which is 2010 to 2050. The 
updates are: 
 New possible technology such as IGCC and wave power is added to the modelled 
types of power plants  
 Plant development durations are updated to include the new possible technologies 
 Demand side participation is included 
 Future gas and carbon prices are taken into account 
  LRMC values are updated to be relevant for 2010-2050 
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Generally, the inputs for the SD model follow the inputs for the GEM model as per the 
SOO2008 to ensure that fair comparisons can be made between the results. 
7.2 SOO2008 descriptions 
This research uses the Statement of Opportunity 2008 (SOO2008) as its main reference in 
the model development. The SOO2008 are based on the simulation results of the EC’s in-
house model known as the Generation Expansion Model (GEM). It is a capacity expansion 
model for the New Zealand electricity sector. GEM is a mathematical programming (i.e. 
optimisation) problem of the mixed integer program (MIP) type. It is coded using the 
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software and is solved with the CPLEX
1
 
solver (Electricity Commission 2009). 
Taking into account various factors, the GEM model provides the generation build 
schedule under different possible future scenarios as one of its main outputs. The GEM 
model takes the following factors into account: demand forecasts, national policies, fuel 
prices, hydrological and wind data, carbon prices and transmission costs. The SD model 
also takes these factors into account and in addition, incorporates the interaction between 
generation capacity and the wholesale electricity market. 
7.3 Models inputs 
To make fair comparisons between the GEM and the SD model results, the same GEM 
inputs are fed into the SD models. The SOO2008 components that are taken as inputs by 
the SD model are: 
                                                 
1 Named CPLEX because it implements the simplex method in C programming language in solving optimization 
problems  
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(i) Records of existing power plants and committed projects 
(ii) Future generation scenarios 
(iii) Scheduled power plants under each scenario 
(iv) Demand forecasts 
(v) Future energy prices 
The records on the existing power plants determine the initial conditions for both the GEM 
model and the SD model. The full record is provided in Appendix B1 and B2. The data is 
only correct at the time the EC ran its GEM model for the SOO2008. Since then, several 
plants have been commissioned and decommissioned. However, to make sure that the SD 
model results are comparable to the SOO2008, the SD model uses the SOO2008 data 
directly without updating it. The record as listed in the SOO2008 is summarised in Table 
7.1. 
Table 7.1: Summary of existing power plants by type 
Plant type Capacity (MW) 
Hydro 5111 
Wind 183 
Geothermal 385 
OCGT 205 
CCGT 1320 
Coal 1000 
Cogeneration 284 
Total 8488 
For existing embedded generation plants that are over 10MW, the total capacity is 342MW. 
There are no existing wave, pumped storage or Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
(IGCC) power plants in New Zealand, but these new plant types are proposed under some 
of the future scenarios. The SD model categorised the power plants according to their 
186 
 
technology type. For the evaluation of the SOO2008, the technology types are hydro, 
geothermal, wind, OCGT, CCGT, conventional coal, IGCC, wave and pumped storage. 
 
7.3.1 Future generation scenarios 
The SOO2008 considers five different generation scenarios: 
i. Sustainable Path  
ii. South Island Surplus  
iii. Medium Renewables  
iv. Demand-side Participation  
v. High Gas Discovery  
The scenario development process for the 2008 generation scenarios included three main 
steps (Electricity Commission 2008): 
• assembling input data; 
• developing the scenario 'stories' identifying the key drivers and assumptions (for 
example fuel cost and availability, discount rates, carbon price) which guide the future 
development paths in the scenarios and determine what combination of drivers will 
apply in each scenario; and 
• running the models to develop each generation scenario. 
This process is illustrated in Figure 7.1. Based on the developed scenarios and demand 
forecasts, the GEM produces the least cost power plant build schedules corresponding to 
each scenario. The build schedules are discussed in the next section.
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Figure 7.1: Scenario development process (Electricity Commission 2008) 
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The five scenarios are presented in Table 7.2. They were intended to provide reasonably 
credible future possibilities, while encompassing most of the uncertainties (Electricity 
Commission 2008).  
With the national targets set out in the NZES2007 for renewable energy, the scenarios are 
formulated so that the following objectives are achieved (Electricity Commission 2008): 
 Sustainable Path is 89 percent renewable by 2025. 
 South Island Surplus is about 82 percent renewable by 2025, with a bias towards 
South Island wind and hydro. 
 Medium Renewables is about 77 percent renewable by 2025, with more generation 
located in the North Island. 
 Demand-side Participation is about 69 percent renewable by 2025, with extensive 
demand-side involvement and high electric vehicle uptake. 
 High Gas Discovery is approximately 69 percent renewable by 2025, with low gas 
prices due to indigenous gas finds. 
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Table 7.2:  Scenarios outline of SOO2008 (Electricity Commission 2008) 
Scenario Description 
Sustainable 
Path 
(MDS1) 
New Zealand embarks on a path of sustainable electricity development 
and sector emissions reduction. Major existing thermal power stations 
close down and are replaced by renewable generation, including hydro, 
wind and geothermal backed by thermal peakers for security of supply. 
Electric vehicle uptake is relatively rapid after 2020. New energy 
sources are brought on stream in the late 2020s and 2030s, including 
biomass, marine, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Demand-side 
response helps to manage peak demand. 
South Island 
Surplus 
(MDS2) 
Renewable development proceeds at a slightly more moderate pace, 
with all existing gas-fired power stations remaining in operation until 
after 2030, though taking a more mid-order role as gas prices increase. 
The coal-fired units at Huntly Power Station are shifted into a reserve 
role and eventually removed from service. Wind and hydro generation 
increase considerably, particularly in the lower South Island. Relatively 
little geothermal energy is utilised. Thermal peakers supplement 
renewable development. 
Medium 
Renewables 
(MDS3) 
A 'middle-of-the-road' scenario. Renewables are developed in both 
islands, with North Island geothermal development playing an 
important role. The coal-fired units at Huntly transition through dry-
year reserve to total closure. Thermal peakers and a new combined 
cycle gas turbine (CCGT) supplement renewable development. Tiwai 
smelter is assumed to be decommissioned in the mid-2020s. 
Demand-side 
Participation 
(MDS4) 
Demand-side participation becomes a more important feature of the 
market, driven by a desire from consumers of all types to become more 
fully involved. Electric vehicle uptake is high, and vehicle-to-grid 
technology is used to manage peaks and provide ancillary services. On 
the generation side, new coal and lignite-fired plants are constructed 
after 2020, and geothermal resources are developed. Little new hydro 
can be consented, however, and some existing hydro schemes have to 
reduce their output (due to difficulty in securing water rights). Huntly 
Power Station remains in full operation until 2030. Electricity-sector 
emissions rise, though transport-sector emissions would be lower than 
in other scenarios. 
High Gas 
Discovery 
(MDS5) 
Major new indigenous gas discoveries keep gas prices low to 2030 and 
beyond. Some existing thermal power stations are replaced by new, 
more efficient gas-fired plants. New CCGTs and gas-fired peakers are 
built to meet the country's power needs; the most cost-effective 
renewable plants are also developed. The demand-side remains 
relatively uninvolved. 
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7.3.2 Scheduled power plants under each scenario 
To produce the build schedules for the SOO2008, the GEM incorporated the following key 
features (Electricity Commission 2008):  
 The costs the model seeks to minimise capital expenditure on new generation plant 
and transmission investments, fixed and variable operating costs for all generation 
plant, and HVDC charges (where variable costs include operating and maintenance 
costs, carbon charges, fuel costs, and, where applicable, carbon sequestration costs). 
 Inter-island transfers over the HVDC linked are modeled explicitly, as are 
transmission losses on the HVDC link. 
 Upgrades to the HVDC link are assumed to occur in 2012 and 2018. 
 Perfect competition in the wholesale electricity market is assumed  
The proposed build schedules are as listed in Appendix C3. The build schedules are fed 
into the SD model as inputs for the corresponding simulated scenarios. As previously 
described in Chapter 6, the plant capacities are fed using step functions. The functions are 
set up using the following rules:   
 Plants already in the development stage in 2010 get commissioned as scheduled.  
 Planned power plants go through the investment decision process (as illustrated in 
Figure 6.3) 
 Plants that are scheduled to be decommissioned, get decommissioned as scheduled  
 
7.3.3 Demand forecasts 
The demand forecasts utilised by both the GEM and SD models are developed by the EC’s 
in house specialist modelling team. Forecasts are made of the following demands: 
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(i) Energy demand – total electrical energy demand over a period of time (in GWh) 
(ii) Energy demand from potential electric vehicles usage (in GWh)  
(iii) Peak demand – highest rate at which energy is consumed (in GW) 
(iv) Demand side participation 
7.3.3.1 Energy demand forecast 
The EC used econometric models for its long term national electric energy demand 
forecasting. The models use an historical relationship between the electricity demand and 
key economic variables - gross domestic product (GDP), population, electricity prices and 
number of household -  to produce future demand projections based on forecasts of those 
key drivers (Electricity Commission 2008). The key drivers forecast are included in 
Appendix C4. 
Before the forecasts are made, the demand is split into three main sectors – residential, 
commercial and industrial, and heavy industrial (Tiwai aluminium smelter) – because each 
sector has different characteristics and hence different economic variables attached to it. 
Accordingly, different econometric models and assumptions are used for each, tailored to 
the particular characteristics, as shown in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Drivers used in the residential, commercial and industrial and heavy industrial model 
(Electricity Commission 2008) 
Sector Population GDP Number of 
households 
Electricity 
prices 
Model structure 
Residential Yes Yes Yes Yes Log based model using 
data from 1974 onwards. 
Commercial 
and industrial 
No Yes  No No Linear model using data 
from 1986 onwards. 
Heavy 
industrial 
(Tiwai Point 
aluminum 
smelter) 
No No No No Fixed forecast based on 
maximum annual 
historical demand. 
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A key problem with forecasting demand over long time periods is the high level of 
uncertainty that arises due to potential changes in the underlying drivers. The Commission 
has used a Monte Carlo simulation technique to model uncertainty in the key drivers. This 
technique involves estimating distributions for key drivers used in the model. The model is 
then re-run many times, replacing the actual input data with data randomly drawn from the 
estimated distributions. This provides a range of forecasts that confidence limits can be 
based on (Electricity Commission 2008). The resulting national energy forecast with 80 
percent confidence limits is shown in Figure 7.2. The corresponding data table is provided 
in Appendix C5. 
 
Figure 7.2: National electric energy forecast with 80% confidence limits (Electricity Commission 
2008) 
 
Based on the given aggregated demand forecasts in the SOO2008, the total annual 
forecasted demand for each scenario is summarised as shown in Figure 7.3. MDS1 and 
MDS4 have higher demands to include demands from electric vehicles, whereas MDS3 has 
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a lower demand due to the decommissioning of the Tiwai aluminium smelter in the mid 
2020s.  
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Figure 7.3: Electrical energy demand baseline forecasts for all scenarios (Electricity Commission 
2008) 
 
The GEM model performs its analyses at a regional level and hence the input data for the 
SOO2008 are aggregated regionally. Hence, to evaluate whether the projected generation 
capacity in SOO2008 is sufficient to provide the national energy demand, the regional 
energy demands are summed up before being fed into the SD model. Similar to the GEM 
model, the SD model also looks at the demand on a monthly basis so that seasonal demand 
variations can be captured.  
7.3.3.2 Plug in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) or electric vehicles (EV) forecasts 
The electric vehicle demand has been modeled as an additional component of demand, 
added to the base forecast in two of the five scenarios, namely the Sustainable Path and 
Demand-side Participation scenarios. The electric vehicle demand forecast is based 
substantially on an electric vehicle penetration scenario developed by the Ministry of 
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Transport (MoT), using their vehicle fleet emissions model. The projected demand increase 
is shown in Figure 7.4. 
 
Figure 7.4: Demand increase projection for electric vehicles (Electricity Commission 2008) 
 
7.3.3.3 Peak demand forecast 
Peak demand forecasts are important for investment decision making and determining the 
type of required power plants. The peak demand in this context is defined as the maximum 
of the average demand levels in all the half-hours ('trading periods') in a calendar year (as 
opposed to the highest instantaneous demand). Typically, demand peaks occur on 
weekdays in winter; they can occur either in the morning (often around 8am) or in the early 
evening. They are generally associated with cold weather events during which domestic 
heating demand is high (Electricity Commission 2008).  
The peak forecasts are annual (representing the highest projected half-hourly demand 
occurring in a given calendar year), and cover the period from 2012 to 2049. The expected 
forecasts are calculated as projections of the historical peak demand series. In the longer 
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term, peak demand growth is projected to proceed at the same rate as energy demand 
growth. EC assumed that the usage of EVs does not affect the peak demand growth. 
Demand growth in some regions is adjusted for known changes at specific sites. For 
example, it is assumed that the electricity demand of the aluminum smelter at Tiwai will 
plateau at 605 MW, rather than continuing to grow as it has in recent years. This resulted in 
a different growth projection under MDS3 where it is assumed that the aluminum smelter 
would be decommissioned in the mid 2020s. The resulted forecasts are shown in Figure 7.5 
for the baseline as well as low and high growth projections under all scenarios except 
MDS3. Figure 7.6 shows the forecasts under MDS3. The forecasted peak demand values 
are tabulated in Appendix C6. 
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Figure 7.5: Peak demand forecasts for New Zealand from 2012 to 2048 under all scenarios except 
MDS3 (Electricity Commission 2008) 
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Figure 7.6: Peak demand forecasts for New Zealand from 2012 to 2048 under MDS3 (Electricity 
Commission 2008) 
 
7.3.3.4 Demand side participation 
Demand side participation can avoid the need to build a new power plant and hence should 
be incorporated in generation expansion planning. Unlike many other countries, demand 
side participation is already significant in New Zealand. Currently, there are consumers 
offering their hot water heaters as interruptible loads (IL). ILs are electrical loads that can 
be quickly disconnected by a central agency. Participation in IL provision is voluntary and 
is compensated for. The distribution companies then offer these loads in a similar way a 
generator offers a capacity to Transpower in managing peak load demands. Under MDS4, 
vehicle to grid technology is also considered as a potential IL.   
Demand side management refers to voluntary load reductions in response to price, and can 
be supported by a range of initiatives including demand side bidding, time-of-use pricing, 
and/or demand-side aggregation. This is expected to become significant in the future with 
the rollouts of smart meters to customers. 
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Both the GEM and SD model treat the demand side participation as a potential generating 
unit and as part of the list of scheduled power plants (Appendix C3).  
7.3.4 Future generation costs 
A key aspect of the generation input data is the relative economics of the various types of 
generation. Table 7.4 to 7.6 describe the costs of the modeled generation technologies, in 
terms of long-run marginal cost (LRMC) and short-run marginal cost (SRMC). 
7.3.4.1 LRMC 
LRMC is defined as the mean price (at the relevant GIP) that is sufficient to cover all plant 
costs (in this context this includes capital financing costs, carbon costs, fuel costs, O & M 
and transmission charges but excludes network loss costs). A real pre-tax discount rate of 
8% has been assumed in the calculation of the LRMC. Assumed depreciation rates vary 
between technologies. LRMCs depend on plant factor and have been calculated for several 
different plant factors, where applicable. Connection costs have not been included in the 
LRMCs shown here (but are modeled in GEM). The LRMCs shown here may differ with 
those published in other documents due to differences in assumed project life, depreciation 
rate, treatment of tax, discount rate, plant factor and/or types of cost considered (Electricity 
Commission 2008). Both costs depend on carbon prices and fuel prices. The forecasted 
carbon and fuel prices are discussed in the following sections. 
 
The EC assumptions about LRMCs for thermal technologies are shown in Table 7.4 . Two 
sets of prices are shown, to indicate the range of values. Thermal plant LRMCs also depend 
strongly on the assumed plant factor. A plant operating as mid-order (plant factor in the 
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ballpark of 50 percent) faces a higher LRMC per unit output than a similar plant operating 
as base load. On the other hand, the mid-order plant has the flexibility to run when prices 
are higher, so will earn more revenue per unit output. Plants running in a peaking capacity 
have extremely high LRMCs (much higher than their SRMCs).GEM determined the plant 
factor of each plant in each simulated year on a least-cost basis, within the limits imposed 
by the technology.  
Table 7.4: LRMC corresponding to the plant availability factors for thermal power plants 
(Electricity Commission 2008) 
Plant types Plant 
availability 
factor  
(%) 
LRMC 
($/MWh)  
– gas at $7/GJ, 
no carbon 
charge 
LRMC 
($/MWh) – gas 
at $10/GJ, 
carbon at 
$30/tonne 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 90 75 107 
Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) 20 215 261 
Coal 90 85 111 
Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle (IGCC) with Carbon Capture 
Storage (CCS) 
90 119 123 
 
Assumed LRMCs for renewable technologies are shown in Table 7.5. These assumptions 
indicate that the best available resources of wind, hydro and geothermal are each around 
the $80/MWh level. Geothermal generation has a relatively low LRMC, in part because 
geothermal has no fuel cost and a high capacity factor, and in part because of the moderate 
capital costs assumed for geothermal projects. LRMCs of near-future geothermal 
generation options typically range from $70 to $90/MWh, based on a capital cost of $3000 
to $4000/kW. Wind and hydro have lower capacity factors, but can still be economic where 
capital costs are low enough (Electricity Commission 2008). 
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Table 7.5: LRMC corresponding to the plant availability factors for renewable power plants 
Plant types Plant 
availability 
factor (%) 
LRMC  
($/MWh) 
Hydro 50 85 
Geothermal 90 80 
Cogenerationeration 70 130 
Marine 45 125 
Wind 45 80 
 
 
7.3.4.2 SRMC 
SRMC is defined as the marginal cost, at the relevant grid injection points (GIP), of 
producing the next unit of electricity (in this context, including carbon costs, fuel costs and 
variable operation and maintenance (O & M), but excluding capital expenditures 
(CAPEX), fixed routine O&M , transmission charges and network loss costs). Due to the 
relatively lower O&M for renewable technology power plants, the SRMC is more 
significant for fossil fuel power plants, especially the peaking plants, as shown in Table 7.6. 
The SRMC is very much affected by fuel prices, and by carbon prices once the Emission 
Trading Scheme becomes more significant.  
Table 7.6: SRMC of existing fossil fuel power plants 
Plant (example) SRMC ($/MWh) – 
gas price at $7/GJ, 
no carbon charge 
SRMC ($/MWh) – 
gas price at 
$10/GJ, carbon 
charge at $30/t 
SRMC ($/MWh) – 
gas price at 
$13/GJ, carbon 
charge at $50/t 
Taranaki 
Combined Cycle 
56 90 119 
Whirinaki diesel 
plant 
280 304 320 
Huntly units 1-4 on 
coal 
52 81 100 
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7.3.4.3 Fossil fuel prices 
The three main fossil fuels currently used for electricity generation in New Zealand are 
natural gas, coal and oil. New Zealand has a plentiful supply of coal which could meet its 
needs in the long run. However, it seems unlikely that natural gas will continue to be 
available in large quantities, at current prices, in the long-term. The availability and price of 
natural gas are important drivers of the scenarios. 
The future price of natural gas is unknown and difficult to predict. Among other things, the 
price will depend on the price of carbon, the extent of new gas discoveries around New 
Zealand, and whether an LNG terminal is constructed for the importation of liquefied gas. 
In the absence of new gas discoveries, the amount of gas available will decline and the 
price will increase, eventually to very high levels. New gas discoveries will tend to increase 
the amount of gas available and reduce its price, unless the gas is exported. The availability 
of imported LNG would tie the price of gas to the international LNG price and potentially 
allow large volumes of gas to be imported. The gas price paths assumed in the scenarios are 
shown in Figure 7.7.  
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Figure 7.7: Modelled gas prices for the five scenarios (exclusive of the cost of carbon) (Electricity 
Commission 2008) 
  
The gas prices shown are denominated in NZ$/GJ, paid for base load electricity generation. 
They do not include charges for flexible gas supply (chargeable by OCGT plants), the cost 
of carbon (section 7.3.4.4), or charges for gas transmission. 
Each scenario follows one of three outcomes for the gas market. 
 In the Sustainable Path and South Island Surplus scenarios, it is assumed that no 
LNG terminal is constructed (perhaps because high international carbon prices 
cause worldwide fuel substitution from coal to gas, increasing the international 
demand for gas and making it difficult for New Zealand to secure a supply). Gas 
prices rise to $13/GJ by 2024, and less than 60 PJ per year is used in the electricity 
sector. At this price, renewable plants tend to displace gas-fired generation. 
 In the Medium Renewables and Demand-side Participation scenarios, it is assumed 
that an LNG terminal is commissioned in 2020. Based on advice from the MED 
and consistent with estimates in the NZES2007, it is assumed that gas prices rise to 
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$11/GJ by 2024 and remain steady at that level indefinitely, and that unlimited 
amounts of gas can be obtained at that price. 
 In the High Gas Discovery scenario, it is assumed that new gas finds provide an 
ongoing supply of gas at relatively affordable prices. Up to 120 PJ per year is 
available at a price of $8/GJ. 
It is assumed that the gas price is highest in scenarios where the assumed carbon price is 
highest. It might be argued that high carbon prices would lead to reduced use of gas and 
hence lower gas prices. The counter argument would be that high carbon prices would lead 
to reduced gas exploration and/or substitution of gas for coal, both of which would result in 
higher gas prices. 
There is also uncertainty about the future price and availability of oil for electricity 
generation. However, the sensitivity to these parameters is relatively low, since the 
scenarios only use oil in small quantities to fuel peaking generation. All scenarios assume 
that up to 25 PJ per year of diesel can be used for electricity generation; this constraint is 
never approached. Following advice from the MED, the future price of oil for electricity 
generation is assumed to be $25/GJ in all scenarios except the Sustainable Path scenario, 
where it assumed to rise to $35/GJ by 2020 following a 'peak oil' scenario. Future prices of 
$4/GJ for black coal and $1.80/GJ for lignite are assumed (Electricity Commission 2008). 
7.3.4.4 Carbon prices 
Effective of July 2019, generation companies have to pay for the greenhouse gases that 
their plant emits according to the implemented Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). All five 
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of the generation scenarios assume that there is a price on carbon required to pay for 
greenhouse gas emissions. The framework of carbon charging may change over time. The 
current proposed Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is a broad-based, economy-wide cap-
and-trade scheme that is neutral between domestic and international emissions reduction. 
Future measures to curb greenhouse emissions may or may not use the same framework.  
In the SOO2008, EC has modeled the cost of carbon as a flat rate applied to all electricity-
sector emissions, denominated in real NZ$/t CO2-equivalent. The future price of carbon in 
the New Zealand electricity sector is unknown and difficult to predict. Many different 
estimates have been published, based on a number of methodologies. These have included 
modeling simulations and comparative analyses, and have typically produced estimates 
with large standard errors, reflecting the uncertainty associated with the factors being 
considered. Nevertheless, expectations seem to be that the price of carbon will rise over 
time, with indicated price estimates in the range of $20/t to $60/t over the next ten years 
and potentially significantly higher after that. 
In the SOO2008, the EC has used a range of carbon prices, to indicate the uncertainty about 
the price path. The assumed long-run price of carbon varies from NZ$20/t (Demand-side 
Participation) to NZ$60/t (Sustainable Path). In all the scenarios, the EC assumes the price 
of carbon applies from 2010, when the electricity sector comes under the ETS. The price 
starts low due to free allocation of some units, but increases until it reaches its long-term 
level in 2018; it remains constant thereafter. The resulting price paths are shown in Figure 
7.8. In practice, carbon prices might fluctuate widely from year to year.  
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Figure 7.8: Modelled carbon prices for the five scenarios (Electricity Commission 2008) 
 
7.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the inputs that were used by the GEM and SD model used to 
forecast future generation trends in New Zealand. The main inputs were the five possible 
market development scenarios, consumption trends and generation costs. The consumption 
trends and generation costs under some of the scenarios differed from other scenarios 
because of the key assumptions made in developing them.  
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8 RESULTS COMPARISONS AND DISCUSSIONS   
The SD model is run to simulate the years 2010 until 2050 to allow its results to be 
compared with the GEM model’s results shown in the SOO2008. The results from the SD 
and GEM models are compared in terms of the installed generation capacities. From the 
SD model simulations, the resultant ECM and CM for each MDS are determined. The 
result comparisons and discussions are arranged according to their simulated scenarios (i.e. 
MDS1 to MDS5). Part of the results discussed in this chapter had been published in 
AUPEC2010 (Jalal and Bodger 2010) and PSCE2011 (Jalal and Bodger 2011).  
The results shown here are for the simulations using the baseline future load forecasts (as 
illustrated in Figure 7.5 and listed in Appendix C5). The plants’ availability factors were set 
to their maximum values as shown in with their corresponding costs listed in Table 7.4 and 
Table 7.5. 
The simulations discussed in this chapter were also run assuming no delays in power plant 
developments. Even though the plant build schedules in the SOO2008 are for the years up 
to 2040, the SD model was run until 2050 to observe when any delayed plants get 
commissioned. The build schedules for each MDS are listed in Appendix C3. In the SD 
model, the power plants proceed to the next development phase only when market 
conditions are perceived to provide profits, as illustrated in Figure 6.3.  
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8.1 Results comparisons for MDS1 (Sustainable Path) 
8.1.1 MDS1 descriptions 
As described in Table 7.1, MDS1 assumes a high penetration of renewable resources in the 
generation mix. The scheduled plants are mainly hydro, wind and geothermal. Pumped 
storage and wave plants are introduced after 2020.  Most existing thermal plants are 
decommissioned by 2025. Development of new thermal plants is discouraged by the high 
gas and carbon prices shown in Figure 8.1. The high gas prices result from the assumption 
that there will be no import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Among all scenarios, MDS1 
assumes the highest eventual carbon price ($60/tonne of CO2 equivalent) by 2018. Only 
clean coal and gas technology such as IGCC and CCGT plants with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technology are scheduled to be built (Electricity Commission 2008) as base 
power plants. However, OCGTs are scheduled for development so that they can act as 
peaking plants. 
 
Figure 8.1: Modelled gas and carbon prices for MDS1, extracted from Figure 7.7 and 7.8 
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8.1.2 Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS1 
The resultant total installed generation capacities from the two models are shown in Figure 
8.2. It shows that the installed capacities in the SD model lag behind the build schedules 
proposed in the SOO2008. This is due to investors waiting for the right wholesale market 
price before investing to allow for maximum profit. The simulated monthly averaged spot 
market price is shown in Figure 8.3. As expected, the prices are higher in the winter 
months. The simulated prices for MDS1 are generally low with the calculated mean of 
NZD74.42/MWh.  
 
Figure 8.2: Total installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS1 
 
For MDS1, capacity boom and bust cycles are not obvious as the observed capacity dips 
are only for several months. By 2050, the SD model generates less total installed 
generation capacity as compared to the GEM model. Looking at the results for each plant 
type, it is observed that all the scheduled OCGT plants will not be installed by 2050, as 
shown in Figure 8.4. The reason for this is due to the insufficient difference in the supply 
and demand margin that results in spot market prices not reaching high enough to trigger 
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investments in the OCGT technology. Figure 8.3 shows that the forecasted prices after 
2022 are lower than the OCGT’s LRMC (Figure 8.4). Hence, it is predicted that all the 
scheduled OCGTs will not be commissioned. 
 
Figure 8.3: Forecasted monthly averaged wholesale electricity price for MDS1 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Modelled LRMC for OCGT technology under MDS1 
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Figure 8.5: Results comparison for installed OCGT capacity for MDS1 
 
Most plants using other technology get commissioned without much delay (see Appendix 
D1) except for the CCGT and pumped storage plants. Due to their higher LRMCs, the 
CCGT and pumped storage plants seemed to face delays of almost two years in order to 
wait for the market price to be conducive for their developments (see Figure 8.6 and Figure 
8.7). The CCGT plants LRMC are higher under MDS1 because it is assumed that gas and 
carbon prices will be higher. However, all of their scheduled capacities get commissioned 
by 2040. This is consistent with the MDS1 scenario target where more renewable plants 
will be dominant by 2040. However, being more reliant on renewable resources can make 
the supply vulnerable under certain weather conditions. This vulnerability is investigated in 
Chapter 9.  
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Figure 8.6: Results comparison for installed pumped storage capacity for MDS1 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Results comparison for installed CCGT capacity for MDS1 
 
  
8.1.3 Resultant ECM for MDS1 
Figure 8.8 shows the corresponding ECM for the SD model results. The ECM remains 
positive but dips low around 2020, 2022 and around 2040. If a dry year occurs during these 
years, a shortage may occur. The higher ECMs from 2033 onwards indicate that the supply 
is adequate and no new plants are required to meet the demand. This is reflected in the 
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forecasted wholesale electricity prices shown in Figure 8.3. As expected, the ECM after 
2042 declines rapidly with no new plants being scheduled (since the build schedules are 
only up to the year 2040).  
 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Resultant ECM for MDS1 
 
8.1.4 Resultant CM for MDS1 
In terms of peak demands, the simulated CM shown in Figure 8.9 indicates that New 
Zealand will not have problems in meeting its future peak electricity demands.  
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Figure 8.9: Resultant CM for MDS1 
 
Results comparisons for MDS2 (South Island Surplus) 
8.1.5 MDS2 descriptions 
MDS2 is characterised as having most of the generation resources coming from the South 
Island with extensive hydro and wind availability. Developments of new geothermal and 
thermal power plants are restricted. Most thermal plants have reduced operation by 2023. 
The modelled gas and carbon prices are shown in Figure 8.10. The modelled gas prices are 
the same as MDS1 but the carbon prices rose to only NZD50/tonne of CO2 equivalent.  
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Figure 8.10: Modelled gas and carbon prices for MDS2, extracted from Figure 7.7 and 7.8 
 
8.1.6 Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS2 
Figure 8.11 shows that for MDS2, the SD model results lag behind the SOO2008 proposed 
schedule. Capacity cycles are not obvious as the capacity dips are only for several months 
except from the year 2038 to mid 2039. By 2050, the SD model eventually generates the 
same total installed capacity as the GEM model.  
The simulated spot market price is shown in Figure 8.12. Prices spike in the mid of 2038 
and 2039 (resulting from the long capacity dip). Prices start to increase again after 2045 
indicating the need for new power plants to be scheduled. Looking at the results for each 
plant type, it is observed that scheduled OCGT and IGCC capacities get delayed to wait for 
the wholesale electricity price to increase, as shown in Figure 8.13 and Figure 8.14 
respectively. Figure 8.12 shows that the forecasted wholesale electricity prices are 
generally lower than the LRMCs for OCGT and IGCC until the price hikes in mid 2038 
and mid 2039. Cogeneration plants (Figure 8.16) also face substantial delays because of 
their relatively higher LRMC ($130/MWh) compared to other renewable technology (about 
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$85/MWh). All other plants using other technology gets commissioned without much delay 
(see Appendix D2). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.11: Total installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS2 
 
 
Figure 8.12: Forecasted monthly averaged wholesale electricity price for MDS2 
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Figure 8.13: Results comparison for installed OCGT capacity for MDS2 
 
Figure 8.14: Results comparison for installed IGCC capacity for MDS2 
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Figure 8.15: Results comparison for installed CCGT capacity for MDS2 
 
Figure 8.16: Results comparison for installed cogeneration capacity for MDS2 
 
 
8.1.7 Resultant ECM for MDS2 
The calculated ECM (shown in Figure 8.17) for MDS2 indicates that shortages are 
predicted in the winter of 2038 and 2039. After 2046, new plants need to be built to prevent 
energy shortages. 
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Figure 8.17: Resultant ECM for MDS2 
 
8.1.8 Resultant CM for MDS2 
The calculated CM for MDS2 (Figure 8.18) indicates that New Zealand should not have 
any problem in meeting its peak power demand even in 2039 when the ECM is lowest. 
 
 
Figure 8.18: Resultant CM for MDS2 
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8.2 Results comparisons for MDS3 (Medium Renewables) 
8.2.1 MDS3 descriptions 
The generation mix under MDS3 is with a moderate amount of renewable plants as well as 
fossil fuel plants. However, base load thermal plants are still restricted until the year 2019 
and no new coal plants are built. The carbon and gas price increases at a moderate pace (see 
Figure 8.19). LNG is allowed to be imported after 2020. Wind and geothermal resources 
become extensively used. On the demand side, it is assumed that the Tiwai aluminium 
smelter is phased out around 2020, causing a significant drop in base and peak demand 
(Figure 8.20 and Figure 8.21). The results from two models for this scenario are shown in 
the following sections. 
 
Figure 8.19: Modelled gas and carbon prices for MDS3 
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Figure 8.20: Forecasted monthly load consumption for MDS3 (2010 – 2050) (Electricity Commission 
2008) 
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Figure 8.21: Forecasted annual peak load demand for MDS3 (2010 – 2050) (Electricity Commission 
2008) 
 
8.2.2 Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS3 
The total installed generation capacities resulted from the two models are shown in Figure 
8.22. Due to the reduced demand, the GEM model predicted a stagnant period from 2022 
until 2034. The SD model on the other hand, predicted that no new plants will be 
commissioned despite having old plants retiring, causing a significant drop in the total 
installed capacity. The bust period is predicted to last for around 7 years from 2026 until 
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2033. The reduced demand also results in low wholesale market prices from 2020 until 
2030 (Figure 8.23). Hence it makes sense for investors not to invest in new plants until the 
prices are conducive again, after 2032. The installed capacities in the year 2033 are 
predicted to pick up again, followed by a boom period until 2045. By 2050, all of the 
scheduled capacities are commissioned. Most of the scheduled capacities (Appendix D3) 
do not face many delays except for scheduled OCGT plants (Figure 8.24). Some wind 
(Figure 8.25) and cogeneration (Figure 8.26) plants faces delays during the flat demand 
growth period. During this period, some old plants get decommissioned and the wholesale 
market prices begin to increase again as the supply and demand margin narrows. 
 
Figure 8.22: Total installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS3 
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Figure 8.23: Forecasted monthly averaged wholesale electricity price for MDS3 
 
 
Figure 8.24: Results comparison for installed OCGT capacity for MDS3 
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Figure 8.25: Results comparison for installed wind capacity for MDS3 
 
 
Figure 8.26: Results comparison for installed cogeneration capacity for MDS3 
 
8.2.3 Resultant ECM for MDS3 
The calculated ECM from the SD model (Figure 8.27) shows that the ECM became low 
around 2032, which could bring about energy shortages. The boom period in 2033 
increases the ECM for the next few years. After 2042, the ECM becomes low again, 
indicating the need for new investments. 
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Figure 8.27: Forecasted ECM for MDS3 
 
8.2.4 Resultant CM for MDS3 
The calculated CM for MDS3 (Figure 8.28) shows a cycle of bust and boom following the 
cycle in the installed capacities. The CM value from around 2032-2033 becomes low and 
poses a threat to system security.  
 
Figure 8.28: Forecasted CM for MDS3 
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8.3 Results comparisons for MDS4 (Demand Side Participation) 
8.3.1 MDS4 descriptions 
The MDS4 scenario anticipates intensive demand side participation with high EV uptakes 
with vehicle to grid technology taking place after 2030. Wind and geothermal will be 
widely available whereas not many new hydro are consented. The gas and carbon prices 
are low.  The results comparisons for the two models are made in the following sections.  
8.3.2 Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS4 
Under MDS4, the SD model predicts some boom and bust cycles in the total installed 
generation capacities despite the GEM model predicting a steady increase (Figure 8.29). 
The bust period between 2028 and 2030 results in high wholesale electricity prices (Figure 
8.30). Despite the high prices, not all of the scheduled capacities get commissioned by 
2050. Looking at the detailed installed capacities, it is observed that the SD model predicts 
that not all the scheduled coal plants get commissioned by 2050 (Figure 8.31). Most 
scheduled plants using other technologies faced development delays causing the bust 
periods (see Figure 8.32-Figure 8.36).  The hydro plants are not affected much since there 
are very few being scheduled (Appendix D4). 
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Figure 8.29: Total installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS4 
 
 
Figure 8.30: Forecasted monthly averaged wholesale electricity price for MDS4 
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Figure 8.31: Results comparison for installed coal capacity for MDS4 
 
 
Figure 8.32: Results comparison for installed CCGT capacity for MDS4 
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Figure 8.33: Results comparison for installed wind capacity for MDS4 
 
 
Figure 8.34: Results comparison for installed geothermal capacity for MDS4 
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Figure 8.35: Results comparison for installed OCGT capacity for MDS4 
 
Figure 8.36: Results comparison for installed cogeneration capacity for MDS4 
 
8.3.3 Resultant ECM for MDS4 
Besides the seasonal cycles in the ECM, the ECM trend also goes up and down following 
the boom and bust cycles in the installed generation capacities (Figure 8.37). Low ECM is 
observed in the winter months of 2028 until 2030, indicating a high likelihood of energy 
shortages in those years. The successive boom period increases the ECM again until the 
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next bust cycle commences around 2037. The ECM also declines after 2047 indicating the 
need for new plants to meet the increasing demands. 
 
Figure 8.37: Resultant ECM for MDS4 
 
8.3.4 Resultant CM for MDS4 
Similar to the ECM, the CM also seems to replicate some cyclic pattern following the 
cyclic generation capacities (Figure 8.38). The lowest CM of 10% is predicted in 2030, 
indicating a possibility of a threat to system security.   
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Figure 8.38: Resultant CM for MDS4 
 
8.4 Results comparisons for MDS5 (Gas surplus) 
8.4.1 MDS5 descriptions 
MDS5 considers a scenario where more gas is discovered in New Zealand resulting in low 
gas prices.  CCGT plants are built to replace existing coal plants. The amount of renewable 
resources in the generation mix is moderate. The results comparisons for the two models 
are discussed in the following sections. 
8.4.2 Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS5 
The resultant installed generation capacities from the two models (Figure 8.39) do not 
differ much in the periods of 2010-2013 and 2018-2028. Outside these times, disparities 
arise from some delayed plants. The delays occur in waiting for the generally low 
wholesale electricity prices (Figure 8.40) to rise high enough for the plants to recover their 
cost and gain profits. The plants that face delays are the OCGT, coal and CCGT plants 
(Figure 8.41-Figure 8.43) whereas other plants get developed without many delays 
(Appendix D5). All the scheduled capacities get commissioned by 2050. 
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Figure 8.39: Total installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS5 
 
 
Figure 8.40: Forecasted monthly averaged wholesale electricity price for MDS5 
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Figure 8.41: Results comparison for installed OCGT capacity for MDS5 
 
 
Figure 8.42: Results comparison for installed coal capacity for MDS5 
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Figure 8.43: Results comparison for installed CCGT capacity for MDS5 
 
8.4.3 Resultant ECM for MDS5 
The calculated ECM for MDS5 is shown in Figure 8.44. The ECM remains positive 
throughout the simulated time but hovers relatively lower during some periods which can 
cause shortages if some hydro resources are limited.  
 
Figure 8.44: Resultant ECM for MDS5 
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8.4.4 Resultant CM for MDS5 
The calculated CM for MDS5 (Figure 8.45) remains above 10% at all times throughout the 
simulated duration. 
 
Figure 8.45: Resultant CM for MDS5 
 
8.5 Installed generation capacities comparisons between all scenarios 
Looking at the results of the total installed generation capacities from the SD model, it is 
observed that most of the scheduled capacities get commissioned by 2050 except for those 
shown in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1: Summary of unmet proposed capacities from all the five scenarios 
Scenario Unmet 
capacities 
(MW) 
Technology 
types 
Plant’s name 
Sustainable Path 
(MDS1) 
1100 OCGT Gas fired OCGT 2, Generic 
OCGT NI 1-6 
Demand-side 
Participation 
(MDS4) 
400 Coal Generic coal 5 Huntly stage 1 
 
Under an energy only market, low wholesale electricity prices do not encourage the 
development of OCGT plants with LRMC. Under all the scenarios, OCGT plants often 
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face delays (Figure 8.13, Figure 8.24, Figure 8.35 and Figure 8.41). In MDS1, the stable 
low prices do not even allow any OCGT plants to be built (Figure 8.5). The ESI can face 
problems when there is not enough peaking plants in the total installed capacities because 
the base load plants are not capable of meeting sharp increases of electricity demand 
quickly enough. The lack of peakers can also cause blackouts when there is an unexpected 
outage of a large generator and the void cannot be filled promptly. 
As for MDS4, the high demand side participation keeps the electricity prices low enough 
and avoid the need for a coal power plant to be built until 2050. This is in agreement with 
the main objective of a demand side participation programme. 
Comparing the results of the two models for the five scenarios, it can be observed that the 
SD model predicts that some plants face delays in their development, whereas the GEM 
model assumes that the plants get built as scheduled. Unlike the GEM model, the SD 
model is able to capture the effect of market interactions with generation investments. 
Investor’s decisions to wait for profitable market conditions can thus be taken into account 
by the SD model.  
The SD model is also capable of predicting future generation capacity cycles. The 
cumulative effects of development delays in power plants can cause a bust period and drive 
the electricity prices up when the supply and demand margin declines. The bust period is 
then followed by a boom period where generation companies rush to build new plants to 
meet the demand. Boom and bust cycles have been observed in other commodity markets 
such as real estates. However, the cycles in generation capacity are more pronounced when 
there are power plants of large lumpy capacities, enormous capital investment and long 
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lead time.  Comparing the results for the different scenarios, the cyclic patterns in installed 
capacities are more obvious when the plants are large capacity thermal plants with high 
LRMCs (MDS3 and MDS4). Having more small renewable plants (like in MDS1 and 
MDS2) produces less cyclic patterns as the LRMCs are lower and hence the profit can be 
recovered easily with relatively lower spot market prices. 
 
8.6 ECM comparisons between all scenarios 
It can be argued that capacity cycles are normal under a market environment to ensure that 
investments are made efficiently in meeting demands. However, a severe bust period in the 
generation capacity may cause severe electricity shortages that can be detrimental to the 
economy and cause inconvenience to consumers. The variable ECM provides a good 
indicator in measuring a potential electricity shortage. The resultant ECMs for all five 
scenarios are summarised in Table 8.2. The following criteria are used in determining the 
possibility of future energy shortages: 
 Shortages are possible if ECM<5%. 
 Shortages occur when ECM<0 
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Table 8.2: Summary of ECM statistics for the five scenarios 
Scenario ECM statistics (%) Shortage occurs? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustainable Path 
(MDS1) 
1.53 52.01 19.56 Possibly in 2019-2022, 2024-2026, 2028, 
2032 and 2039-2041  
South Island 
Surplus (MDS2) 
-0.29 48.74 20.28 Possibly in 2028, 2031, 2038 and 2039. 
Yes in 2050 if no new plants are 
scheduled after 2040 
Medium 
Renewables 
(MDS3) 
-4.59 49.76 22.17 Possibly in winter 2031- 2033 and after 
2041. Yes after 2046 if no new plants are 
scheduled after 2040 
Demand-side 
Participation 
(MDS4) 
-0.33 54.12 24.53 Possibly from winter of 2028 until 2030. 
Yes in 2031 
High Gas 
Recovery (MDS5) 
1.60 46.99 20.31 Possibly in 2016, 2017, 2030, 2038-2040 
 
From Table 8.2, the highest possibility for shortages are observed for MDS3 and MDS4 
where distinct boom and bust cycles are observed.  
 
8.7 CM comparisons between all scenarios 
The capacity margin measures the system ability to meet peak demands. Unlike load 
consumptions which are expected to rise in time, peak demand timings are random and its 
values are more difficult to predict. Hence, a system is usually designed to have a certain 
amount of capacity margin to meet peak demands (e.g. 15%). Table 8.3 summarises the 
calculated CM values by the SD model for all five scenarios. 
The following criteria are used in determining the possibility of future supply security risk: 
 Security risk likely to occur if CM<15%. 
 Security risk occurs when CM<0 
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Table 8.3: Summary of CM statistics for the five scenarios 
Scenario CM statistics (%) Security risk occurs? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustainable Path 
(MDS1) 
16.28 38.36 28.39 No 
South Island Surplus 
(MDS2) 
17.64 33.54 26.18 No 
Medium Renewables 
(MDS3) 
4.49 25.32 18.87 Possibly from 2030-2033 and 2045 if 
no new plants are scheduled after 2040 
Demand-side 
Participation (MDS4) 
9.85 28.93 22.44 Possibly between 2028 and 2031 
High Gas Recovery 
(MDS5) 
12.83 25.50 20.04 Possibly in 2015, 2038 and 2040 
 
From Table 8.3, it can be observed that security risks are higher for MDS3 and MDS4 
where obvious capacity boom and bust cycles are observed.   
 
8.8 Chapter summary 
From the results comparisons of the GEM and SD model under the five scenarios, it can be 
observed that the SD model is able to capture the effect of market interactions with 
generation investments. Due to this feature, the SD model is capable of predicting the 
following: 
 future plant development delays due to investment decisions  
 future generation capacity cycles 
 
From the ECM calculated in the SD model, it can be observed that boom and bust cycles 
can cause future energy shortages in New Zealand. As for the system security, even though 
the resultant CM values remain positive throughout the simulated duration, higher security 
risks are posed when boom and bust cycles are observed.  
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Boom and bust cycles are more pronounced when the generation mix are dominated by 
plants of large capacity and high LRMC. For New Zealand, it seems like having more 
small renewable plants (like in MDS1 and MDS2) produces less generation capacity 
cycles. However, under these scenarios, NZ might face shortages under some weather 
conditions, as discussed in Chapter 9. 
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9 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES ON THE SD MODEL 
A sensitivity analysis is a study of how the outputs of a model change with the 
variations of its inputs. To analyse the SD model results further, the model inputs were 
varied to study their impacts on its outputs. The inputs considered in these sensitivity 
analyses are shown in Table 9.1. The table also provides the reasons why these inputs 
were considered. 
Table 9.1: Model inputs analysed in the sensitivity analyses 
Model inputs Analysis motivation 
(i) Delays in plant 
development 
Delays during long term development projects are 
common 
(ii) Forecasted load 
demand 
This model uses long term load forecasts made by 
the EC. The SOO2008 states that their forecasts 
are subject to 80% confidence limits with 10% 
chance of the forecasted demand being higher or 
lower 
(iii) Weather conditions  
 
Weather conditions affect the availability of 
renewable resources. Historically, New Zealand 
hydro resources have been affected by La Niña 
occurrences  
 
By varying these inputs, their impacts on installed generation capacities, ECM and 
CM were analysed. These inputs are varied one at a time so that their impacts on the 
outputs can be clearly observed. When an input is varied, the two other model inputs 
are assumed to be at their baseline values. The full simulation results for these 
sensitivity analyses are shown in Appendix E. The following sections discuss how the 
input variations affect the SD model outputs.  
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9.1 Impacts of plant development delays 
During power plant development, delays can arise at various stages for various 
reasons. For example, a delay can occur at the approval stage if a plant’s resource 
consent application (in accordance with the RMA) gets rejected. The plant will then 
need to undergo the resource consent application stage all over again. The impacts of 
delays are analysed by applying medium and long delays at each plant development 
stage as shown in Table 9.2.  
The baseline development duration is the fastest time a type of plant can get 
developed. Medium delays commonly occur whereas long delays may happen in some 
circumstances, e.g. when there is public opposition to a project. The SD model outputs 
for the baseline plant development phase are the same as shown previously in Chapter 
8. The results featured in this section are only for the medium and long delays. 
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Table 9.2: Variations applied to plant development durations to study the impacts of delays 
Plant type Plant lead time 
(year) 
Planning  
(year) 
Approval  
(year) 
Construction 
(year) 
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Hydro 5 7.5 10 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 
Coal/IGCC 4 5.5 7 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 2 2.5 3 
CCGT 3 5.5 7 0.5 1.5 2 0.5 1.5 2 2 2.5 3 
OCGT 2 5 7 0.5 1.5 2 0.5 1.5 2 1 2 3 
Wind 3 5.5 8 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 1 2 3 
Geothermal 3 5.5 8 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 1 2 3 
Cogeneration 3 5 7 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 
Pumped 
storage 
8 10.5 13 1 2 3 2 2.5 3 5 6 7 
Wave 5 6.5 8 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 3 3.5 4 
 
9.1.1 Impacts on installed generation capacities 
After applying the different delays to plant development, their impacts on the total 
installed generation capacities for the different MDS can be observed as per Appendix 
E1. The results indicate the following: 
i. Depending on the scenarios and timing of the scheduled plant, delays can 
affect whether a scheduled power plant gets commissioned or not. In the long 
run, this affects the total installed generation capacities. 
ii. The various delays act as damping factors on the boom and bust pattern of the 
total installed generation capacities.   
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These findings are elaborated further as follows. For MDS1, under the baseline case, 
none of the OCGT plants get commissioned, as shown in section 8.1.1. From Figure 
9.1, it can be observed that for MDS1, plant development delays cause all the 
scheduled capacities to get commissioned. The reason is because delays cause the 
margin between supply and demand to become larger and hence push the wholesale 
prices up (Figure 9.2) and allow all the scheduled plants to get developed.  
 
Figure 9.1: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS1 
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Figure 9.2: Forecasted prices under various delays for MDS1 
 
However, the opposite happens for MDS2 (see Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.4). When 
delays happen, one of the scheduled OCGT plants does not get commissioned. The 
plant that is predicted not to get commissioned is the 150MW generic OCGT NI 7 
(with a LRMC of NZD302/MWh) that was scheduled to be commissioned by 2038. 
Based on the typical lead time for OCGT plants, if the OCGT NI 7 plant is to be 
commissioned by 2038, it needs to be proposed at the latest by 2036. The reason why 
it does not get commissioned is because the delays have caused price spikes to occur 
around 2033-2034 (see Figure 9.5) causing many plants to be commissioned by 2037 
(see Figure 9.3). By then, adequate plants have been built, leading to stable prices 
around that time. However, for the baseline case, the lower amounts of installed 
capacities from 2038-2042 push up the price (Figure 9.5) around that time and hence 
allow the 150MW plant to be built. 
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Figure 9.3: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS2 
 
 
Figure 9.4: Impacts of delays on the OCGT installed capacities for MDS2 
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Figure 9.5: Forecasted price for baseline case under MDS2 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Forecasted prices under various delays for MDS2 
 
As discussed in section 8.1.1, boom and bust patterns can be observed under MDS3 
and MDS4 where there are more large capacity thermal plants being scheduled. Plant 
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development delays seem to have damping effects on the predicted boom and bust 
cycles (Figure 9.7). The same effects can be observed under MDS4 (Figure 9.8). 
Under MDS5 (Figure 9.9), boom and bust cycles can be observed more clearly when 
delays occur, even though the cycles are not so obvious for the baseline case. 
 
Figure 9.7: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS3 
 
 
 
Figure 9.8: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS4 
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Figure 9.9: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS5 
 
The damping effects of plant development delays are elaborated further as follows. 
Figure 9.10-Figure 9.12 show examples from MDS3 on the damping effects caused by 
plant development delays on the total installed capacities. The total capacities in each 
figure are compared to the scheduled capacities in the SOO2008 to make the damping 
effects more visible. By comparing the three figures, it can be observed that delays 
cause the boom and bust cycles to be more obvious, i.e. the longer the delay, the more 
capacity trends became less damped. Similar observations can be made for MDS5. 
Figure 9.13 and Figure 9.14 show the delay effects on the installed capacities under 
MDS5. For the baseline case, the capacity cycles are not so obvious (Figure 9.13). 
Comparing this with Figure 9.14, it can be observed that the delays cause the boom 
and bust cycles in the capacity to become less damped and hence more pronounced.
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Figure 9.10: Predicted total installed capacity under MDS3 for baseline case 
 
 
Figure 9.11: Predicted total installed capacity under MDS3 in the case of medium delay 
 
Figure 9.12: Predicted total installed capacity under MDS3 in the case of long delay 
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Figure 9.13:  Predicted total installed capacity under MDS5 for baseline case 
 
 
Figure 9.14: Predicted total installed capacity under MDS5 in the case of long delay 
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9.1.2 Impacts of delays on ECM 
In this section, the impacts of delays on the ECM are discussed. The ECM resulting 
from various development durations under the five different scenarios are shown in 
Appendix E1.2.  The results correspond to the statistics that are summarised in Table 
9.3 . From the table, it can generally be observed that the longer the delay, the lower 
the minimum values of ECM become, indicating a more severe shortage. It generally 
does not affect the maximum ECM values since all the scheduled plants are more 
likely to get installed when there are high prices due to the shortages. In the case of 
delays, the mean ECMs are generally lower. 
Figure 9.15 to Figure 9.17 show the simulation results for MDS4 under the different 
cases of delays. Comparing the three figures, it can be observed that delays reduce the 
ECM and hence increase the probability and risk of longer and more severe shortages, 
as indicated in Table 9.3. 
. 
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Table 9.3: Summary table on the ECM statistics under various delays 
Scenario Delays ECM statistics (%) Shortage occurs? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustainable 
Path 
(MDS1) 
Baseline 1.53 52.01 19.56 Possibly in 2019-2022, 2024-2026, 
2028, 2032 and 2039-2041  
Medium 
delays 
-4.02 52.01 18.10 Yes in 2021, 2024 and 2025. 
Possibly in 2015-2030, 2036, 2040-
2042, after 2048.  
Long 
delays 
-4.84 52.01 15.86 Yes in 2017, 2019-2022, 2024-2027. 
Possibly 2015-2035, 2039-2042, 
after 2048 
South Island 
Surplus 
(MDS2) 
Baseline -0.29 48.74 20.28 Possibly in 2028, 2031, 2038 and 
2039. Yes in 2050 if no new plants 
are scheduled after 2040 
Medium 
delays 
-1.67 48.74 17.98 Yes in 2013 and 2049. Possibly in 
2012-2014, 2020, 2028, 2030-2035, 
2038-2042, after 2045 
Long 
delays 
-3.24 48.74 17.16 Yes in 2014 and 2033. Possibly in 
winters of 2012- 2015, 2018-2021, 
2028-2036, 2038, and after 2041 
Medium 
Renewables 
(MDS3) 
Baseline -4.59 49.76 22.17 Possibly in winter 2031- 2033 and 
after 2041. Yes after 2046 if no new 
plants are scheduled after 2040 
Medium 
delays 
-5.17 49.76 19.76 Yes in winter 2033-2035. Possibly in 
winter 2012-2013, winters of 2030 
onwards (except 2037) 
Long 
delays 
-5.83 49.76 18.04 Yes in winter 2033-2036, winter 
2039-2042, after 2046. Possibly in 
winter 2012-2014, after 2030 
Demand-
side 
Participa-
tion 
(MDS4) 
Baseline -0.33 54.12 24.53 Possibly from winter of 2028 until 
2030. Yes in 2031 
Medium 
delays 
-5.03 54.12 21.85 Yes in winter of 2013 and winters of 
2027-2033 
Long 
delays 
-6.42 54.12 20.61 Yes in winters of 2013-2014 and  
2027-2033 
High Gas 
Recovery 
(MDS5) 
Baseline 1.60 46.99 20.31 Possibly in 2016, 2017, 2030, 2038-
2040 
Medium 
delays 
-4.22 46.99 18.75 Yes in winters of 2015-2017 and 
2034-2035. Possibly in 2015-2025, 
2030-2035,  2038-2040, 2047 
onwards 
Long 
delays 
-4.22 46.99 16.94 Yes in winters od 2015-2017 and 
2033-2035. Possibly in 2015-2025, 
2028-2035,  2038-2040, 2047 
onwards 
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Figure 9.15: ECM for baseline case under MDS4 
 
Figure 9.16: ECM for the case of medium delays under MDS4 
 
Figure 9.17: ECM for the case of long delays under MDS4 
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9.1.3 Impacts on CM 
Appendix E1 contains the figures showing the simulation results of the CM under the 
various cases of delay for all the five scenarios. The statistics of the results are 
summarised in Table 9.4. 
Table 9.4: Summary table on the CM statistics under various delays 
Scenario Delays CM statistics (%) Security risk occurs? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustainable 
Path 
(MDS1) 
Baseline 16.28 38.36 28.39 No 
Medium 
delays 
13.75 44.22 30.86 Possibly in 2019 
Long 
delays 
9.26 40.19 28.10 Possibly in 2018, 2019-2022, 
2024 
South Island 
Surplus 
(MDS2) 
Baseline 17.64 33.54 26.18 No 
Medium 
delays 
14.45 35.95 25.00 Possibly in 2014 
Long 
delays 
12.79 34.29 24.78 Possibly in 2014-2015 
Medium 
Renewables 
(MDS3) 
Baseline 4.49 25.32 18.87 Possibly from 2030-2033 and 
2045 if no new plants are 
scheduled after 2040 
Medium 
delays 
2.62 24.73 16.58 Possibly from 2029-2036, 2038-
2040 and 2045 onwards if no 
new plants are scheduled after 
2040 
Long 
delays 
15.0 25.56 15.18 Possibly from 2029-2037, 2039 
and 2045 onwards if no new 
plants are scheduled after 2040 
Demand-
side 
Participation 
(MDS4) 
Baseline 9.85 28.93 22.44 Possibly between 2028 and 
2031 
Medium 
delays 
8.13 27.90 20.47 Possibly between 2027 and 
2033 
Long 
delays 
5.33 27.53 19.40 Possibly between 2027 and 
2033 
High Gas 
Recovery 
(MDS5) 
Baseline 12.83 25.50 20.04 Possibly in 2015, 2038 and 
2040 
Medium 
delays 
10.31 25.02 17.93 Possibly in 2015-2017, 2019, 
2031-2033, 2036-2039 and 
2047 onwards 
Long 
delays 
9.06 25.02 16.71 Possibly in 2015-2018, 2019-
2022, 2030-2036, 2039 and 
2047 onwards 
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From the table, it can generally be observed that the longer the delay, the lower the 
minimum values of CM become, indicating a higher risk of system security. The mean 
CMs are also generally lower.  There is no obvious effect of the impact of the delays 
on the maximum ECM values. 
9.1.4 Discussions on delay impacts onto CM 
Figure 9.18 to Figure 9.20 are taken from the results of MDS4 for the different cases 
of delays. Comparing the three figures, it can be observed that delays bring down the 
CM, increasing the probability of longer and more severe system security problems, as 
indicated in Table 9.6.  
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Figure 9.18: CM for baseline case under MDS4 
 
 
Figure 9.19: CM for the case of medium delay under MDS4 
 
 
Figure 9.20: CM for the case of long delay under MDS4 
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9.2 Impacts of variations in the load forecasts 
As mentioned in the chapter’s introduction, there is a 10% probability of the load 
growth being higher than the forecasted load growth. Figure 9.21shows the baseline 
load growth, whereas Figure 9.22 shows the high load growth, for all the MDS.     
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Figure 9.21: Baseline growth load forecast 
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Figure 9.22: High growth load forecast 
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The simulation results using the baseline and high load growths are shown in 
Appendix E2. The following sections discuss the impacts of the variations in the load 
forecasts on the different model outputs.   
 
9.2.1 Impacts on installed generation capacities 
The resultant installed capacities for the baseline and high load growths indicate that 
higher load consumption stimulates and speeds up power plant development. The 
result for MDS1 (Figure 9.23) shows that the installed capacities under the high load 
growth increase faster compared to the capacities under the baseline growth, 
indicating that power plants get developed and commissioned quicker. The high load 
also allows more scheduled plants to get commissioned, resulting in higher total 
installed capacities by 2050.    
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Figure 9.23: Installed capacities for different load growth projections under MDS1 
 
9.2.2 Impacts on ECM 
The figures of ECMs under the different load projections suggest that ECMs are lower 
under high load growth. Even though more power plants get commissioned, the 
development is not fast enough to keep up with the load growth. Figure 9.24 shows 
the ECMs under MDS1. It can be observed that the ECMs for high load are 
significantly lower. The statistics for the results under all MDS are shown in 
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Table 9.5. Under all the MDS, the mean and minimum values of the ECMs for high 
load growth are lower than for the baseline growth. Due to the lower ECMs, more 
supply shortages are forecasted.  
 
Figure 9.24: ECM for different load growth projections under MDS1 
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Table 9.5: Summary table on the ECM statistics under different demand growth 
Scenario Delays ECM statistics (%) Shortage occurs? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustaina
ble Path 
(MDS1) 
Baselin
e 
1.53 52.01 19.56 None  
High 
demand 
growth 
-15.01 52.01 9.11 Yes in every winters of 2019 
onwards  
South 
Island 
Surplus 
(MDS2) 
Baselin
e 
-0.29 48.74 20.28 Yes in 2050 if no new plants 
are scheduled after 2040 
High 
demand 
growth 
-18.76 48.73 20.31 Yes, in winters of 2028 
onwards 
Medium 
Renew-
ables 
(MDS3) 
Baselin
e 
-4.59 49.75 22.17 Yes after 2046 if no new 
plants are scheduled after 
2040 
High 
demand 
growth 
-23.28 49.75 9.21 Yes in winter 2028 onwards 
Demand-
side 
Participa
-tion 
(MDS4) 
Baselin
e 
-0.33 54.12 24.53 Yes in 2031 
High 
demand 
growth 
-10.42 51.55 14.58 Yes in winter 
2030,2032,2038 and 2043 
onwards 
High 
Gas 
Recover
y 
(MDS5) 
Baselin
e 
1.60 46.99 20.31 None 
High 
demand 
growth 
-17.21 46.98 8.11 Yes, in all winters of 2015-
2050 
 
9.2.3 Impacts on CM 
The forecasted peak loads with baseline and high load growth for the various MDS are 
shown in Figure 9.25 (for all MDS except MDS3) and Figure 9.26 (for MDS3). Peak 
load growths under MDS3 are slower after 2020 because of the assumption that the 
Tiwai aluminium smelter will be decommissioned in that year. 
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Figure 9.25: Forecasted peak load growth for all MDS except MDS3 (Electricity Commission 
2008) 
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Figure 9.26: Forecasted peak load growth for MDS3 (Electricity Commission 2008) 
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Figure 9.27 shows the CMs for baseline and high growth in the peak load projection 
under MDS2. From the figure, it can be observed that the CMs for high growth are 
lower than the baseline case. The statistics for results under other MDS are shown in 
Table 9.6. The table shows that the CMs for high load growth are lower in their mean, 
maximum and minimum values. Security risks are predicted under MDS2, MDS4 and 
MDS5 if there are no other plants scheduled after 2040.  This indicates that even 
though there are more total installed generation capacities resulting from the high load 
growth, the capacities do not increase fast enough to keep up with the demand.  
 
 
Figure 9.27: CM for different load growth projections under MDS2 
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Table 9.6: Summary of the CM statistics for various load growth 
Scenario Load 
growth 
CM statistics (%) Security risk occurs? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustainable 
Path 
(MDS1) 
Baseline 16.28 38.36 28.39 No 
High 
demand 
growth 
9.85 27.49 20.12 No 
South 
Island 
Surplus 
(MDS2) 
Baseline 17.64 33.54 26.18 No 
High 
demand 
growth 
-0.28 27.96 17.80 Yes after 2049 if no new 
plants are scheduled after 
2040 
Medium 
Renew-
ables 
(MDS3) 
Baseline 4.49 25.32 18.87 Possibly from 2030-2033 
and 2045 if no new plants 
are scheduled after 2040 
High 
demand 
growth 
10.57 29.53 22.34 No 
Demand-
side 
Participa-
tion 
(MDS4) 
Baseline 9.85 28.93 22.44 Possibly between 2028 
and 2031 
High 
demand 
growth 
-2.49 23.27 12.5 Yes after 2047 if no new 
plants are scheduled after 
2040 
High Gas 
Recovery 
(MDS5) 
Baseline 12.83 25.50 20.04 Possibly in 2015, 2038 
and 2040 
High 
demand 
growth 
-7.86 19.9 8.27 Yes after 2044 if no new 
plants are scheduled after 
2040 
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9.3 Impacts of weather factor / dry year  
As discussed in Chapter 5, hydro is the dominant electricity resource in New Zealand. 
History has shown that weather can have a major impact on energy security during dry 
winters.  The capacity stackplots in Appendix C3 show that hydro is predicted to still 
be the dominant resource under all five scenarios. Hence, it is useful to study the 
impacts of dry years on the energy and system security. Part of the results in this 
analysis have been presented at an IEEE international conference proceedings in 
Trondheim, Norway (Jalal and Bodger 2011).  
The hydro inflows in New Zealand are highly dependent on the season. The natural 
lake cycles cause high lake levels heading into summer (around December), reducing 
levels during summer and autumn, and increasing levels during winter (around June) 
and spring (Opus International Consultants Limited 2009). Figure 9.28 demonstrates 
the seasonal variation of lake level for Lake Wanaka from 1998 to 2008. It is part of 
the catchment for the Clutha River hydro scheme (750MW) located in the South 
Island, New Zealand.  
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Figure 9.28: Lake Wanaka levels from 1998 and 2008 (Opus International Consultants Limited 
2009) 
 
Depending on the location, the inflows into storage lakes can also be affected by the 
El Niño-La Niña Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Monitoring of inflows to New 
Zealand’s hydroelectric lakes stretches back to the 1920s. With the benefit of such a 
long time series, New Zealand’s National Institute of Water and Atmospheric 
Research (NIWA) can show that the flow into South Island hydro lakes in La Niña 
years is considerably lower than the flow for other years (National Institute of Water 
and Atmostpheric Research 2008).The schemes in the South Island account for 66% 
of the total installed hydro capacity in New Zealand (Electricity Commission 2010). 
This is almost twice the capacity of hydro schemes in the North Island. Hence, 
drought in the South Island lake catchments causes a serious problem for hydro 
resources in New Zealand. 
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From Figure 9.29, it can be  observed that severe La Niña  happens at least once in 
every seven years (National Institute of Water and Atmostpheric Research 2008). The 
y-axis represents the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) which indicates the severity of 
the ENSO. For La Niña, the higher the SOI, the worse is its severity. The figure also 
shows that energy shortages in New Zealand in 2001, 2003 and 2008 coincided with 
severe La Niña occurrences. 
 
Figure 9.29: Global ENSO occurrence in the last 110 years (National Institute of Water and 
Atmostpheric Research 2008) 
 
The GEM model used a constant plant availability factor for hydro plants. In the 
previous analyses, the SD model also used a constant plant availability to allow for 
fair comparisons between the two models. In this analysis, the SD model uses variable 
hydro plant availability factors (AF) for the different months of the year to take into 
account the lake level cycles (see Figure 9.30). The monthly average values are 
calculated from past hydrological data of the main hydro lakes in New Zealand. The 
calculations are discussed in the next section. To include the impact of a severe La 
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Niña on the hydro resources, the SD model includes its effects once every seven years 
with dry winters occurring in 2015, 2022, 2029, 2036 and 2043. This model is deemed 
adequate since it is not the research objective to perform accurate forecasting of hydro 
data. 
 
Figure 9.30: Hydro AF used by the SD model in the dry year analysis 
 
9.3.1 Dry year model development  
The steps for the average hydro availability data calculations are: 
1. The lake level history data for the main storage lakes in New Zealand from July 
1996 to June 2008 are used in formulating the dry dear model. The lakes 
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considered are Taupo
1
, Tekapo
2
, Pukaki
2
, Manapouri
3
, Wanaka and Hawea
4
. 
These lakes are chosen because of they are the main storage for the larger power 
plants in New Zealand.  
2. Their monthly availability factor are calculated in Equation 1: 
Monthly availability factor 
 
= 
level operating minimum - level operating Maximum
level operating minimum - level lake averageMonthly 
 
 
Equation 1 
 
3. However, the SD model looks at the hydro availability at a national level. Hence, 
depending on the contribution of the lakes to the national electricity demand, 
weighted averages are calculated to obtain the national monthly AF. Different 
weights are used within different durations to take into account system upgrades 
of the various hydro plants utilising the lakes involved (see Table 9.7).  
                                                 
1 Lake Taupo is the main storage for the Waikato hydro scheme. 
2 Lakes Tekapo and Pukaki are the main storage for the Waitaki hydro scheme. 
3 Lake Manapouri feeds the largest hydro power station in New Zealand, Manapouri plant. 
4 Lakes Wanaka and Hawea are the main storage for Clutha hydro scheme.   
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Table 9.7: The weights applied to the monthly hydro availability averages for the different 
lakes 
Lake/ Year 1977-1984 1984-1985 1985-1992 1992-2002 2002-2009 
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Taupo 1072 0.31 1072 0.29 1072 0.28 1072 0.25 1072 0.24 
Tekapo (Waitaki 
River Scheme) 185 0.05 185 0.05 185 0.05 185 0.04 185 0.04 
Pukaki (Waitaki 
River Scheme) 1129 0.33 1341 0.37 1553 0.40 1553 0.36 1553 0.35 
Manapouri 730 0.21 730 0.20 730 0.19 730 0.17 850 0.19 
Wanaka & 
Hawea (Clutha 
River Scheme) 320 0.09 320 0.09 320 0.08 752 0.18 752 0.17 
Total  3436 1 3648 1 3860 1 4292 1 4412 1 
 
Applying the weights shown in Table 9.7 to the monthly availability factors calculated 
in Step 1 yielded the results presented in Table 9.8. The low values observed, 
especially for the year dry years in 2001, 2003 and 2008, were used to decide the 
appropriate values to apply in modelling a dry year.  
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Table 9.8: Historical monthly average hydro AF calculated for July 1996 to June 2008 
Year/Month Jan Feb Mac Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1996             0.40 0.40 0.57 0.96 0.59 0.61 
1997 0.44 0.54 0.41 0.61 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.57 0.38 0.54 0.75 0.85 
1998 0.63 0.84 0.78 0.65 0.47 0.55 0.79 0.59 0.61 1.00 0.55 0.53 
1999 0.48 0.38 0.51 0.50 0.63 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.42 0.55 1.00 0.49 
2000 0.54 0.47 0.31 0.51 0.55 0.79 0.56 0.46 0.61 0.83 0.46 0.80 
2001 0.51 0.44 0.39 0.32 0.38 0.50 0.31 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.62 0.97 
2002 0.75 0.39 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.68 0.50 0.54 0.76 0.53 0.58 0.76 
2003 0.48 0.46 0.34 0.25 0.54 0.59 0.46 0.33 0.59 0.60 0.66 0.67 
2004 0.68 0.76 0.62 0.34 0.57 0.69 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.63 0.57 
2005 0.66 0.53 0.55 0.30 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.48 0.41 0.49 
2006 0.65 0.39 0.34 0.54 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.54 0.57 0.87 0.63 
2007 0.55 0.38 0.40 0.28 0.44 0.42 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.71 0.45 0.57 
2008 0.45 0.39 0.40 0.31 0.32 0.38             
Average 0.57 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.53 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.65 0.63 0.66 
 
Severely low AF<0.3  
Low  0.3<AF<0.35 
Medium low 0.35<AF<0.4 
 
The monthly averages (in bold) are used for normal years whereas the AF values for a 
dry year are shown in Table 9.9. Different AF values in any month between the two 
years are italicized. The dry year AF values are only applicable in the months where 
the lake inflows are usually low in the year. It is assumed that lake inflows start to 
increase again during winter as part of the usual lake cycles in New Zealand. 
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Table 9.9: Monthly AF applied in the SD model for a normal year and a dry year 
Month 
No dry 
year 
1 in 7 
dry year 
January 0.57 0.57 
February 0.50 0.50 
March 0.46 0.40 
April 0.41 0.30 
May 0.46 0.32 
June 0.53 0.36 
July 0.48 0.38 
August 0.47 0.40 
September 0.52 0.52 
October 0.65 0.65 
November 0.63 0.63 
December 0.66 0.66 
 
9.3.2 Dry year model validation 
Similar to the model validation work discussed in Chapter 7, the dry year model has 
been validated using past data. The plot of the AF values in Table 9.9 is shown in 
Figure 9.31. The AF values are compared with the historical hydro AF.  
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Figure 9.31: Comparison of hydro AFs used in the model validation with actual historical data 
 
 
Even though the modelled AF did not represent the AF for the dry year in 2003, the 
resultant installed capacity is close to the historical installed capacity. The results are 
also close to the SD model results when the model was simulated using the historical 
hydro data. These results are shown in Figure 9.32. Since the dry year model’s result 
is close to the historical data, the model is suitable to be used for future forecasting. 
The hydro input data for the forecasting is previously shown in Figure 9.30. 
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Figure 9.32: Comparison between the historical installed capacity and the SD model total 
installed capacity taken annually in December 
 
9.3.3 Impacts on installed generation capacities 
Applying the dry year model for the simulated years of 2010 to 2050 under the five 
different scenarios gave the results shown in Figure 9.33 to Figure 9.37.  
 276 
 
 
Figure 9.33: Comparison of the results between the baseline and dry years cases for MDS1 
 
 
Figure 9.34: Comparison of the results between the baseline and dry years cases for MDS2 
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Figure 9.35: Comparison of the results between the baseline and dry years cases for MDS3 
 
 
Figure 9.36: Comparison of the results between the baseline and dry years cases for MDS4 
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Figure 9.37: Comparison of the results between the baseline and dry years cases for MDS5 
 
From the figures, it can be observed that the results between the baseline and hydro 
shortage cases vary more when there is a bigger percentage of hydro in the generation 
mix such as in MDS1 and MDS2. The occurrences of dry years also cause the 
installed capacities to be commissioned faster since they are usually accompanied by 
high prices.  The system susceptibility to shortages (measured by the ECMs) during 
dry years are discussed in the next section.  
9.3.4 Impacts on ECM 
The ECMs for the dry year analysis under all five scenarios are shown in Figure 9.38 
to Figure 9.42. They are compared to the ECM values for the baseline case. It can be 
observed that the ECMs for the dry year analysis became negative during every 
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modelled dry winter under most scenarios, indicating the predicted occurrences of 
energy shortages. 
 
Figure 9.38: Forecasted ECM for MDS1 
 
Figure 9.39: Forecasted ECM for MDS2 
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Figure 9.40: Forecasted ECM for MDS3 
 
 
Figure 9.41: Forecasted ECM for MDS4 
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Figure 9.42: Forecasted ECM for MDS5 
 
The resultant ECMs for all five scenarios are summarised in Table 9.10. Shortages are 
forecasted to happen during dry winters under all MDS. The least number of shortages 
are observed under MDS4. The severest shortage is predicted for the year 2015 under 
MDS5.  
Table 9.10: Summary of ECM statistics for the dry year analysis 
Scenario Delays ECM statistics (%) Shortage predicted? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustainable 
Path (MDS1) 
Baseline 1.53 52.01 19.56 None  
Dry years -8.39 61.75 23.66 Yes in every modelled 
dry winter 
South Island 
Surplus 
(MDS2) 
Baseline -0.29 48.74 20.28 Yes in 2050 if no new 
plants are scheduled after 
2040 
Dry years -5.57 58.69 23.25 Yes in every modelled 
dry winter, after 2049 if 
no new plants are 
scheduled after 2040 
Medium 
Renewables 
Baseline -4.59 49.76 22.17 Yes after 2046 if no new 
plants are scheduled after 
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(MDS3) 2040 
Dry years -8.03 65.43 25.09 Yes in every modelled 
dry winter, after 2045 
Demand-side 
Participation 
(MDS4) 
Baseline -0.33 54.12 24.53 Yes in 2031 
Dry years -9.78 68.43 27.38 Yes in 2015 and 2029 
High Gas 
Recovery 
(MDS5) 
Baseline 1.60 46.99 20.31 None 
Dry years -15.84 57.06 22.71 Yes in every modelled 
dry winter 
 
 
 
The SD model results from the dry year analyses indicate the impact of generation 
mix onto New Zealand’s energy security. High hydro penetration as in MDS1 and 
MDS2 can cause future energy shortages during dry years.  
However, under the current market structure, having more thermal plants aggravates 
the bust and boom patterns in the installed capacities. More severe shortages can occur 
if bust periods are accompanied with a dry winters. An example of this is for the year 
2015 under MDS5. The bust period in that year, as shown in Table 9.10, resulted in 
the worst predicted shortage (ECM of -15.8%). 
9.3.5 Impacts on CM 
The CMs for the dry year analysis under all five scenarios are shown in Figure 9.43 to 
Figure 9.47. They are compared to the CM values for the baseline case. 
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Figure 9.43: Forecasted CM for MDS1 
 
 
Figure 9.44: Forecasted CM for MDS2 
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Figure 9.45: Forecasted CM for MDS3 
 
 
Figure 9.46: Forecasted CM for MDS4 
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Figure 9.47: Forecasted CM for MDS5 
 
The CM statistics are shown in Table 9.11. 
Table 9.11: Summary of CM statistics for the dry year analysis 
 
Scenario Delays CM statistics (%) Security risk predicted? 
Min Max Mean 
Sustainable 
Path (MDS1) 
Baseline 16.28 38.36 28.39 No 
Dry years 16.50 48.49 33.35 No 
South Island 
Surplus 
(MDS2) 
Baseline 17.64 33.54 26.18 No 
Dry years 21.26 36.38 28.74 No 
Medium 
Renewables 
(MDS3) 
Baseline 4.49 25.32 18.87 Possibly from 2030-2033 
and 2045 if no new plants 
are scheduled after 2040 
Dry years 10.57 28.56 20.37 Possibly in 2031 and after 
2046 
Demand-side 
Participation 
(MDS4) 
Baseline 9.85 28.93 22.44 Possibly between 2028 
and 2031 
Dry years 13.42 30.76 23.22 Possibly in 2027 
High Gas 
Recovery 
(MDS5) 
Baseline 12.83 25.50 20.04 Possibly in 2015, 2038 
and 2040 
Dry years 12.76 26.08 20.77 Possibly in 2015, 2033 
and after 2047 
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Comparing the results from the two cases for all five scenarios, it can be observed that 
the CM values are higher when dry years occur. This is because the plants get 
commissioned much faster when prices rise during dry years.   
9.3.6 Dry year analysis summary 
Hydro is predicted to continue its domination in New Zealand’s generation mix in 
years to come under all the forecasted scenarios. When hydro plant availability factors 
decline during dry years, energy shortages are predicted. However, dry years also push 
prices up and hence cause power plants to become commissioned faster. This results 
in a higher ability for the system to meet peak demands as indicated by higher 
capacity margins.   
9.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has demonstrated the sensitivities of the SD model outputs to 
development delays, load growth and dry year occurrences. Development delays act 
like a damping factor to the boom and bust trends of installed generation capacity. 
This effect is more visible under MDS with higher large capacity thermal plants. 
ECMs and CMs are lower when delays are longer, even though the forecasted 
wholesale electricity prices are sustainably high to encourage investments. This is 
because it takes a long time for plants to get commissioned. It is therefore important 
for regulators to ensure that plant developments are not impeded by bureaucratic 
delays. 
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High load growth encourages more generation investments as wholesale electricity 
prices get higher with the smaller margins between supply and demand. However, the 
smaller margins also reduce the ECMs and CMs and increase the risks of shortages 
and security breach. 
Dry year occurrences cause wholesale electricity prices to increase in dry years with 
the lower availability of hydro resources. Even though the prices encourage generation 
investments, it might not encourage the suitable plant type. Having more hydro plants 
will not improve the dry year shortages unless they are backed up by thermal plants. 
Severe shortages can occur with a higher percentage of hydro plants in the generation 
mix. This is the reason why in a regulated ESI with a dominant share of hydro, the 
regulator ensures that there is a high capacity margin to cater for dry years. In New 
Zealand, severe shortages can also occur if a dry year coincides with a bust period as 
predicted in 2015 under MDS5. The simulation results for the dry year analyses 
emphasise the importance of having a diversified generation mix.    
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10 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK  
 
This chapter concludes the findings from this study and relates them back to its 
research objectives. It also suggests some potential future work that can be done by 
others who wish to follow up on this study.  
10.1 Conclusions 
In the last twenty years, the ESI in many countries have gone through several 
substantial restructurings. Changes are still being made to the ESI structures to 
achieve the results promised by a perfect market. It is difficult to decide which 
structure will work for a country and the results from a wrong decision can be 
devastating to the country’s economy.  
One of the difficulties faced by the restructured ESI is to deliver the correct level of 
generation capacity. Generally, when an ESI is restructured into a retail competition 
model, boom and bust cycles in generation capacity are observed. Electricity shortages 
have been observed in several countries during their ESI bust periods. On the other 
hand, boom periods provide too much excess capacity that defeats the purpose of the 
restructuring in the first place.    
To analyse the boom and bust trends in generation capacity further, this research 
developed an SD model to study the electricity market and generation expansion in 
New Zealand. Five different possible future MDS were analysed and the results were 
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discussed in Chapter 8. The SD model predicted that generation capacity cycles will 
continue to happen in New Zealand under the current market structure. The boom and 
bust cycles are more obvious under the MDS with large capacity thermal plants in the 
scheduled generation. During bust periods, energy shortages are predicted as the 
forecasted energy supply is not sufficient to meet demand. However, with the existing 
high capacity margin, given the assumed peak load growth, the SD model did not 
predict much threat to supply security.    
Sensitivity analyses were also done to determine the model outputs sensitivities to 
variations in development delays, load growths and weather factors. Development 
delays dampen the boom and bust trends of installed generation capacities. Even 
though the resulting boom and bust pattern looks less obvious with long delays, longer 
energy shortages are predicted to happen because the investors cannot respond quickly 
enough to market signals with such a long lead time for development. The impacts of 
development delays are not too severe on supply security as no breach is predicted by 
the SD model.    
High load growths encourage more installed capacy because the smaller margin 
between supply and demand pushes up electricity prices. However, more energy 
shortages are predicted because new power plants do not get commissioned fast 
enough to meet the demand growth. A high peak load growth can also threaten the 
supply security. 
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Weather factors in countries with high dependence on natural resources like New 
Zealand can have a big impact in generation capacities and supply adequacy. During 
the occurrence of La Niña, hydro inflows in New Zealand can be reduced, causing low 
hydro storage levels and as a result, decreases in the hydro generation outputs. Under 
the MDS where hydro generation remains dominant, shortages are predicted to happen 
during dry winter years. However, the most severe shortage was predicted under 
MDS5 (High Gas Recovery scenario) in 2015 when the forecasted dry year coincides 
with a bust period.    
The SD model results highlight the importance of maintaining the correct level of 
generation supply. The current NZEM structure is unable to encourage the right level 
of investments that are required by consumers. It is also unclear how the NZEM will 
encourage the correct generation mix for energy and supply security. New Zealand is 
keen to increase its renewable portfolios, but thermal plants are still required for 
periods when renewable resources are low.    
In conclusion, this study demonstrated that the SD model is able to evaluate 
generation supply adequacy under various market development scenarios. This makes 
SD a potentially useful tool to analyse energy and supply security. The GEM provides 
some quantitative indication on potential generation capacities. However, without 
taking into account the dynamics of electricity prices and their relationship with 
generation capacities, the GEM’s predicted generation capacity might not materialise. 
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Investors will only commit to a plant development when they are certain of their 
return of investments. On the other hand, an SD model can capture the relationship 
between electricity prices and generation capacities and potentially produce more 
realistic results.    
10.2 Further work 
This research is the first and preliminary attempt at using SD to analyse New 
Zealand’s ESI. Several improvements can be made to enhance the accuracy of the SD 
model. Some of the improvements and potential results are listed as follows: 
1.   Refine the inputs of the SD model – Currently the SD model uses the average 
LRMC for a plant type. With a better knowledge of the actual scheduled 
power plants, their actual LRMC can be used instead.  
2.   Improve the forecast of electricity prices – Currently the SD model’s equation 
for the electricity price is simple. Even though prices are difficult to predict, 
with better modelling techniques in the future, this input can be made more 
accurate. An accurate price model can include the different prices at different 
grid nodes and also include the impact of hedging. 
3.   Improve the forecast of ENSO occurrences – Currently the SD model assumes 
a 1 in 7 years of ENSO occurrences for its dry year analyses. ENSO is difficult 
to predict as the prediction is only as good as predicting the weather. When 
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more research development is done on ENSO predictions, the SD model 
assumptions can be improved.   
4.    Include the information on power plants ownership – The information can be 
used to predict investment behaviour and potentially measure their market 
power under various MDS. 
5.    Improve the carbon pricing inputs – This model was developed before the 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) commenced in New Zealand. The carbon 
pricing inputs were based on the assumptions made by the Electricity 
Commission as per SOO2008. As the ETS gets more established, better 
knowledge on it can be gained and the model’s carbon pricing inputs can be 
improved. 
6.    Extend the SD model to study changes to the NZEM – The SD model can 
potentially be a useful tool to study the impacts of any suggested change to the 
NZEM. The SD model was completed before the Ministerial Review 2009 
outcomes were published. A good update to the model should include some of 
the new features introduced under the review. 
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APPENDIX A: GENERATION TRENDS AFTER ESI RESTRUCTURING 
Extracts from “Competitive Electricity Markets and Sustainability” (Lévêque 2006) 
 
Figure A1: Generation investment in England and Wales from 1991 until 2004 
 
 
Figure A2: Generation investment in Finland from 1992 until 2000 
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Figure A3: Generation investment in Norway from 1992 until 2003 
 
 
Figure A4: Generation investment in Sweden from 1992 until 2003 
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Figure A5: Generation investment in United States from 1992 until 2003
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APPENDIX B: INPUT DATA FOR MODEL VALIDATION 
B1. Monthly consumption data for January 1997 till December 2009 
(Electricity Commission 2010) 
 
Year Month 
Number 
of days 
Monthly 
consumption 
(GWh) 
997 1 31 2458.754 
1997 2 28 2314.218 
1997 3 31 2577.483 
1997 4 30 2623.997 
1997 5 31 2790.681 
1997 6 30 2901.497 
1997 7 31 3072.357 
1997 8 31 3040.332 
1997 9 30 2805.177 
1997 10 31 2671.482 
1997 11 30 2556.784 
1997 12 31 2548.49 
1998 1 31 2520.142 
1998 2 28 2351.794 
1998 3 31 2614.215 
1998 4 30 2587.149 
1998 5 31 2805.599 
1998 6 30 2845.223 
1998 7 31 2925.3 
1998 8 31 2967.82 
1998 9 30 2763.014 
1998 10 31 2691.369 
1998 11 30 2605.821 
1998 12 31 2577.08 
1999 1 31 2561.53 
1999 2 28 2400.205 
1999 3 31 2703.603 
1999 4 30 2606.412 
1999 5 31 2849.061 
1999 6 30 2932.696 
1999 7 31 3104.297 
1999 8 31 3081.716 
1999 9 30 2821.844 
1999 10 31 2781.308 
1999 11 30 2677.502 
1999 12 31 2662.3 
2000 1 31 2591.449 
2000 2 29 2571.209 
2000 3 31 2812.329 
2000 4 30 2673.844 
2000 5 31 2956.777 
2000 6 30 2978.37 
2000 7 31 3083.92 
2000 8 31 3146.738 
2000 9 30 2894.337 
2000 10 31 2847.378 
2000 11 30 2785.735 
2000 12 31 2661.744 
2001 1 31 2679.139 
2001 2 28 2521.43 
2001 3 31 2853.461 
2001 4 30 2764.241 
2001 5 31 3048.614 
2001 6 30 3087.584 
2001 7 31 3261.291 
2001 8 31 2993.493 
2001 9 30 2759.498 
2001 10 31 2834.587 
2001 11 30 2741.619 
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2001 12 31 2657.558 
2002 1 31 2668.817 
2002 2 28 2540.836 
2002 3 31 2889.182 
2002 4 30 2851.258 
2002 5 31 3069.292 
2002 6 30 3051.277 
2002 7 31 3287.366 
2002 8 31 3256.811 
2002 9 30 3003.428 
2002 10 31 3009.753 
2002 11 30 2905.935 
2002 12 31 2815.536 
2003 1 31 2844.383 
2003 2 28 2662.154 
2003 3 31 2930.957 
2003 4 30 2745.181 
2003 5 31 2882.004 
2003 6 30 2926.591 
2003 7 31 3356.202 
2003 8 31 3269.659 
2003 9 30 3040.393 
2003 10 31 3012.545 
2003 11 30 2906.154 
2003 12 31 2905.965 
2004 1 31 2897.737 
2004 2 29 2750.189 
2004 3 31 3034.746 
2004 4 30 2999.413 
2004 5 31 3173.26 
2004 6 30 3208.443 
2004 7 31 3465.985 
2004 8 31 3501.976 
2004 9 30 3178.703 
2004 10 31 3073.563 
2004 11 30 2948.629 
2004 12 31 2894.832 
2005 1 31 2848.261 
2005 2 28 2759.201 
2005 3 31 3026.373 
2005 4 30 2978.213 
2005 5 31 3204.31 
2005 6 30 3357.341 
2005 7 31 3392.272 
2005 8 31 3375.5 
2005 9 30 3145.324 
2005 10 31 3095.361 
2005 11 30 2986.894 
2005 12 31 2944.94 
2006 1 31 2896.316 
2006 2 28 2731.709 
2006 3 31 3102.118 
2006 4 30 2906.514 
2006 5 31 3284.766 
2006 6 30 3451.675 
2006 7 31 3562.36 
2006 8 31 3478.331 
2006 9 30 3103.488 
2006 10 31 3164.545 
2006 11 30 2990.948 
2006 12 31 2912.96 
2007 1 31 2911.957 
2007 2 28 2784.663 
2007 3 31 3121.043 
2007 4 30 3006.867 
2007 5 31 3193.308 
2007 6 30 3407.298 
2007 7 31 3591.258 
2007 8 31 3472.072 
2007 9 30 3178.949 
2007 10 31 3169.478 
2007 11 30 3117.438 
2007 12 31 3013.099 
2008 1 31 3039.837 
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2008 2 29 2896.636 
2008 3 31 3074.649 
2008 4 30 3060.1 
2008 5 31 3339.104 
2008 6 30 3251.468 
2008 7 31 3509.86 
2008 8 31 3482.334 
2008 9 30 3131.321 
2008 10 31 3143.309 
2008 11 30 2946.993 
2008 12 31 2833.37 
2009 1 31 2848.715 
2009 2 28 2657.528 
2009 3 31 2918.675 
2009 4 30 2917.041 
2009 5 31 3307.757 
2009 6 30 3447.896 
2009 7 31 3557.432 
2009 8 31 3291.607 
2009 9 30 3138.928 
2009 10 31 3180.435 
2009 11 30 3053.875 
2009 12 31 3042.411 
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B2. Monthly averaged price data for Hayward, Benmore and Otahuhu from 
October 1996 until December 2009 (all prices are in New Zealand Dollars) 
(MCo 2010)
Year Hayward Benmore  Otahuhu 
Oct-1996 39.01 31.16 34.78 
Nov-1996 42.74 28.17 50.23 
Dec-1996 36.45 26.25 42.07 
Jan-1997 40.99 31.65 47.74 
Feb-1997 49.56 46.05 55.19 
Mar-1997 49.92 47.29 53.79 
Apr-1997 46.43 43.74 50.43 
May-1997 49.17 46.55 52.86 
Jun-1997 58.25 57.39 59.01 
Jul-1997 57.91 58.18 57.25 
Aug-1997 44.02 41.39 47.60 
Sep-1997 27.52 25.29 30.79 
Oct-1997 38.89 37.11 42.21 
Nov-1997 38.75 35.92 43.74 
Dec-1997 38.93 33.91 46.59 
Jan-1998 41.03 34.91 49.97 
Feb-1998 39.11 26.95 49.68 
Mar-1998 32.65 17.48 39.67 
Apr-1998 32.40 24.26 39.66 
May-1998 33.98 29.69 39.75 
Jun-1998 33.74 30.86 38.45 
Jul-1998 36.31 33.64 42.80 
Aug-1998 34.47 32.45 40.41 
Sep-1998 35.35 33.11 41.63 
Oct-1998 42.19 38.51 50.10 
Nov-1998 26.94 25.29 31.70 
Dec-1998 32.32 30.52 38.40 
Jan-1999 42.08 40.01 54.98 
Feb-1999 55.92 52.48 66.62 
Mar-1999 61.35 57.19 79.75 
Apr-1999 15.30 13.60 18.35 
May-1999 26.50 22.06 31.31 
Jun-1999 40.53 37.15 45.35 
Jul-1999 25.62 23.76 33.63 
Aug-1999 31.12 29.57 37.13 
Sep-1999 24.73 23.67 27.36 
Oct-1999 46.42 45.61 48.84 
Nov-1999 16.29 15.20 20.93 
Dec-1999 19.32 18.51 21.33 
Jan-2000 23.99 22.75 25.64 
Feb-2000 25.45 23.74 27.43 
Mar-2000 36.65 33.83 38.29 
Apr-2000 37.84 35.93 39.96 
May-2000 41.03 38.60 45.89 
Jun-2000 38.05 34.85 48.52 
Jul-2000 28.95 26.58 35.33 
Aug-2000 33.29 29.56 44.81 
Sep-2000 33.80 30.06 46.78 
Oct-2000 25.17 20.46 47.35 
Nov-2000 33.80 30.17 53.90 
Dec-2000 32.61 28.41 42.87 
Jan-2001 35.83 32.67 50.30 
Feb-2001 46.28 43.79 50.13 
Mar-2001 51.78 50.21 52.91 
Apr-2001 67.40 64.61 67.28 
May-2001 75.50 74.50 73.92 
Jun-2001 166.11 169.71 148.97 
Jul-2001 236.79 238.22 219.78 
Aug-2001 111.29 127.26 99.25 
Sep-2001 55.79 56.41 52.85 
Oct-2001 48.97 48.60 48.05 
Nov-2001 43.54 42.04 45.91 
Dec-2001 16.12 10.58 21.47 
Jan-2002 29.83 16.08 37.81 
Feb-2002 34.76 32.53 37.97 
Mar-2002 44.34 42.59 46.60 
Apr-2002 70.75 69.29 69.15 
May-2002 58.85 58.18 58.22 
Jun-2002 47.35 47.13 45.79 
Jul-2002 33.09 32.16 33.81 
Aug-2002 34.57 33.66 35.27 
Sep-2002 24.64 21.14 28.31 
Oct-2002 23.36 15.45 27.96 
Nov-2002 30.91 24.91 36.94 
Dec-2002 49.41 36.53 61.24 
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Jan-2003 55.50 45.18 66.13 
Feb-2003 87.21 78.13 93.11 
Mar-2003 154.29 149.22 160.41 
Apr-2003 204.06 199.10 202.25 
May-2003 127.61 126.39 122.48 
Jun-2003 65.56 63.42 66.83 
Jul-2003 58.51 56.20 61.34 
Aug-2003 64.81 63.89 64.44 
Sep-2003 51.85 50.51 53.03 
Oct-2003 32.32 28.68 36.59 
Nov-2003 48.45 43.56 54.11 
Dec-2003 45.77 41.52 49.44 
Jan-2004 69.57 49.06 75.78 
Feb-2004 13.56 10.52 16.12 
Mar-2004 29.70 10.43 33.90 
Apr-2004 46.35 44.16 45.70 
May-2004 44.17 42.55 45.54 
Jun-2004 33.49 27.22 36.34 
Jul-2004 26.10 17.74 28.61 
Aug-2004 39.47 26.88 33.11 
Sep-2004 29.71 26.74 32.84 
Oct-2004 35.81 34.14 37.99 
Nov-2004 36.08 34.03 38.01 
Dec-2004 40.23 34.59 43.65 
Jan-2005 31.18 28.46 34.64 
Feb-2005 73.14 64.97 80.16 
Mar-2005 62.57 54.42 69.60 
Apr-2005 60.90 56.75 64.48 
May-2005 70.25 68.88 70.86 
Jun-2005 80.07 79.09 78.93 
Jul-2005 78.94 78.65 77.02 
Aug-2005 73.49 72.04 73.62 
Sep-2005 70.29 68.47 70.39 
Oct-2005 70.20 70.26 65.68 
Nov-2005 103.40 102.31 106.06 
Dec-2005 116.20 117.05 117.33 
Jan-2006 92.13 90.60 92.98 
Feb-2006 101.84 105.54 100.97 
Mar-2006 160.75 161.30 155.60 
Apr-2006 129.54 135.30 120.75 
May-2006 69.37 69.20 67.24 
Jun-2006 82.28 80.86 81.66 
Jul-2006 69.76 69.92 67.70 
Aug-2006 65.53 68.22 60.50 
Sep-2006 61.01 61.71 58.25 
Oct-2006 49.58 48.19 50.06 
Nov-2006 39.34 34.99 42.05 
Dec-2006 20.41 15.81 22.00 
Jan-2007 25.45 21.52 29.70 
Feb-2007 41.10 38.42 43.02 
Mar-2007 57.67 55.64 60.25 
Apr-2007 61.25 59.09 62.11 
May-2007 71.64 71.59 68.85 
Jun-2007 68.84 68.75 66.59 
Jul-2007 64.29 64.79 61.97 
Aug-2007 50.77 51.52 50.18 
Sep-2007 52.18 52.25 51.21 
Oct-2007 32.67 30.88 33.68 
Nov-2007 38.89 35.42 40.75 
Dec-2007 57.71 59.08 58.44 
Jan-2008 82.28 66.76 83.22 
Feb-2008 137.85 126.28 134.85 
Mar-2008 128.87 118.17 126.32 
Apr-2008 126.24 133.91 119.36 
May-2008 271.72 306.78 237.13 
Jun-2008 305.95 351.05 265.47 
Jul-2008 155.76 170.78 132.64 
Aug-2008 118.05 160.10 88.10 
Sep-2008 49.40 59.36 46.89 
Oct-2008 44.85 40.88 45.23 
Nov-2008 47.85 42.94 50.80 
Dec-2008 29.52 21.45 33.58 
Jan-2009 35.93 9.73 38.93 
Feb-2009 41.08 31.05 44.97 
Mar-2009 39.02 27.06 43.32 
Apr-2009 44.44 31.64 46.72 
May-2009 59.18 4.26 59.02 
Jun-2009 67.04 32.53 70.06 
Jul-2009 60.66 55.02 60.50 
Aug-2009 22.71 15.63 24.18 
Sep-2009 26.67 9.21 28.88 
Oct-2009 39.22 15.16 41.37 
Nov-2009 70.57 66.54 70.82 
Dec-2009 50.80 46.30 55.52 
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B3. Electricity Generation Capacity by Plant Types (MW) 
Source: Energy Data File (Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand 
2009)
Hydro
Geothe
rmal
Biogas Wind
Fuel 
Oil
Diesel
Coal/ 
Gas
Gas
Gas 
/Oil
Sub-
total
1974 3,665   156      -      -      240      180      -      -      -      4,241 76 4,317
1975 3,665   156      -      -      240      180      -      -      -      4,241 83 4,324
1976 3,665   156      -      -      240      180      -      220      600      5,061 83 5,144
1977 3,825   156      -      -      240      180      -      220      600      5,221 83 5,304
1978 3,825   156      -      -      240      494      -      220      600      5,535 88 5,622
1979 4,089   156      -      -      490      494      -      220      600      6,049 88 6,137
1980 4,301   156      -      -      490      494      -      220      600      6,261 88 6,349
1981 4,326   156      -      -      490      494      -      220      600      6,286 107 6,393
1982 4,328   156      -      -      490      494      -      220      600      6,288 107 6,394
1983 4,474   156      -      -      490      494      500      220      600      6,934 107 7,041
1984 4,543   156      -      -      490      494      750      220      600      7,253 107 7,360
1985 4,760   156      -      -      490      494      1,000   220      600      7,720 107 7,827
1986 4,760   156      -      -      490      494      1,000   220      600      7,720 107 7,827
1987 4,760   156      -      -      490      494      1,000   220      600      7,720 143 7,863
1988 4,760   156      -      -      490      314      1,000   220      600      7,540 143 7,683
1989 4,760   273      -      -      490      314      1,000   220      600      7,656 143 7,799
1990 4,760   273      4         -      490      314      1,000   220      600      7,660 143 7,803
1991 4,760   273      7         -      490      314      1,000   220      600      7,663 143 7,806
1992 5,192   273      7         -      250      314      1,000   220      600      7,855 143 7,998
1993 5,192   276      7         0         250      314      1,000   220      600      7,859 143 8,003
1994 5,192   276      7         0         250      314      1,000   220      600      7,859 144 8,003
1995 5,192   276      8         0         250      314      1,000   220      600      7,861 212 8,072
1996 5,192   276      11       4         -      314      1,000   220      600      7,617 217 7,834
1997 5,192   373      11       4         -      -      1,000   220      600      7,401 488 7,888
1998 5,192   383      11       4         -      -      1,000   357      500      7,448 488 7,935
1999 5,199   383      11       36       -      -      1,000   357      400      7,386 483 7,869
2000 5,202   365      11       36       -      -      1,000   737      400      7,751 532 8,283
2001 5,202   365      11       36       -      -      1,000   737      400      7,751 534 8,284
2002 5,342   365      11       36       0         -      1,000   737      400      7,891 518 8,409
2003 5,348   370      18       72       0         -      1,000   737      400      7,945 515 8,460
2004 5,345   370      22       166      0         155      1,000   777      400      8,236 517 8,753
2005 5,346   425      22       168      0         155      1,000   777      300      8,195 556 8,751
2006 5,346   425      23       169      0         155      1,000   787      300      8,206 585 8,792
2007 5,349   443      26       320      0         155      1,000   1,172   300      8,765 631 9,396
2008 5,376   577      27       322      0         155      1,000   1,189   100      8,746 634 9,380
Note:
1) All capacities are net of any plant decommissioning
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APPENDIX C: INPUTS TO THE SOO2008 & SD MODEL 
C1. Existing grid connected power plants (Electricity Commission 2008) 
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C2. Existing significant embedded generation (Electricity Commission 
2008) 
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C3. Build schedules and corresponding capacity stackplots for the five 
scenarios  
Table A1: Build schedules for Sustainable Path (MDS1) 
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Figure A6: Capacity stackplot by fuel and by year for MDS1 (Sustainable Path) 
scenario 
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Table A2: Build schedules for South Island Surplus (MDS2) 
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Figure A7: Capacity stackplot by fuel and by year for MDS2 (South Island Surplus) 
scenario 
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Table A3: Build schedules for Medium Renewables (MDS3) 
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Figure A8: Capacity stackplot by fuel and by year for MDS3 (Medium Renewables) 
scenario 
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Table A4: Build schedules for Demand Side Participation (MDS4) 
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Figure A9: Capacity stackplot by fuel and by year for MDS4 (Demand Side 
Participation) scenario 
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Table A5: Build schedules for High Gas Recovery (MDS5) 
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Figure A10: Capacity stackplot by fuel and by year for MDS5 (High Gas Recovery) 
scenario 
 342 
 
C4. Forecasts of key economic drivers used for demand forecasts in 
SOO2008 
 
Figure A11: Total New Zealand population – mean forecast  
 
Figure A12: Total New Zealand real GDP ($1995/1996) – mean forecast 
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Figure A13: Total New Zealand real GDP ($1995/1996) – percentage growth 
 
 
Figure A14: Average New Zealand household size 
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C5. National energy demand projections – March years (GWh) 
(Electricity Commission 2008) 
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C6. The peak demand forecasts for New Zealand with 80% confidence 
interval  
Table A6: Peak demand forecasts for all scenarios except MDS3 
Year Low 
Medium/ 
baseline High 
2012 7301 7615 7939 
2013 7384 7741 8112 
2014 7468 7870 8284 
2015 7555 8000 8467 
2016 7626 8118 8633 
2017 7706 8239 8800 
2018 7786 8360 8970 
2019 7866 8484 9134 
2020 7951 8609 9304 
2021 8012 8717 9463 
2022 8081 8828 9638 
2023 8146 8939 9806 
2024 8211 9051 9979 
2025 8280 9165 10139 
2026 8347 9277 10306 
2027 8411 9389 10472 
2028 8470 9502 10639 
2029 8533 9616 10805 
2030 8604 9734 10993 
2031 8672 9849 11167 
2032 8737 9963 11332 
2033 8795 10079 11506 
2034 8861 10195 11691 
2035 8914 10314 11867 
2036 8989 10439 12058 
2037 9051 10566 12251 
2038 9114 10695 12465 
2039 9195 10826 12679 
2040 9257 10958 12882 
2041 9328 11090 13093 
2042 9393 11224 13306 
2043 9472 11362 13536 
2044 9530 11493 13749 
2045 9596 11634 13971 
2046 9665 11767 14195 
2047 9725 11902 14426 
2048 9784 12040 14686 
2049 9855 12178 14914 
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Table A7: Peak demand forecasts for MDS3 
Year Low 
Medium/ 
baseline High 
2012 7301 7615 7939 
2013 7384 7741 8112 
2014 7468 7870 8284 
2015 7555 8000 8467 
2016 7626 8118 8633 
2017 7706 8239 8800 
2018 7786 8360 8970 
2019 7866 8484 9134 
2020 7951 8609 9304 
2021 8012 8717 9463 
2022 7981 8728 9538 
2023 7946 8739 9606 
2024 7911 8751 9679 
2025 7880 8765 9739 
2026 7847 8777 9806 
2027 7811 8789 9872 
2028 7870 8902 10039 
2029 7933 9016 10205 
2030 8004 9134 10393 
2031 8072 9249 10567 
2032 8137 9363 10732 
2033 8195 9479 10906 
2034 8261 9595 11091 
2035 8314 9714 11267 
2036 8389 9839 11458 
2037 8451 9966 11651 
2038 8514 10095 11865 
2039 8595 10226 12079 
2040 8657 10358 12282 
2041 8728 10490 12493 
2042 8793 10624 12706 
2043 8872 10762 12936 
2044 8930 10893 13149 
2045 8996 11034 13371 
2046 9065 11167 13595 
2047 9125 11302 13826 
2048 9184 11440 14086 
2049 9255 11578 14314 
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APPENDIX D: INSTALLED GENERATION CAPACITIES 
COMPARISONS FOR DIFFERENT MDS 
D1. Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS1 
 
Figure A15: Results comparison for installed hydro capacity for MDS1 
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Figure A16: Results comparison for installed wind capacity for MDS1 
 
 
 
Figure A17: Results comparison for installed geothermal capacity for MDS1 
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Figure A18: Results comparison for installed cogen capacity for MDS1 
 
 
Figure A19: Results comparison for installed wave capacity for MDS1 
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Figure A20: Results comparison for installed IGCC capacity for MDS1 
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D2. Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS2 
 
 
Figure A21: Results comparison for installed hydro capacity for MDS2 
 
 
Figure A22: Results comparison for installed wind capacity for MDS2 
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Figure A23: Results comparison for installed geothermal  capacity for MDS2 
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D3. Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS3 
 
 
Figure A24: Results comparison for installed hydro capacity for MDS3 
 
 
Figure A25:Results comparison for installed geothermal capacity for MDS3 
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Figure A26: Results comparison for installed CCGT capacity for MDS3 
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D4. Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS1 
 
Figure A27: Results comparison for installed hydro capacity for MDS4 
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D5. Installed generation capacities comparisons for MDS5 
 
 
 
Figure A28: Results comparison for installed hydro capacity for MDS5 
 
 
Figure A29: Results comparison for installed wind capacity for MDS5 
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Figure A30: Results comparison for installed geothermal capacity for MDS5 
 
 
Figure A31: Results comparison for installed cogen capacity for MDS5 
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Appendix E – Simulation results from the sensitivity analyses  
E1.Variations in delays and development duration 
 
Figure A1: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS1 
 
 
Figure A2: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS2 
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Figure A3: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS3 
 
 
Figure A4: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS3 
 
 
Figure A5: Impacts of delays on the installed capacities for MDS3 
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E1.2 Impacts of delays on ECM 
 
 
 
Figure A6: Impacts of delays on ECMs under MDS1 
 
 
 
Figure A7: Impacts of delays on ECMs under MDS2 
368 
 
 
 
Figure A8: Impacts of delays on ECMs under MDS3 
 
 
 
Figure A9: Impacts of delays on ECMs under MDS4 
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Figure A10: Impacts of delays on ECMs under MDS5 
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E1.3 Impacts of delays on CM 
 
 
Figure A11: Impacts of delays on CMs under MDS1 
 
 
 
Figure A12: Impacts of delays on CMs under MDS2 
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Figure A13:  Impacts of delays on CMs under MDS3 
 
 
Figure A14: Impacts of delays on CMs under MDS4 
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Figure A15: Impacts of delays on CMs under MDS5 
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E2.Variations in forecasted load  
E2.1 Impacts of variations in forecasted load on total installed 
generation capacities 
 
Figure A16: Impacts of load forecast variations on total installed generation capacities 
under MDS1 
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Figure A17: Impacts of load forecast variations on total installed generation capacities 
under MDS2 
 
 
Figure A18: Impacts of load forecast variations on total installed generation capacities 
under MDS3 
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Figure A19: Impacts of load forecast variations on total installed generation capacities 
under MDS4 
 
 
Figure A20: Impacts of load forecast variations on total installed generation capacities 
under MDS5 
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E2.2 Impacts of variations in forecasted load on total installed generation 
capacities 
 
 
 
Figure A21: Impacts of load forecast variations on ECMs capacities under MDS1 
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Figure A22: Impacts of load forecast variations on ECMs capacities under MDS2 
 
 
Figure A23:  Impacts of load forecast variations on ECMs capacities under MDS3 
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Figure A24: Impacts of load forecast variations on ECMs capacities under MDS4 
 
 
Figure A25: Impacts of load forecast variations on ECMs capacities under MDS5 
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E2.3 Impacts of variations in forecasted load on total installed generation 
capacities 
 
 
Figure A26: Impacts of load forecast variations on CMs capacities under MDS1 
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Figure A27: Impacts of load forecast variations on CMs capacities under MDS2 
 
Figure A28: Impacts of load forecast variations on CMs capacities under MDS3 
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Figure A29: Impacts of load forecast variations on CMs capacities under MDS4 
 
Figure A30: Impacts of load forecast variations on CMs capacities under MDS
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Appendix F: Full Vensim SD Model Used in this Study 
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Figure A. 62: Model for hydro plants development 
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Figure A. 63: Model for pumped storage plants development 
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Figure A. 64: Model for OCGT plants development 
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Figure A. 65: Model for CCGT plant development 
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Figure A. 66: Model for coal plant development 
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Figure A. 67: Model for IGCC plants development 
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Figure A.68: Model for geothermal plants development 
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Figure A. 69: Model for cogeneration plants development 
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Figure A. 70: Model for wave plants development 
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Figure A. 1: Model for wind plants development 
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Figure A. 72: Model for calculating total capacity and comparing the SD model output against GEM output 
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Figure A. 73: Model to calculate energy generation outputs of GEM (to make comparison with SD model outputs) 
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Figure A. 74: Model to determine market price 
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